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Privacy Protection(ism): The Latest Wave 
of Trade Constraints on Regulatory 
Autonomy 
SVETLANA YAKOVLEVA* 
Countries spend billions of dollars each year to 
strengthen their discursive power to shape international pol-
icy debates. They do so because in public policy conversa-
tions labels and narratives matter enormously. The “digital 
protectionism” label has been used in the last decade as a 
tool to gain the policy upper hand in digital trade policy de-
bates about cross-border flows of personal and other data. 
Using the Foucauldian framework of discourse analysis, this 
Article brings a unique perspective on this topic. The Article 
makes two central arguments. First, the Article argues that 
the term “protectionism” is not endowed with an inherent 
meaning but is socially constructed by the power of dis-
course used in international negotiations, and in the inter-
pretation and application of international trade policy and 
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rules. In other words, there are as many definitions of “(dig-
ital) protectionism” as there are discourses. The U.S. and 
E.U. “digital trade” discourses illustrate this point. Using 
the same term, those trading partners advance utterly differ-
ent discourses and agendas: an economic discourse with 
economic efficiency as the main benchmark (United States), 
and a more multidisciplinary discourse where both eco-
nomic efficiency and protection of fundamental rights are 
equally important (European Union). Second, based on a de-
tailed evaluation of the economic “digital trade” discourse, 
the Article contends that the coining of the term “digital pro-
tectionism” to refer to domestic information governance 
policies not yet fully covered by trade law disciplines is not 
a logical step to respond to objectively changing circum-
stances, but rather a product of that discourse, which is com-
ing to dominate U.S.-led international trade negotiations. 
The Article demonstrates how this redefinition of “protec-
tionism” has already resulted in the adoption of interna-
tional trade rules in recent trade agreements further restrict-
ing domestic autonomy to protect the rights to privacy and 
the protection of personal data. The Article suggests that the 
distinction between privacy and personal data protection 
and protectionism is a moral question, not a question of eco-
nomic efficiency. Therefore, when a policy conversation, 
such as the one on cross-border data flows, involves non-
economic spill-over effects to individual rights, such conver-
sation should not be confined within the straightjacket of 
trade economics, but rather placed in a broader normative 
perspective. Finally, the Article argues that, in conducting 
recently restarted multilateral negotiations on electronic 
commerce at the World Trade Organization, countries 
should rethink the goals of international trade for the 
twenty-first century. Such goals should determine and define 
the discourse, not the other way around. The discussion 
should not be about what “protectionism” means but about 
how far domestic regimes are willing to let trade rules inter-
fere in their autonomy to protect their societal, cultural, and 
political values. 
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Labels and framing matter in public policy discussions. So much 
so, in fact, that they often dictate the outcome of the discourse. For 
example, China spent billions of dollars a year over the past several 
years to strengthen its discursive power to shape specific interna-
tional policy debates,1 especially in artificial intelligence (“AI”), 
which is an area where countries race for global technological and 
policy dominance.2 Similarly, the “digital protectionism” label has 
                                                                                                             
 1 David Shambaugh, China’s Soft-Power Push: The Search for Respect, 
FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 2015, at 99, 99–100. 
China’s diplomatic and development schemes form just one 
part of a much broader agenda aimed at enhancing its soft 
power in media, publishing, education, the arts, sports, and 
other domains. Nobody knows for sure how much China spends 
on these activities, but analysts estimate that the annual budget 
for “external propaganda” runs in the neighborhood of $10 bil-
lion annually. By contrast, the U.S. Department of State spent 
$666 million on public diplomacy in fiscal year 2014. 
Id. See Hung-jen Wang, Contextualizing China’s Call for Discourse Power in 
International Politics, CHINA: INT’L J., Dec. 2015, at 172, 173 n.4. (“Point 5 in 
Section 7 of ‘Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 
on Major Issues Pertaining to Deeping Reform of the Cultural System and Pro-
moting the Great Development and Flouring of Social Culture’ states that China 
needs to ‘strengthen international discourse power, and properly respond to exter-
nal world concerns.’”); see also JACOB TURNER, ROBOT RULES: REGULATING 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 234–35 (2019) (citing recommendation III from Chap-
ter 6 of China’s “Artificial Intelligence Standardization White Paper” of January 
18, 2018, which advocates “promotion of international standardization work on 
artificial intelligence, gathering domestic resources for research and development, 
participating in the development of international standards, and improving inter-
national discourse power.”) (emphasis added); Paul SN Lee, The Rise of China 
and Its Contest for Discursive Power, 1 GLOBAL MEDIA & CHINA 102, 113 (2016) 
(“Since Xi took over the reins of power in 2013, there have been signs of a shift 
in China’s foreign policy from one that accommodates the existing international 
rules to a policy that makes new rules and institutions on China’s terms.”). 
 2 See, e.g., Tim Dutton, An Overview of National AI Strategies, MEDIUM 
(June 28, 2018), https://medium.com/politics-ai/an-overview-of-national-ai-strat-
egies-2a70ec6edfd (illustrating the global race for artificial intelligence (“AI”) 
dominance by the fact that between 2016 and 2018 Canada, China, Denmark, the 
E.U. Commission, Finland, France, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Nordic-Baltic 
region, Singapore, South Korea, Sweden, Taiwan, the United Arab Emirates, and 
the United Kingdom published their strategies on AI). 
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been used in the last decade as a tool to gain control in the domain 
of “digital trade”3 policy debate in relation to personal data protec-
tion, and specifically to influence policy outcomes in the European 
Union, where privacy and personal data are well protected.4 Perhaps 
even too well protected for those whose business models turn on 
personal data.5 The view that domestic restrictions on international 
flows of data generally, and more specifically of personal data, is a 
form of protectionism is now front and center as the focus of inter-
national trade negotiations shift to digital trade.6 From this angle, 
unrestricted cross-border data flows promise global economic 
growth, and are often perceived as a bonum in se.7 However, the 
tendency of international trade law to liberalize international data 
flows appears to be at odds with some domestic legal regimes that 
restrict such flows on privacy and data protection grounds, espe-
cially in the European Union.8 As a result, the data flow issue has 
                                                                                                             
 3 There is no universally-accepted definition of “digital trade”. See Susan 
Ariel Aaronson & Patrick Leblond, Another Digital Divide: The Rise of Data 
Realm and Its Implications for the WTO, 21 J. INT’L ECON. L. 245, 248 (2018) 
(citing Javier López González & Marie-Agnes Jouanjean, Digital Trade: Devel-
oping a Framework for Analysis, at 6, OECD TRADE POLICY PAPERS No. 205 
(July 27, 2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/524c8c83-en) (defining “digital trade” 
as encompassing “digitally-enabled transactions in trade in goods and services 
that can be either digitally or physically delivered involving consumers, firms, 
and governments.”). For the purposes of this Article, I will use this term as defined 
by Aaronson & Leblond, id.  
 4 See infra Part II.A. 
 5 See Carole Cadwalladr & Duncan Campbell, Revealed: Facebook’s Global 
Lobbying Against Data Privacy Laws, GUARDIAN (Mar. 2, 2019, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/mar/02/facebook-global-lobby-
ing-campaign-against-data-privacy-laws-investment (revealing Facebook’s lob-
bying around the world, particularly in the United Kingdom, against data privacy 
legislation). 
 6 See infra Part II.C. 
 7 See infra Part II.B. 
 8 See, e.g., PETER SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: 
WORLD DATA FLOWS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY 
DIRECTIVE 188–93 (1998); ROLF H. WEBER & DOMINIC STAIGER, 
TRANSATLANTIC DATA PROTECTION IN PRACTICE 58–59 (2017); Lucas 
Bergkamp, EU Data Protection Policy: The Privacy Fallacy: Adverse Effects of 
Europe’s Data Protection Policy in an Information-Driven Economy, 18 
COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 31, 39–40 (2002); Joel R. Reidenberg, E-Com-
merce and Trans-Atlantic Privacy, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 717, 735–38 (2001); Svet-
lana Yakovleva & Kristina Irion, The Best of Both Worlds? Free Trade in Services 
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become “the new battlefield”9 of domestic legal regimes, not only 
between the United States and the European Union, but also be-
tween the European Union and its other trading partners.10 
                                                                                                             
and EU Law on Privacy and Data Protection, 2 EUR. DATA PROTECTION L. REV. 
191, 202–07 (2016). But see Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protec-
tion: The Impact of EU and International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Pri-
vacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 46–51 (2000) (arguing that a hypothetical 
U.S. claim regarding World Trade Organization inconsistency of European Un-
ion’s framework for personal data transfers “would likely not prevail”); Maria 
Veronica Perez Asinari, Is There Any Room for Privacy and Data Protection 
Within the WTO Rules?, 9 ELECTRONIC COMM. L. REV. 249, 277 (2002); Yi-
Hsuan Chen, The EU Data Protection Law Reform: Challenges for Service Trade 
Liberalization and Possible Approaches for Harmonizing Privacy Standards into 
the Context of GATS, 19 SPANISH Y.B. INT’L L. 211, 218–19 (2015) (admitting 
that, although the E.U. regime for transfers of personal data may violate the Eu-
ropean Union’s WTO commitments, such violation can be justified under the gen-
eral exception). 
 9 Mira Burri, The Regulation of Data Flows Through Trade Agreements, 48 
GEO. J. INT’L L. 407, 408 (2017) [hereinafter Burri, The Regulation of Data 
Flows]. 
 10 For example, provisions on cross-border flows of information, including 
personal data, have been a contentious point in the negotiations of the Economic 
Partnership Agreement between the European Union and Japan (“JEFTA”). See 
MARIJA BARTL & KRISTINA IRION, UNIV. OF AMSTERDAM, THE JAPAN EU 
ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT: FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA TO THE LAND 
OF THE RISING SUN 2 (2017), https://pure.uva.nl/ws/files/21047289/Trans-
fer_of_personal_data_to_the_land_of_the_rising_sun_FINAL.pdf. Not being 
able to reach an agreement in trade negotiations, instead of such provisions, the 
parties included a three-years review clause in the final version of the agreement. 
Aaronson & Leblond, supra note 3, at 261. Cross-border flows of personal data 
from the European Union to Japan were ultimately regulated through a mutual 
adequacy decision. Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/419 of 23 
January 2019 Pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2016 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on the Adequate Protection of Personal Data by Japan Under the 
Act on the Protection of Personal Information, 2019 O.J. (C 304) 1, 2. For its data 
protection to be recognized as “adequate” under E.U. law, Japan has amended its 
legislation and has undertaken additional commitments in the adequacy decision. 
Id. at 2–3. The adequacy decision was adopted on January 23, 2019, shortly before 
JEFTA took effect. European Commission Press Release IP/19/421, European 
Commission Adopts Adequacy Decision on Japan, Creating the World’s Largest 
Area of Safe Data Flows (Jan. 23, 2019). 
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“‘Protectionism’ has become a dirty word.”11 Yet, discursively, 
that is far from obvious: in a broader societal context, the term “pro-
tection” (the root of “protectionism”) is often seen in a positive light, 
especially when it refers to shelter, safety, or harm prevention. But 
when it comes to protecting privacy and personal data, trade policy 
and fundamental rights discourses often seem to work on separate, 
parallel tracks. Paraphrasing Yale Law School Professor Daniel 
Esty, while the word “protection” “warms the hearts” of those see-
ing data protection and privacy as fundamental rights, it “sends 
chills down the spines of free traders.”12 
This Article asks where we should draw the line between pro-
tection and (digital) protectionism. Set against a discursive backdrop 
where the label “protectionism,” or “digital protectionism,” is in-
creasingly used in academic, societal, and political debates to refer 
to regulation that aims to protect privacy and personal data,13 this 
Article considers the implications of this distinction for the auton-
omy afforded to domestic regulators to protect privacy and personal 
data by international trade rules and the rules’ interpretation. Fur-
ther, it asks how the framing of the debate on privacy and data pro-
tection in terms of (digital) protectionism affects the normative 
foundations of domestic regulation on privacy and personal data, 
and the optimal level of privacy and personal data protection. 
This Article tackles these questions through the application of 
“discourse analysis,”14 channeling the work of Michel Foucault, 
                                                                                                             
 11 DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX: DEMOCRACY AND THE 
FUTURE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 252 (2011). 
 12 See DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND 
THE FUTURE 36 (1994) (Emphasizing the “clash of cultures” between environmen-
talists and free traders and noting that “the word ‘protection’ warms the hearts of 
environmentalists but sends chills down the spines of free traders.”). 
 13 See infra Section II.C. 
 14 See JAMES PAUL GEE, AN INTRODUCTION TO DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: 
THEORY AND METHOD 8 (3d ed. 2010) (ebook). 
Discourse analysis is the study of language-in-use. There are 
many different approaches to discourse analysis . . . . Some of 
them look only at the “content” of the language being used, the 
themes or issues being discussed in a conversation or a news-
paper article, for example. Other approaches pay more attention 
to the structure of language (“grammar”) and how this structure 
functions to make meaning in specific contexts. These ap-
proaches are rooted in the discipline of linguistics. 
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whose leading scholarship underscores the relationship between dis-
course and power.15 According to Foucault, discourse is a “system 
that makes possible and governs” the formation of knowledge; it 
predetermines the objects of knowledge, statements, concepts, and 
theoretical options as well as the rules of their production.16 Dis-
                                                                                                             
Id.  
 15 See, e.g., Seumas Miller, Foucault on Discourse and Power, THEORIA: J. 
SOC. AND POL. THEORY, Oct. 1990, at 115, 120–25. 
 16 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE 
DISCOURSE OF LANGUAGE 72 (A. M. Sheridan Smith trans., Pantheon Books, 
1972) (1971) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, ARCHEOLOGY]. 
We set out with an observation: with the unity of a discourse 
like that of clinical medicine, or political economy, or Natural 
History, we are dealing with a dispersion of elements. This dis-
persion itself- with its gaps, its discontinuities, its entangle-
ments, its incompatibilities, its replacements, and its substitu-
tions - can be described in its uniqueness if one is able to deter-
mine the specific rules in accordance with which its objects, 
statements, concepts, and theoretical options have been formed: 
if there really is a unity, it does not lie in the visible, horizontal 
coherence of the elements formed; it resides, well anterior to 
their formation, in the system that makes possible and governs 
that formation. 
Id. According to Foucault, “[I]n every society the production of discourse is at 
once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed according to a certain num-
ber of procedures, whose role is to ward off its powers and its dangers, to gain 
mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality.” 
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF DISCOURSE (1971), reprinted in UNTYING 
THE TEXT: A POST-STRUCTURALIST READER 52 (Robert Young ed., 1981) [here-
inafter FOUCAULT, DISCOURSE]. See also Julia Black, Regulatory Conversations, 
29 J.L. & SOC’Y 163, 168 (2002). 
Foucault, for example, whose influence is strong, conceptual-
ized discourse as a group of statements that provided the rules 
for representing the knowledge about a particular topic at a par-
ticular historical moment. Discourse is about the production of 
knowledge, and itself produces the objects of our knowledge. It 
governs the way that a topic can and cannot be meaningfully 
talked and reasoned about, and influences how ideas are put into 
practice and used to regulate the conduct of others . . . . Neither 
contends that nothing exists outside of discourse, that things do 
not have a real, material existence in the world, but rather that 
nothing has any meaning outside of discourse. 
Id. See also Iara Lesser, Discursive Struggles Within Social Welfare: Restaging 
Teen Motherhood, 36 BRIT. J. SOC. WORK 283, 285 (2006) (defining discourses 
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course is not determined once and for all—it controls the very pro-
duction of knowledge at a particular moment in history and can 
evolve over time.17 Discourse has power to “mediate the dominant 
view of what constitutes normality or deviance” and to “produce[] 
behaviour that is in conformity with the dominant standard of nor-
mality or acceptability.”18 Language, as Julia Black puts it, “frames 
thought, and produces and reproduces knowledge” and is “inti-
mately related to power.”19 The use of language places the produc-
tion of knowledge in a particular discourse, which defines the mean-
ing of terms according to shared practices in line with ideologies of 
the social groups controlling the discourse.20 In other words, control 
over discourse ultimately translates into control over the production 
of “truth” at a particular point in time, and allows to suppress the 
views outside of the prevailing discourse. The power of discourse, 
or discursive power, is often mentioned in academic, political, and 
                                                                                                             
as “systems of thoughts composed of ideas, attitudes, courses of actions, beliefs 
and practices that systematically construct the subjects and the worlds of which 
they speak.”). 
 17 See FOUCAULT, ARCHEOLOGY, supra note 16, at 73. 
As a group of rules for a discursive practice, the system of for-
mation is not a stranger to time. It does not concentrate every-
thing that may appear through an age-old series of statements 
into an initial point that is, at the same time, beginning, origin, 
foundation, system of axioms, and on the basis of which the 
events of real history have merely to unfold in a quite necessary 
way . . . . A discursive formation, then, does not play the role of 
a figure that arrests time and freezes it for decades or centuries; 
it determines a regularity proper to temporal processes; it pre-
sents the principle of articulation between a series of discursive 
events and other series of events, transformations, mutations, 
and processes. It is not an atemporal form, but a schema of cor-
respondence between several temporal series. 
Id. 
 18 Ivan Manokha, Foucault’s Concept of Power and the Global Discourse of 
Human Rights, 23 GLOBAL SOC’Y 429, 430 (2009). 
 19 Black, supra note 16, at 165. 
 20 Id. at 165–69. See also Teun A. Van Dijk, Ideology and Discourse Analy-
sis, 11 J. POL. IDEOLOGIES 115, 138 (2006) (“Defined as socially shared represen-
tations of groups, ideologies are the foundations of group attitudes and other be-
liefs, and thus also control the ‘biased’ personal mental models that underlie the 
production of ideological discourse.”). 
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journalistic sources in the context of international relations,21 do-
mestic trade policy formation,22 and the functioning of international 
organizations.23 As noted above, states (or governments) use discur-
sive power to advance certain narratives and to shape international 
discourses and rules on particular topics. In a narrower sense, dis-
course can also be controlled by “disciplines” or, put differently, by 
social groups practicing such disciplines.24 
Julia Black’s work shows that discourse forms the basis of reg-
ulation in several respects: it influences regulation by, inter alia, de-
fining the problem and operational categories; it determines the 
goals that regulation aims to achieve; and it “produces shared mean-
ings as to regulatory norms and social practices which then form the 
basis for action (for example, the formation of regulatory interpre-
tive communities).”25 Discourse analysis is, thus, a particularly use-
ful tool to trace how and why the definition of “protectionism” 
evolved, and how the interpretation of the legal norms embedding 
this term in the body of international trade law have evolved over 
time, especially because international trade rules are often phrased 
in broad and ambiguous terms,26 which are operationalized through 
interpretation by the adjudicating bodies (in case of World Trade 
                                                                                                             
 21 See, e.g., CHARLOTTE EPSTEIN, THE POWER OF WORDS IN INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 2–4, 11–14, 16, 19–20, 22–23 (Peter M. Haas & Sheila Jasanoff eds., 
2008); A.J. Paolini, Foucault, Realism and the Power Discourse in International 
Relations, 28 AUSTL. J. POL. SCI. 98, 98–99 (1993); Jennifer Milliken, The Study 
of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods, 5 
EUR. J. INT’L REL. 225, 225–26 (1999). 
 22 See, e.g., Gabriel Siles-Brügge, The Power of Economic Ideas: A Con-
structivist Political Economy of EU Trade Policy, 9 J. CONTEMP. EUR. RES. 597, 
605–13 (2013). 
 23 See, e.g., Dongsheng Zang, Divided by Common Language: ‘Capture’ 
Theories in GATT/WTO and the Communicative Impasse, 32 HASTINGS INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 423, 425–28 (2009) [hereinafter Zang, Divided by Common Lan-
guage].  
 24 FOUCAULT, DISCOURSE, supra note 16, at 59–60. By “discipline,” Foucault 
meant “a domain of objects, a set of methods, a corpus of propositions considered 
to be true, a play of rules and definitions, of techniques and instruments.” Id. Ac-
cording to Foucault, a discipline controls the production of discourse by recog-
nizing true and false propositions within itself, thus pushing back “a whole tera-
tology of knowledge beyond its margins.” Id. 
 25 Black, supra note 16, at 165, 178, 188. 
 26 See infra Section I.A. 
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Organization (“WTO”) law, by the WTO Panels and Appellate 
Body). 
The Article makes two arguments using the theoretical frame-
work of Foucauldian discourse analysis to answer the questions for-
mulated above. First, this Article argues that “protectionism” is not 
endowed with an inherent meaning but is socially constructed by the 
power of discourse controlling the negotiation, application, and in-
terpretation of anti-protectionist international trade policy and rules. 
It explicates how shifts in the dominant discourse in the past resulted 
in redefining protectionism as “new protectionism,” which triggered 
the expansion of the scope of domestic policies viewed as protec-
tionist by international trade institutions and elites and, respectively, 
the shrinking of domestic autonomy to regulate in the public inter-
est. By extrapolating these historical insights to current policy con-
versations surrounding digital trade negotiations by the European 
Union and the United States (referred to here as “digital trade” dis-
course(s)), this Article shows that, despite the fact that both the E.U. 
and the U.S. rhetoric on the issue are centered around the same term, 
“digital protectionism,” the trading partners advance different dis-
courses based on diverging values, which translate to a different 
baseline between privacy and data protection and protectionism. 
Second, this Article contends that coining the term “digital protec-
tionism” to refer to domestic information governance policies that 
are not yet fully covered by trade law disciplines is not a logical step 
to respond to objectively changing circumstances, but a product of 
a certain economic “digital trade” discourse, advanced, in particu-
lar, by the United States. This Article then demonstrates how the 
shift from “protectionism” to “digital protectionism” has already re-
sulted in the adoption of international trade rules further restricting 
domestic autonomy to protect the rights to privacy and the protec-
tion of personal data.  
This Article also suggests that the discourse controlling regula-
tory conversations on privacy and personal data protection predeter-
mines the baseline between privacy protection and protectionism 
and, as a result, affects the level of such protection considered to be 
optimal and legitimate from a trade perspective. The optimal level 
of protection is determined by the benchmarks of economic utility 
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maximization within the economic discourse of digital trade.27 Any 
protection beyond what is economically efficient is viewed as pro-
tectionist.28 Therefore, conducting policy conversations on domes-
tic regulation protecting privacy and personal data within the bound-
aries of a purely economic “digital trade” discourse puts such regu-
lation in an a priori defensive position.29 In contrast, within a mul-
tidisciplinary discourse, which internalizes non-economic grounds 
for protecting privacy and personal data as fundamental rights, the 
optimal level of protection will be higher.30 As a result, some of the 
policies viewed as protectionist in the digital trade discourse will be 
viewed as protection. Image One illustrates this point: 
                                                                                                             
 27 See Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Kikolaud Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy 
Law, 106 GEO L.J. 115, 117, 119, 121–23, 127, 130, 132, 136–137, 157, 178 
(2017). 
 28 See Susan Strange, Protectionism and World Politics, 39 INT’L ORG. 233, 
235 (1985); see also Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 28, at 118 (“In the United 
States, there has been scepticism about E.U. privacy rights and whether they are 
merely disguised protectionism.”). 
 29 See, e.g., EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY, 
U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF GETTING DATA 
PROTECTION RIGHT: PROTECTING PRIVACY, TRANSMITTING DATA, MOVING 
COMMERCE 4–9, 20–21 (2013), https://www.uschamber.com/sites/de-
fault/files/documents/files/020508_EconomicImportance_Final_Revised_lr.pdf. 
 30 See, e.g., Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 27, at 121 (comparing the Euro-
pean Union’s multidisciplinary, fundamental rights-based approach to data pro-
tection with the United States’ consumer-based approach). 





Against this backdrop, this Article asserts that countries should 
be conscious of the value frameworks that come with a certain dis-
course and should ensure that their mutual values determine the dis-
course, as opposed to the other way around. 
On January 25, 2019, seventy-six members of the WTO 
launched talks on electronic commerce, which, among other things, 
will cover rules on cross-border flows of data.31 This multilateral 
dialog, having emerged within the discourse(s) of digital trade, aims 
at “long-standing, high-standard trade principles to digital trade.”32 
                                                                                                             
 31 See 76 WTO Partners Launch Talks on E-commerce, EUR. COMM’N (Jan. 
25, 2019), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1974&title=76-
WTO-members-launch-talks-on-e-commerce; Kimberley Botwright, Davos Par-
ticipants Call for Digital Trade Deal, WORLD ECON. F. (Jan. 23, 2019), 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/01/davos-participants-call-for-digital-
trade-deal/; Rana Foroohar, Nations Move to Avoid Global Ecommerce ‘Splinter-
net’, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/3a8b7458-1fe5-
11e9-b2f7-97e4dbd3580d. See also Adam Behsudi, WTO E-Commerce Talks 
Could Be a Long Slog, POLITICO (Nov. 8, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.polit-
ico.com/newsletters/morning-trade/2019/11/08/wto-e-commerce-talks-could-be-
a-long-slog-782169 (indicating that e-commerce talks are likely to take a very 
long time). 
 32 Botwright, supra note 31. 
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The parties to these negotiations include countries and regions that 
have different domestic policy priorities and that are situated at dif-
ferent levels of the ladder of economic development—Australia, 
China, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, the United States, 
and Russia are examples.33 This Article suggests that, to be able to 
yield any meaningful results, the parties to this multilateral effort 
should not proceed from the dominant discourse of digital trade as a 
starting point. Instead, first and foremost, the parties to the effort 
should agree on the goals of the international trading system in the 
digital age and the place afforded to essential domestic policy goals 
in this system. Negotiations conducted within a discourse based on 
such a mutual understanding would have a much higher chance of 
producing meaningful results. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I focuses on the most im-
portant milestones in the evolution of the notion of “protectionism” 
from the mid-eighteenth century until the early-twenty-first century 
using the lens of discourse analysis. Part II discusses the controversy 
around the E.U. restrictions on cross-border data flows and intro-
duces the discourse of digital trade labelling any such restriction as 
“(digital) protectionism.” Then, it extrapolates the logic of recon-
struction of the term “protectionism” on the claims to redefine “pro-
tectionism” as “digital protectionism.” Part III explicates how dis-
course affects the baseline between privacy protection and protec-
tionism and predetermines the underlying normative rationale be-
hind regulation of privacy and personal data protection.  
I. THE EXPANSION OF THE NOTION OF “PROTECTIONISM” 
Although the notions of “free trade” and “protectionism” are 
among the oldest in economics,34 there is still no uniform under-
standing of what constitutes “protectionism.”35 This Part analyzes 
of the notion of protectionism and shows that protectionism is not a 
                                                                                                             
 33 See Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce, WTO Doc. WT/L/1056 (Jan. 
25, 2019). 
 34 JOHANNES OVERBEEK, FREE TRADE VERSUS PROTECTIONISM viii (1999). 
 35 Susan Ariel Aaronson, What Are We Talking About When We Discuss Dig-
ital Protectionism? 1–4, 16, 19, (Inst. for Int’l Econ. Policy, Working Paper No. 
13, 2018) [hereinafter Aaronson, What We Are Talking About]. 
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natural phenomenon—it is a concept socially constructed within a 
particular discourse. 
The core issue in defining protectionism is where to draw the 
line between regulation that is a precondition for trade (such as state 
intervention aimed at correcting market failures, which is economi-
cally efficient and socially more productive), and protectionist reg-
ulation which creates market failures and stifles trade.36 As Jagdish 
Bhagwati, one of the leading twentieth-century trade theorists, 
noted, 
[S]ince all policies will inevitably affect (directly or 
indirectly) comparative advantage and (in this sense) 
there is therefore no purely ‘natural’ or ‘market-de-
termined’ comparative advantage, where should one 
draw the line and say that autonomy in this set of pol-
icies is fine but not in others?37 
Eleven years later, NYU Professor Robert Howse argued along 
similar lines that “[t]here is no natural or self-evident baseline or 
rule that can solve this basic dilemma.”38 Defining what constitutes 
a precondition for free trade and what is a barrier to trade is, indeed, 
“an interpretive act,” to use the terminology of Professor Andrew 
Lang of Edinburgh Law School.39 As former Federal Reserve Board 
                                                                                                             
 36 See, e.g., JAGDISH BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM 126 (1988) [hereinafter 
BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM]. 
 37 See Jagdish Bhagwati, Threats to the World Trading Regime: Protection-
ism, Unfair Trade et al, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT: 
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JAGDISH BHAGWATI 237, 240–41 (Ad Koekkoek & Loet 
B. M. Mennes eds., 1991) [hereinafter Bhagwati, Threats to the World Trading 
Regime]. 
 38 See Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy––And Back Again: The 
Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 94, 95–96 (2002) 
[hereinafter Howse, From Politics to Technocracy]. 
 39 See ANDREW LANG, WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER NEOLIBERALISM 169–70 
(2011) [hereinafter LANG, AFTER NEOLIBERALISM]. 
Since virtually every conceivable form of governmental action 
has some direct or indirect impact on trade, the selection of a 
particular set of measures as “barriers to trade” involves the ap-
plication of principles of selection and categorization . . . . Sim-
ilarly, we draw distinctions between government actions which 
constitute trade “distortions” on the one hand, and other kinds 
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member Daniel Tarullo explained, determining what constitutes a 
trade barrier and what does not depends on the assumption of “‘nor-
mal’ conditions of competitive markets” that is used as a benchmark 
to identify the deviations.40 It is the discourse that predetermines 
what Lang calls “collective habits of interpretation”41 or “the char-
acteristic mindsets and ways of thinking”42 that ultimately deter-
mines what the normal market is and what constitutes protectionism. 
In other words, defining protectionism is an act of interpretation 
that occurs within a certain discourse. Using a particular theoretical 
construction of protectionism has two important practical implica-
tions. First, such construction informs the design of international 
trade rules—an example of this would be the non-discrimination 
provisions found in current international trade agreements.43 Sec-
ond, since these provisions are often phrased in broad and ambigu-
ous terms, which are neither explained nor defined in the agree-
ments,44 interpretation by adjudicating bodies plays a crucial role in 
                                                                                                             
of government actions which correct pre-existing market dis-
tortions on the other. 
Id. at 170. 
 40 Daniel K. Tarullo, Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of International 
Trade, 100 HARV. L. REV. 546, 549 (1987) [hereinafter Tarullo, Beyond Normalcy 
in the Regulation of International Trade] (discussing trade laws of general appli-
cation).  
These statutes are based on a regulatory model that assumes that 
deviations from market principles are “exceptional events”; 
they correct deviations from market principles by imposing ex-
tra duties to raise the low prices of imports to what they would 
(hypothetically) have been had the foreign producer been oper-
ating under “normal” conditions of competitive markets and 
non-distortion by government.  
Id. See also LANG, AFTER NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 227 (refer-
ring to a notion of an “imagined ideal of a market” that is used as a ref-
erence point to characterize a particular governmental policy as a pre-
condition for free trade or “protectionism”). 
 41 LANG, AFTER NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 170. 
 42 Id. at 173. 
 43 See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 1(1), Oct. 30, 1947, 
61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 1947] (non-discriminatory 
most-favored nation provision); North American Free Trade Agreement art. 
301(2), Dec. 8–17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) (non-discriminatory national treat-
ment provision). 
 44 See Daniel K. Tarullo, Logic, Myth, and the International Economic Order, 
26 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 533, 535–36 (1985) [hereinafter Tarullo, Logic, Myth, and 
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recognizing particular domestic policies and rules as “legitimate” or 
“protectionist.”45 Hence, non-discrimination provisions will be in-
terpreted broadly or narrowly depending on the discourse governing 
such interpretation. 
Against this backdrop, this Part shows how the shifts in the dom-
inant discourse have affected the (re)construction of the notion of 
protectionism, and how such (re)construction influences both the 
substance and interpretation of international trade rules.46 This Part 
also underscores how the change in the discourse has transformed 
the very goal of the international trade system over time––from eco-
nomic stability to liberalization of trade—and how this transfor-
mation has led to a shrinking regulatory space left to domestic legal 
regimes by international trade rules.47 It is, however, not the purpose 
of this Article to provide a comprehensive account of all aspects of 
protectionism in a historical perspective, for this would require at 
least an entire book. Instead, this Part focuses on the key milestones 
of the evolution of protectionism in order to illustrate how the 
boundaries of discourse and its underlying goals and values affect 
the predominant conceptualization of protectionism and the func-
tioning of the international trading system.48 It starts in the mid-
eighteenth century from the birth of the classical free trade idea, fast-
forwards to the 1940s, the time of the formation of the first multilat-
                                                                                                             
the International Economic Order] (arguing that “legal principles are generally 
indeterminate” and that “[p]olitical or ideological choices are embodied in doc-
trines that promise a faithful implementation of the principles themselves.”). Us-
ing Article I of the GATT, which codifies the principle of non-discrimination in 
international trade, Tarullo illustrates that the non-discrimination principle “can-
not be administered without political choices about legitimate national policies 
[and t]he rule cannot be explained or justified simply by reference to the aim of 
increased trade or the principle of equality.” See id. at 536–41. 
 45 See, e.g., Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization 20 Years On: 
Global Governance by Judiciary, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9, 47 (2016) [hereinafter 
Howse, The World Trade Organization 20 Years On] (“The text of the national 
treatment provisions of the GATT requires that the adjudicator decide whether 
less favourable treatment is provided for ‘like’ imported products and/or, in the 
case of taxation measures only, whether dissimilar treatment is provided for di-
rectly competitive and substitutable products.”). 
 46 See infra Sections I(A)–(D). 
 47 See infra Sections I(B)–(D). 
 48 See infra Sections I(B)–(D). 
2020] PRIVACY PROTECTION(ISM) 433 
 
eral trading system, and ends with a discussion of the neoliberal dis-
course originating in the late 1960s.49 But, before moving on to a 
historical account of the evolution of protectionism, let us pause for 
a moment and introduce the key disagreements on the notion of pro-
tectionism woven like a red thread throughout the discussion. 
A. Defining Protectionism: Key Disagreement 
Historically, the main disagreement in understanding what pro-
tectionism is lies in the determination of whether protectionism is a 
subjective or an objective notion. This general disagreement is ap-
parent in the question of whether the regulatory intent underlying a 
domestic regulatory measure that discriminates against foreign com-
petitors matters for the purpose of qualifying such measure as pro-
tectionist.50 Related questions are how much or how little protection 
of domestic industries is sufficient to render regulation protectionist 
and who bears the burden of proof that a particular regulation is pro-
tectionist: the foreign state affected by the measure or the state that 
has adopted the regulation? As the Article shows, the answer to 
these questions has a profound effect on the breadth of the regula-
tory autonomy left to domestic regulatory regimes by international 
trade law in order to pursue important societal or public policy ob-
jectives, such as protection of human health, the environment, and 
public morals.51 
                                                                                                             
 49 See infra Sections I(B)–(D). 
 50 Compare Alan O. Sykes, Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of Inter-
national Trade, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999) (taking an objective approach to 
protectionism; defin[ing] ‘regulatory protectionism’ as any cost disadvantage im-
posed on foreign firms by a regulatory policy that discriminates against them or 
that otherwise disadvantages them in a manner that is unnecessary to the attain-
ment of some genuine, nonprotectionist regulatory objective”; specifically under-
scoring that in order to qualify as protectionist such regulatory policy “need not 
be deliberate and may result simply from regulators’ failure to appreciate the trade 
impact of their policies”) (emphasis added), with DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, AGAINST 
THE TIDE: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF FREE TRADE 5 (1996) (defining a policy 
of protection as governmental policies discriminating against imported goods “in 
favor of those produced within the country, usually with the aim of sheltering 
domestic producers from foreign competition through tariffs, quantitative re-
strictions, or other import barriers.”) (emphasis added). While the definition of 
Sykes puts an emphasis on the effects of a regulatory policy, that of Irwin focuses 
on the aim of such policy. 
 51 See infra Section I(D); Part II. 
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An objective approach to defining protectionism captures a 
much broader range of regulatory measures, namely any measure 
that may de facto result in discrimination between domestic and for-
eign firms irrespective of its aim, even if such discrimination is in-
cidental.52 An objective approach also tends to impose the burden 
of proving that regulation is not protectionist on the party that has 
adopted the regulation.53 The subjective approach, in contrast, only 
covers regulation intending to shelter domestic markets from foreign 
competition, and places the burden of proof of such intent on the 
party alleging the protectionist nature of another party’s measure.54 
B. Protectionism and the Classical Free Trade Idea 
As a driver of policy, free trade dates back to the classical doc-
trines based on the theories of absolute and comparative advantage 
developed by Adam Smith and David Ricardo, who argued that, just 
like individuals, countries could gain from international trade by ex-
changing goods that each country can produce at a lower cost.55 As 
                                                                                                             
 52 See Sykes, supra note 50, at 3–4 (providing examples of “facially neutral 
regulation[s]” that instituted not de jure but de facto discrimination, for example, 
a pharmaceutical regulation “requir[ing] foreign pharmaceutical manufacturers to 
engage in more testing and clinical trials than domestic manufacturers with no 
apparent health justification for this difference in treatment.”). 
 53 See, e.g., LANG, AFTER NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 268–69 (illus-
trating WTO panel cases that exemplify how the country that has adopted the 
challenged regulation has had to show that the regulation is not protectionist, for 
example, one case regarding Thailand’s “import restrictions and internal taxes on 
imported cigarettes” and another case regarding France’s “ban on products con-
taining asbestos for public health reasons”). 
 54 See, e.g., id. at 211–14 (illustrating WTO panel cases in which the 
challenging country had to argue why the other country’s measures were 
intentionally discriminatory and thus illegitimate, for example, one regarding a 
Pakistani challenge to an Indian measure that Pakistan believed intentionally dis-
criminated against Pakistan, and another regarding a Danish and Norwegian chal-
lenge to a Belgian measure that Denmark and Norway believed intentionally dis-
criminated against Denmark and Norway). 
 55 Adam Smith, Of the Opinion that No Expense at Home Can Be Hurtful, in 
LECTURES ON JUSTICE, POLICE, REVENUE AND ARMS 207, 209 (Edwin Cannan 
ed., Clarendon Press 1869) (1763) [hereinafter Smith, Of the Opinion] (advocat-
ing that eighteenth-century Britain should be “a free port,” government should not 
interfere in free trade by measures “of any kind,” and “free commerce and liberty 
of exchange should be allowed with all nations, and for all things.”). See Adam 
Smith, Of the Balance of Trade, in LECTURES ON JUSTICE, POLICE, REVENUE AND 
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summarized by Douglas Irwin, “free trade describes a policy of the 
nation-state toward international commerce in which trade barriers 
are absent, implying no restrictions on the import of goods from 
other countries or restraints on the export of domestic goods to other 
markets.”56 While free trade is associated with efficiency gains, bar-
riers to trade are seen as sources of forgone gains from trade.57 The 
main benchmarks around which classical economic discourse on 
free international trade revolves are economic efficiency and wel-
fare.58 However, focusing primarily on the enhancement of aggre-
gate national wealth, the logic of comparative advantage does not 
take into account the concerns of distributive justice or morals.59 
                                                                                                             
ARMS 204, 204 (Edwin Cannan ed., Clarendon Press 1869) (1763) [hereinafter 
Smith, Of the Balance of Trade] (“All commerce that is carried on betwixt any 
two countries must necessarily be advantageous to both.”); Howse, From Politics 
to Technocracy, supra note 38, at 94 (“The Ricardian theory of comparative ad-
vantage dictated the removal of import restrictions in almost all circumstances, 
regardless of any commitment of one’s trading partners to liberalize their im-
ports.”). 
 56 IRWIN, supra note 50, at 5 (emphasis added). 
 57 See Howse, From Politics to Technocracy, supra note 38, at 94. 
Smith and Ricardo were concerned in the first instance to dis-
prove the conventional or established mercantilist view that na-
tional wealth was reduced by (unilateral) free trade, and while 
they had many important reflections on the relationship of 
wealth to morals and justice, the basic logic of the theory of 
comparative advantage does not depend on any of those in-
sights. 
Id. See also JAN TUMLIR, PROTECTIONISM 4 (1985) [hereinafter TUMLIR, 
PROTECTIONISM] (“Protection imposes costs on the trading economies; when 
trade restrictions begin to multiply among the main markets, the costs are com-
pounded. When restriction nears the extent indicated, these costs could be large 
enough to be considered a major cause of the decline in economic growth . . . .”). 
 58 See IRWIN, supra note 50, at 4. 
Debates surrounding the economics of free trade and protection 
all revolve around the question of efficiency: how does a par-
ticular trade policy affect a country’s ability to use its limited 
resources (in terms of primary factors of production, such as 
land, labor, and capital) to produce the greatest possible real in-
come, which in turn enables it to procure a larger set of all 
goods. 
Id. 
 59 See generally id. at 40–41 (providing examples of “noneconomic argu-
ments for protection that are a perennial feature of trade policy debates”). “Critics 
of the economic approach frequently contend that the criterion of wealth is too 
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In classical economics, the doctrines of free trade and protec-
tionism are, thus, fundamentally opposed as they offer radically dif-
ferent perspectives on the best way to promote a nation’s (and the 
world’s) welfare: free trade, by maintaining the utmost freedom of 
trade between the countries, and protectionism (or mercantilism), by 
restricting imports, promoting domestic industries, and maintaining 
self-sufficiency from other countries.60 
Developed in the age of the formation of nation-states in Europe, 
mercantilist theory aimed to strengthen the power of the state and 
the accumulation of wealth by stimulating exports and limiting im-
ports.61 The free trade paradigm developed by Smith and Ricardo 
was used to oppose and then supplant mercantilism,62 which domi-
nated trade policy in the early eighteenth century.63 This shift in the 
dominant economic ideology was not purely a result of progress in 
economic thought, but also a reflection of a “‘shared vision’ among 
political economists of Britain’s economic future” that happened to 
                                                                                                             
narrowly materialistic and excludes other more important societal considera-
tions.” Id. 
 60 OVERBEEK, supra note 34, at viii (“[T]he two doctrines of free trade and 
protectionism are fundamentally opposed.”). 
 61 Id. at 1–2 (“The two major aims of mercantilist theory and policy were (1) 
the strengthening of the power of the state (political) and (2) the accumulation of 
wealth (economic) . . . .[M]any of the policy proposals of mercantilist writers con-
sisted of recommendations as to how to stimulate exports and hamper imports.”). 
 62 See Howse, From Politics to Technocracy, supra note 38, at 94 (“Smith 
and Ricardo were concerned in the first instance to disprove the conventional or 
established mercantilist view that national wealth was reduced by (unilateral) free 
trade . . . .”); David Schmidtz, Adam Smith on the Dark Side of Capitalism, 11 
GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 371, 378 (2013) (“Smith is remembered as a defender of 
free trade, but his practical goal was to repudiate mercantilism’s way of protecting 
domestic industry.”); see also Nadia E. Nedzel, Rule of Law v. Legal State: Where 
Have We Come From, Where Are We Going To?, in THE LEGAL DOCTRINES OF 
THE RULE OF LAW AND THE LEGAL STATE (RECHSTAAT) 289, 306 (James R. Silke-
nat et al, eds., 2014) (“Adam Smith, in the Wealth of Nations (1776), challenged 
mercantilism.”). 
 63 See NEDZEL, supra note 62, at 305 (suggesting the prevalence of mercan-
tilism in the eighteenth century) (“From the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, it 
was assumed that the amount of gold and silver amassed indicated a nation’s 
wealth and power, and that the world’s capital was static.”). 
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coincide with the views of certain interest groups in Britain at that 
time.64 
C. Protectionism and “Embedded Liberalism” of GATT 1947 
During the interwar period, protectionism was mostly conceptu-
alized in its narrow form, namely as tariffs, import quotas, and ex-
change controls.65 In addition, protectionism was associated with 
political nationalism, heavy interference by government in eco-
nomic life, and the quest for increased self-sufficiency that charac-
terized the developed countries’ domestic policies at the time.66 
In 1947, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT 
1947”)67 was signed.68 It incorporated the trade policy chapter of the 
charter of the International Trade Organization (“ITO”), the treaty 
establishing an organization that never saw the light of day.69 As a 
                                                                                                             
 64 LEONARD GOMES, THE ECONOMICS AND IDEOLOGY OF FREE TRADE 45–46 
(2003) (“The attitude to foreign trade encapsulated in the principle of comparative 
costs sprang not only from developments in economic theory but reflected a 
‘shared vision’ among political economists of Britain’s economic future. It so 
happened that this coincided with the interests of the new and rising industrial 
bourgeoisie.”) (emphasis added); see also Joan Robinson, What Are the Ques-
tions? 15 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1318, 1336 (1977) (“When Ricardo set out the 
case against protection, he was supporting British economic interests.”). 
 65 See, e.g., Barry Eichengreen & Douglas A. Irwin, The Slide to Protection-
ism in the Great Depression: Who Succumbed and Why?, 70 J. ECON. HIST. 871, 
871 (“The Great Depression of the 1930s was marked by a severe outbreak of 
protectionist trade policies. Governments around the world imposed tariffs, im-
port quotas, and exchange controls to restrict spending on foreign goods.”). 
 66 See OVERBEEK, supra note 34, at 633–34 (stating that up to 1939, “the be-
lief in political and economic classical liberalism was broken. The prevailing cli-
mate of opinion moved increasingly towards a greater role for government, which 
meant more neo-mercantilism, statism and interventionism”). In the late 1920s 
and early 1930s, the United States adopted the interventionist New Deal; England 
ended its free trade policies introduced in the late nineteenth century; Russia, Ger-
many, Italy and Japan “adopted totalitarian institutions, subordinating the individ-
ual to the state.” Id. 
 67 GATT 1947, supra note 43. Throughout the Article, GATT 1947 refers to 
the legal text. GATT (without the year) refers to the organization that adminis-
tered GATT 1947, as well as the agreements and codes that came later, until 1995 
when the WTO took over. 
 68 Press Release, WTO, Fiftieth Anniversary of the Multilateral Trading Sys-
tem (Oct. 27, 1997), https://www.wto.org/english/newse/pres97e/pr81e.htm. 
 69 See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 17 (1998). 
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legal instrument, GATT 1947 codified efforts to curb protectionist 
policy. However, GATT 1947 had broader purposes as well. It was 
executed to avoid future trade wars, similar to those that occurred in 
the 1930s, and were, in part, seen as a cause of WWII;70 to preserve 
international peace; and to prevent the spread of Communism.71 The 
newly created trade rules were not about “comparative advantage as 
such,” but rather about “the avoidance of protectionist summum ma-
lum” (or “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies), that is, when trade barri-
ers introduced by one country led to a chain reaction of trade barriers 
                                                                                                             
Since the GATT was designed to be merely a multilateral treaty, 
it would be similar to the bilateral treaties that preceded it, but 
designed to operate under the umbrella of the ITO, when the 
ITO came into being. The general clauses of GATT were the 
same as those in the chapter of the draft ITO charter which was 
devoted to trading rules, which in turn had been heavily influ-
enced by clauses in bilateral trade treaties. 
Id. See also LANG, AFTER NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 28 (referring to the 
Havana Charter, which was the draft of the ITO). 
 70 See DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, PETROS C. MAVRODIS, ALAN O. SYKES, THE 
GENESIS OF THE GATT 5–6 (2008) [hereinafter IRWIN ET AL., THE GENESIS OF THE 
GATT]. 
To understand the origins of the GATT, one must appreciate the 
traumatic events of the 1920s and 1930s . . . . Although mone-
tary and financial factors were primarily responsible for allow-
ing the recession to turn into the Great Depression of the early 
1930s, the spread of trade restrictions aggravated the problem. 
The commercial policies of the 1930s became characterized as 
‘‘beggar-thy-neighbor’’ policies because many countries 
sought to insulate their own economy from the economic down-
turn by raising trade barriers. 
Id. See also LANG, AFTER NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 196–97 (“GATT 
was in part understood as a way of maintaining Western unity during the Cold 
War, by placing it on a firm and stable economic footing . . . . The fundamental 
and primary purpose of the post-war regime was international stability, in the spe-
cific sense of preventing a repeat of the disastrous trade wars of early 1930s.”); 
Howse, From Politics to Technocracy, supra note 38, at 94–95 (“A paramount 
goal is the avoidance of a protectionist summum malum—the situation where do-
mestic social or economic pressures lead some states to increase or reinstate bar-
riers to trade, thus triggering a competitive reaction in kind by other states, and 
eventually a “race to the bottom” that is disastrous for the global economy.”). 
 71 See LANG, AFTER NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 196 n.4. 
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introduced by other states.72 In this sense, the post-war trading sys-
tem only partially remained faithful to the (neo)classical free trade 
idea.73 
The discursive foundations of the GATT 1947 were not mono-
chromatic, they were laid as a compromise between two discourses 
(or “philosophies,” according to Andrew Lang)74 that influenced its 
development.75 On the one hand, the discourse advanced by the 
United States argued that protectionism was to blame for the Great 
Depression of the 1930s and the trade wars that “led in a straight 
line to the outbreak of the Second World War,” and that discrimina-
tory trade undermined peace.76 On the other hand, another discourse 
advanced by the United Kingdom and influenced by Keynesian 
thinking emphasized the boundaries that the international trade re-
gime should not cross in relation to domestic policies affecting 
trade; in particular, the discourse advocated that an important aspect 
of an international trade regime is the ability of the state to impose 
trade restrictions to ensure full employment and domestic economic 
stability.77 The delicate compromise between these two views 
                                                                                                             
 72 Howse, From Politics to Technocracy, supra note 38, at 103 (“After all . . . 
trade law in its original postwar form was not about comparative advantage as 
such, but about constraining destructive interdependence––of which a race to the 
bottom is one form.”). See id. at 94–95; see also LANG, AFTER NEOLIBERALISM, 
supra note 39, at 190–92. 
 73 See Howse, From Politics to Technocracy, supra note 38, at 94–95 (dis-
cussing how international trade law was not only concerned with “the classic in-
sights about the gains to wealth and welfare from free trade,” but also the “inter-
dependency of different states’ trade and other economic policies . . . .”) “The 
postwar trade and financial order was therefore mainly designed to enable states 
to manage their domestic economies, in a manner consistent with political and 
social stability and justice, without the risk of setting off a protectionist race to the 
bottom.” Id. 
 74 LANG, AFTER NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 192. 
There were, broadly speaking, two “philosophies” which 
emerged at this time, with somewhat different interpretations of 
the causes and consequences of commercial policy during the 
1930s, and different prescriptions for the post-war trading or-
der . . . . [B]oth of these philosophies had an important influ-
ence on the post-war GATT regime. 
Id. For further discussion, see id. at 24–29 and 192–94. 
 75 See id at 192. 
 76 See id. at 192–93. 
 77 See id. at 194. 
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shaped the discourse of “embedded liberalism”78—the term coined 
by John Ruggie (from the Kennedy School of Government),79 which 
he described as follows: 
The essence of embedded liberalism . . . is to devise 
a form of multilateralism that is compatible with the 
requirements of domestic stability. Presumably, then, 
governments so committed would seek to encourage 
an international division of labor which, while mul-
tilateral in form and reflecting some notion of com-
parative advantage (and therefore gains from trade), 
also promised to minimize socially disruptive do-
mestic adjustment costs as well as any national eco-
nomic and political vulnerabilities that might accrue 
from international functional differentiation . . . . 
However, as neoclassical trade theory defines the 
term, the overall social profitability of this division 
of labor will be lower than of the one produced by 
laissez-faire.80 
Hence, contrary to the (neo)classical case for free trade dis-
cussed above, the discourse of “embedded liberalism” leaned to-
wards the subjective––and, therefore, narrower––understanding of 
“protectionism.”81 This matters because “embedded liberalism” was 
not only reflected in the characteristics and design of the GATT 
1947,82 but it also governed the GATT 1947’s operation for at least 
                                                                                                             
 78 See id. 
 79 See John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and 
Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order International Or-
ganization, 36 INT’L REGIMES 379, 392 (1982) (“The liberalism that was restored 
after World War II differed in kind from that which had been known previously. 
My term for it is ‘embedded liberalism.’”) (emphasis added). 
 80 Id. at 399 (emphasis altered). 
 81 See IRWIN, supra note 50, at 5 (defining the subjective understanding of 
protectionism) (defining a policy of protection as governmental policies discrim-
inating against imported goods “in favor of those produced within the country, 
usually with the aim of sheltering domestic producers from foreign competition 
through tariffs, quantitative restrictions, or other import barriers.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 82 See LANG, AFTER NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 195 (“Key players in 
the negotiations shared a common view of the legitimacy of state intervention to 
secure domestic stability, even if they disagreed on the precise form and depth 
2020] PRIVACY PROTECTION(ISM) 441 
 
two decades after its inception.83 Put differently, during that period, 
trade liberalization was less important as a goal in itself; it was a 
component of a broader societal goal of maintaining economic sta-
bility.84 
Although the non-discrimination provisions of the GATT 1947 
were formulated broadly,85 in the first two decades of the GATT 
1947’s existence and the dominance of the discourse of “embedded 
                                                                                                             
that that intervention should take in particular circumstances.”); see also Howse, 
From Politics to Technocracy, supra note 38, at 94–95. 
The postwar trade and financial order was therefore mainly de-
signed to enable states to manage their domestic economies, in 
a manner consistent with political and social stability and jus-
tice, without the risk of setting off a protectionist race to the 
bottom . . . . The legal structure of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was designed to facilitate such con-
cessions and make them binding, but it did not require them. 
Id. at 95. 
 83 See LANG, AFTER NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 205 (“These shared 
ideas were reflected in a set of characteristic institutional forms, social practices, 
and legal structures which more or less endured over the first two decades of the 
GATT’s existence.”). These “shared ideas”, however, represented the compro-
mise of the Global North and did not factor in the views of countries from the 
Global South, such as India. Instead of being normalized, Global South countries’ 
preferences were framed as “special and differential treatment.” See Nicolas 
Lamp, How Some Countries Became ‘Special’: Developing Countries and the 
Construction of Difference in Multilateral Trade Lawmaking, 18 J. INT’L ECON. 
L. 743, 745–52, 770 (2015). 
 84 See LANG, AFTER NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 197. 
[A]lthough the removal of trade barriers was of course an im-
portant intermediate purpose of the regime, liberalization was 
in fact a less important norm during the first two decades of the 
trade regime’s history than is often assumed. Liberalization was 
pursued not through the application of a rigid principle, but only 
as far as states were practically able, and only as far as was con-
sistent with the broader norm of economic stability. 
Id. 
 85 See id. at 208 (“It takes only a moment’s reflection to see how broad and 
intrusive these disciplines had the potential to be.”); see also, e.g., ROBERT E. 
HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 121 (2d ed. 
1990) (stating that paragraph 4 of Article III GATT 1947, which contains a na-
tional treatment provision, “covered every internal law and regulation affecting 
commercial movement of goods, an area that is virtually unlimited in scope.”). 
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liberalism,” they were interpreted narrowly.86 Only those discrimi-
natory measures that were “explicitly or implicitly motivated by a 
protectionist intent” were considered to violate the non-discrimina-
tion provisions and thus qualified as protectionism.87 In other words, 
the subjective view based on regulatory intent had legal significance 
in the assessment of the protectionist character of a domestic meas-
ure challenged under the GATT 1947.88 
The discourse of “embedded liberalism”—reflecting the broad 
consensus on the goals of the multilateral trading system—also gov-
erned the practice of challenging other countries’ domestic regula-
tions.89 In the first decades after the GATT 1947’s formation, do-
mestic policies that only indirectly intervened with international 
trade typically were not challenged as inconsistent with international 
                                                                                                             
 86 See LANG, AFTER NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 211 (arguing that ori-
entation towards embedded liberalism “produced a field of trade law and policy 
which was narrowly defined (relative to the present day), focused on tariffs and 
other kinds of trade measures understood at the time as quantitative restrictions, 
and unwilling to scrutinize ‘internal’ measures except in the clearest circum-
stances of circumvention of liberalization commitments.”). 
 87 See id. at 254 (“From this perspective, the non-discrimination norm con-
tained in Article III of the GATT is essentially an ‘anti-protectionism’ norm and 
ought to be applied solely to those internal measures which are expressly or im-
plicitly motivated by a protectionist intent.”) (emphasis added); see also Howse, 
From Politics to Technocracy, supra note 38, at 97 (“The notion of ‘discrimina-
tion’ against trading partners seems closely linked to the very idea of protection-
ism, though in some cases one may discriminate for non-protectionist reasons, 
which is why at least as a preliminary sorting or sifting mechanism, the nondis-
crimination norm has a certain durability and putative legitimacy.”). 
 88 See LANG, AFTER NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 211; Howse, From 
Politics to Technocracy, supra note 38, at 97. 
 89 See Ruggie, supra note 79, at 399 (describing the “essence of embedded 
liberalism”); LANG, AFTER NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 195, 205, 211  (ar-
guing that orientation towards embedded liberalism “produced a field of trade law 
and policy which was narrowly defined (relative to the present day), focused on 
tariffs and other kinds of trade measures understood at the time as quantitative 
restrictions, and unwilling to scrutinize ‘internal’ measures except in the clearest 
circumstances of circumvention of liberalization commitments.”) (“Key players 
in the negotiations shared a common view of the legitimacy of state intervention 
to secure domestic stability, even if they disagreed on the precise form and depth 
that that intervention should take in particular circumstances.”) (“These shared 
ideas were reflected in a set of characteristic institutional forms, social practices, 
and legal structures which more or less endured over the first two decades of the 
GATT’s existence.”). 
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trade rules.90 In line with this consensus, contracting parties to the 
GATT 1947 did not resort to trade disciplines in order to “reshape 
domestic state-market relations.”91 
D. The New Protectionism and the Neoliberal Discourse: Towards 
an Ever-Broader Conceptualization of “Protectionism” 
1. THE “NEW PROTECTIONISM” 
Starting in the early 1970s, the notion of protectionism has grad-
ually become much more capacious. In trade economics literature, 
the term “new protectionism” was coined to refer to a broader range 
of domestic measures restricting international trade.92 Unlike tradi-
tional protectionism, the new version included not only the more 
traditional or mercantilist restrictions on trade, but also non-tariff 
barriers (“NTBs”) (or “behind the border” barriers) to trade, such as 
negotiated or “voluntary” export restraining arrangements, and 
measures allegedly abusing the GATT 1947 non-discrimination pro-
visions, such as anti-dumping measures.93 
                                                                                                             
 90 For a discussion, see id. at 214–16. 
 91 Id. at 215–16 (“[T]oo intrusive an application of GATT disciplines on in-
ternal regulation would undermine that purpose, as it would run the risk of itself 
upsetting the delicate balance of concessions embodied in the original agreement, 
and undermining support for the trading system as a whole.”). 
 92 See Dominick Salvatore, Protectionism and World Welfare: Introduction, 
in PROTECTIONISM AND WORLD WELFARE 1, 1 (Dominick Salvatore ed., 1993) 
(“This phrase, coined in the mid 1970s, refers to the revival of ‘mercantilism’ 
whereby nations, particularly the industrial nations, attempt to solve or alleviate 
their problems of unemployment, lagging growth, and declining industries by im-
posing restrictions on imports and subsidizing exports.”). 
 93 See BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM, supra note 36, at 43–53 (conceptualizing 
NTBs in the form of domestic regulation on countervailing duties and anti-dump-
ing provisions that was seen as being restrictively used against foreign suppliers); 
see also Bhagwati, Threats to the World Trading Regime, supra note 37, at 239 
(distinguishing between two classes of non-tariff barriers: 1) barriers bypassing 
the GATT’s rules, which include visibly and politically negotiated voluntary ex-
port restraints and other export restraining arrangements (e.g. import quotas, non-
automatic licensing, and variable levies); and 2) protectionist “captured” provi-
sions that have a legitimate role in a free trade regime (e.g. countervailing duties 
and anti-dumping provisions) but are used to “harass unfairly their successful for-
eign rivals and thus to deter fair competition and free trade.”); OVERBEEK, supra 
note 34, at 555. 
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Trade economists also viewed the “new protectionism” as dif-
ferent in another important respect.94 While the old protectionism of 
the 1930s was characterized as “unsystematic, improvised, and at 
the end, a result of panic,” the “new protectionism” was seen to be 
driven by strong politically organized forces representing interests 
of domestic industries.95 This approach, as the Article shows in 
greater detail below, had a major impact on the acceptability (under 
trade law) of key domestic policy measures. 
Trade economists often attributed the rise of non-tariff barriers 
as a form of circumvention of GATT 1947 disciplines,96 linked to 
the tendency of the United States to palliate the decline of its eco-
nomic dominance (a “diminished giant syndrome,” in the words of 
Professor Bhagwati)97 and to suppress increasing competition from 
less developed, newly industrializing countries.98 A number of those 
                                                                                                             
 94 See TUMLIR, PROTECTIONISM, supra note 57, at 38–39. 
 95 See id. (“Protectionism in the 1930’s was unsystematic, improvised, and at 
the end, a result of panic. . . . The new protectionism is a very different animal. It 
has been growing gradually. Industries have used intelligent, long-term planning 
in creating an expanded system of protection. . . . [T]he new protectionism is po-
litically stronger because it accommodates a broader range of interests.”). 
 96 Robert E. Baldwin, The New Protectionism: A Response to Shifts in Na-
tional Economic Power, at 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 1823, 1986), https://www.nber.org/papers/w1823.pdf [hereinafter Robert 
Baldwin, The New Protectionism] (“The international trading economy is in the 
anomalous condition of diminishing tariff protection but the increasing use of 
nontariff trade-distorting measures.”). 
 97 See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, The Diminished Giant Syndrome, FOREIGN 
AFF., Spring 1993, at 22, 22 [hereinafter Bhagwati, The Diminished Giant Syn-
drome] (“America has been struck by a ‘diminished giant syndrome’—reinforced 
by the slippage in the growth of its living standards in the 1980s. This affliction 
has caused a loss of confidence in America’s inherited postwar trade policies.”); 
see also Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Fair Trade, Reciprocity, and Harmonization: The 
Novel Challenge to The Theory and Policy of Free Trade, in PROTECTIONISM AND 
WORLD WELFARE 17, 39 (Dominick Salvatore ed., 1993) [hereinafter Bhagwati, 
Fair Trade] (“Many of my examples [of demands for fair trade] come from the 
United States where the diminished giant syndrome has prompted an acute search 
for unfair trade by others.”). 
 98 Robert Baldwin, The New Protectionism, supra note 96, at 1, 20 (“[N]ew 
nontariff protectionism [is related] to significant structural changes in world in-
dustrial production that have brought about a decline in the dominant economic 
position of the United States, a concomitant rise to international economic prom-
inence of the European Economic Community and Japan, and the emergence of a 
group of newly industrializing developing countries (NICs).”). 
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countries imposed barriers to U.S. exports in areas where the United 
States had a comparative advantage, especially knowledge-intensive 
industries and services.99 In addition, new protectionism was viewed 
as a means of alleviating domestic stability issues, such as growing 
unemployment and inability, due to economic decline, to deliver on 
the social obligations of the expanded welfare states.100 Recall from 
Section I.C that it was precisely these measures that were seen as 
legitimate and not, therefore, protectionist in the “embedded liber-
alism” discourse.101 
In new protectionism, free trade theorists saw a threat to the le-
gitimacy and the very existence of the multilateral trading system 
associated with the post-war prosperity and economic growth.102 
Recalling the disastrous consequences of protectionism in the 
1930s, economists warned that new protectionism would, just like 
its predecessor, trigger beggar-thy-neighbor policies and result in 
new trade wars.103 
                                                                                                             
 99 See Howse, The World Trade Organization 20 Years On, supra note 45, at 
17 (“[M]any barriers worldwide hampered America in exploiting its apparent con-
temporary comparative advantage in knowledge-intensive industries and services. 
In some, intellectual property was largely unprotected; in most, competition in 
network services, such as in telecommunications and finance, was severely re-
stricted or limited, while many others still imposed byzantine and archaic regula-
tory requirements on products, both imported and domestic. In many cases, a busi-
ness presence in the other country was necessary for the full exploitation of com-
parative advantage, and here American firms faced severe foreign investment re-
strictions.”). 
 100 See Salvatore, supra note 92, at 9; see also OVERBEEK, supra note 34, at 
553–55. 
 101 See, e.g., LANG, AFTER NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 29, 192–205; 
Ruggie, supra note 79, at 399. 
 102 Robert Baldwin, The New Protectionism, supra note 96, at 1 (“[New pro-
tectionism] is taking place largely outside the framework of GATT and threatens 
to undermine the liberal international trading regime established after World War 
II.”). For further discussion, see Bhagwati, Threats to the World Trading Regime, 
supra note 37, at 238–44. 
 103 See Bhagwati, Threats to the World Trading Regime, supra note 37, at 
238–44. But see Strange, supra note 28, at 254–55 (1985) (“[T]he next few years 
will show whether world trade can continue to survive despite the deadlock in the 
GATT and despite a certain amount of increased protectionism. My contention is 
that a combination of political and economic interests, reinforced by structural 
change in the international division of labor brought about by the mobility of cap-
ital and technology, is preventing a world depression from seriously arresting or 
reversing the steady growth in world trade.”). 
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2. “FAIR TRADE” 
a. The “New Protectionism” in “Fair Trade” Clothing 
Beginning at approximately the same time as the emergence of 
the new protectionism discourse (the 1970s) within U.S. business 
and governmental circles, measures characterized as new protec-
tionism were increasingly re-framed as means to curtail “unfair 
trade practices” from (primarily) developing countries.104 From this 
perspective, trade-restricting practices, such as import controls and 
voluntary export restraints, labeled as new protectionism by trade 
economists, were presented as responses to unfair trade.105 Implic-
itly using its domestic market as a primary reference point, the 
United States used the “fair trade” discourse to argue that any com-
mercially significant institutional or regulatory difference between 
its domestic regime and other countries distorted the conditions of 
competition and constituted barriers to U.S. exports.106 Trade theo-
                                                                                                             
 104 Subsidies, dumping practices, and other discriminatory rules disfavoring 
U.S. (and other) imports are examples of such “unfair trade practices.” See Robert 
Baldwin, The New Protectionism, supra note 96, at 16–19; see also id. at 18 (“The 
emphasis on the great need for fair trade is evident in the 1974 legislation author-
izing U.S. participation in the Tokyo Round of multilateral negotiations.”) (em-
phasis added). 
 105 See id. at 18–19 (“The most important protectionist action taken by the 
United States since the late 1960’s, namely, the gradual tightening of controls over 
steel imports, has also been justified mainly on the grounds of unfair trade prac-
tices by foreign producers. . . . When a series of voluntary export restraint agree-
ments with leading steel-exporting nations were concluded in late 1984, a spokes-
person for the U.S. Trade Representative stated, ‘We are responding to unfair 
trade in the U.S.; defending yourself against unfair trade is not, in our opinion, 
protectionism.’ The unfair trade argument has been used in support of most other 
trade-restricting or trade-promoting actions taken by the United States in recent 
years.”). 
 106 LANG, AFTER NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 227 (“In practice, when 
one country alleges that another country’s measure is an unfair trade practice (or 
trade distortion), it will implicitly use the institutional form of its own domestic 
market as the primary reference point against which fairness and distortions are 
measured. . . . The result is that the notion of a ‘trade distortion’ comes to be 
equated in practice with the existence of a commercially significant institutional 
or regulatory difference between countries.”). 
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rists, in contrast, viewed these claims as nothing more than a differ-
ent rhetoric of protectionist demands in order to make lobbying ef-
forts more successful.107 
Guided by the new fair trade narrative, the U.S. government saw 
the changing mission of international trade law as the elimination of 
unfair trade practices through, in particular, the harmonization (or 
“globalization”) of a broad range of domestic regulatory frame-
works that affect international trade.108 Demands for “level playing 
fields,” “harmonization,” and “fair trade” more generally worried 
trade economists, who saw in such demands a threat to the legiti-
macy and feasibility of free trade: not only did they consider it to be 
impossible to harmonize every aspect of domestic regulation, but 
they argued that it was in these differences of domestic regimes that 
lay the source of the comparative advantages that make trade bene-
ficial in the first place.109 
                                                                                                             
 107 See e.g. Bhagwati, Threats to the World Trading Regime, supra note 37, at 
239 (“[I]f protectionists demand protection, they will today confront politicians 
who are generally hesitant to supply it because it is not comfortable to be called 
‘protectionist’. However, if you cry ‘foul’ and allege that the foreign rival is re-
sorting to ‘unfair’ trade practices and therefore you need protection, your chances 
of successful lobbying are much greater. Protectionists have increasingly come to 
appreciate this and to shift their style of complaints accordingly to ‘unfair trade,” 
opening this notion to ever more areas of concern (e.g. workers’ rights enforce-
ment by foreign countries).”); see also BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM, supra note 
36, at 123–24 (“The insidious growth of the ‘fairness’ issue poses a yet more dis-
turbing threat to freer trade.”). 
 108 Robert Baldwin, The New Protectionism, supra note 96, at 18 (“In reshap-
ing the proposal of the president [for the Tokyo Round of multilateral negotia-
tions], the Congress stressed that the president should seek ‘to harmonize, reduce, 
or eliminate’ nontariff trade barriers and tighten GATT rules with respect to fair 
trading practices. Officials in the executive branch supported these directives not 
only on their merits but because they deflected attention from more patently pro-
tectionist policies.”). 
 109 See Bhagwati, Fair Trade, supra note 97, at 18 (“[T]he true and greater 
crisis that we face with regard to the theory and policy of free trade today 
comes . . . from the growth of demand for ‘level playing fields,’ ‘harmonization,’ 
‘fair trade,’ etc., all of which are variously undermining insidiously the legitimacy 
and feasibility of free trade since it is virtually impossible to harmonize everything 
so that playing fields are truly level in every way. There will always be something 
that an opponent of free trade will be able to find that is different in the country 
of one’s successful rival and hence can be argued to make free trade unfair and 
therefore illegitimate and unacceptable.”); see also Bhagwati, Threats to the 
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In sum, the “new protectionism” in “fair trade” clothing “pro-
vided the enabling conditions and leverage for a radical renegotia-
tion of the international rules that had undergirded the profound 
global economic transformations of the previous era.”110 
b. “Fair Trade” and the Human Rights Movement 
Another, non-economic, string of “fair trade” debate dealt with 
background conditions affecting the cost of production in develop-
ing countries, such as environmental and labor standards.111 As the 
                                                                                                             
World Trading Regime, supra note 37, at 240 (“If differences in national institu-
tions and policies can affect comparative advantage, as they surely can, and if 
these are now increasingly cited as sources of unfair trade (as they are), then we 
may be seriously eroding the possibility of free trade and leading towards ‘man-
aged trade’ or towards free trade only when a great deal of policy harmonization 
has occurred (as in the European Community (EC)).”). 
 110 Andrew Lang, Protectionism’s Many Faces, 44 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 
1, 3 (2019) (“What “new protectionism” signaled above all . . . [was] an attempt 
by many States to rewrite the rules of global trade to establish a new international 
division of comparative advantage and secure their preferred places in that or-
der . . . . In retrospect, the “new protectionism” is therefore best understood . . . as 
a successful attempt to transform the system from one type of open global trading 
order to another.”). 
 111 See Jagdish Bhagwati, The Demands to Reduce Domestic Diversity Among 
Trading Nations, in 1 FAIR TRADE & HARMONIZATION 9, 10–11 (Jagdish 
Bhagwati & Robert E Hudec eds., 1996) [hereinafter Bhagwati, The Demands to 
Reduce Domestic Diversity] (stating that non-economic fair trade arguments are 
based on three concerns: a sense of a “transborder” obligation towards others liv-
ing in nation-states with lowers standards; concerns of distributive justice that 
amount to the fear that freer trade with poor countries with abundant unskilled 
labor will immiserate working people in those countries; and concerns of fair 
competition that require that costs attributed to environmental and labor standards 
should not differ across countries in free trade.); see also JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN 
DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION 133–34 (2007) [hereinafter BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE 
OF GLOBALIZATION]; Robert Howse & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Fair Trade-
Free Trade Debate: Trade, Labor, and the Environment, 16 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 61, 74 (1996) (“Unlike the arguments for trade restrictions on environmen-
tal and labor rights grounds . . . which have a normative reference point external 
to the trading system itself, competitiveness-based ‘fair trade’ claims focus largely 
on the effects on domestic producers and workers of other countries’ environmen-
tal and labor policies, and not per se on the effects of those policies on the envi-
ronment and on workers elsewhere.”); Robert Wai, Countering, Branding, Deal-
ing: Using Economic and Social Rights in and Around the International Trade 
Regime, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 35, 48–49 (2003) (“Free trade based on comparative 
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liberalization of capital flows allowed multinational companies 
from developed countries to move production to developing coun-
tries with lower environmental and labor standards, the non-eco-
nomic fair trade argument raised concerns of a “race to the bottom” 
of such standards in developed countries.112 To prevent such a race 
to the bottom, proponents of the argument called for the creation of 
an international “level playing field” and especially environmental 
and labor-rights trade measures.113 Just like their economic counter-
part, these arguments were attacked by opponents as protectionism 
in disguise.114 Moreover, even if one views these arguments as not 
                                                                                                             
advantage is agnostic about the production conditions in any particular jurisdic-
tion, including its domestic regulatory standards. Fair trade theory, in contrast, is 
very much concerned with defining the background of those conditions under 
which international trade should occur. Production that violate these background 
conditions would constitute ‘unfair competition’ . . . .”). For an overview of non-
trade rationales for environmental and labor protection, see Howse & Trebilcock, 
supra, at 63–65. 
 112 See Howse, From Politics to Technocracy, supra note 38, at 104 (“In the 
wake of the debt crisis, a range of developing countries ended up removing or 
modifying restrictions on foreign investment and various other domestic policies 
that were disincentives to the attraction of foreign capital . . . . This led to fears of 
‘social dumping’ in the developed world that would eventually cause a race to the 
bottom: developed countries would not be able to sustain high environmental and 
labor standards, or rates of taxation needed to finance the redistributive policies 
of the welfare state, if they had to compete with these poorer countries for the 
location of capital investment.”). 
 113 Howse, From Politics to Technocracy, supra note 38, at 103; see, e.g., 
Howse & Trebilcock, supra note 111, at 78–79. For a literature overview on glob-
alization and labor standards, see Eddy Lee, Globalization and Labour Standards: 
A Review of Issues, 136 INT’L LAB. REV. 173, 176–83 (1997). On the “race to the 
bottom” argument in relation to environmental standards, see ESTY, supra note 
12, at 22–23. 
 114 See, e.g., BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 111, at 
123–31, 147–50 (arguing that the “race to the bottom” argument is not supported 
by empirical evidence; differences in environmental and labor standards are in-
significant to affect the location of production; higher labor and environmental 
standards themselves can be a protectionist move; and finally, attributing such 
arguments to “rent seeking.”); see also OVERBEEK, supra note 34, at 557 (“At 
present [(1990s)], protectionists in wealthier countries, who are always on the 
look-out for new reasons for trade barriers, are using labor and environment re-
lated arguments to back up demands for additional trade impediments . . . . [T]his 
type of argument is extreme protectionism in its crudest possible disguise.”); Lee, 
supra note 89, at 177. But see Sean D. Ehrlich, The Fair Trade Challenge to Em-
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protectionist in nature, addressing non-economic issues through 
trade measures was perceived as a second-best solution, because the 
first-best domestic measures are those not interfering with interna-
tional trade.115 
Although trade theorists advancing the idea of free trade were 
critical of the fair trade narrative, it would be inaccurate to say that 
this critique applied to any domestic interference with free trade.116 
For example, Bhagwati acknowledged that objecting to any state in-
tervention as a departure from fair trade was “a wrongheaded” ap-
proach.117 He also supported some of the “fair trade” arguments in-
sofar as they were focused on the importance of creating intra-sec-
toral level playing fields—especially in the “context of the few tech-
nology-intensive industries in which there are significant scale econ-
omies relative to the size of the world market.”118 Along the same 
lines, he called for greater tolerance of “other countries’ social ob-
jectives”; regulation pursuing such objectives, he argued, should not 
be labelled as “unfair.”119 
3. NEOLIBERAL DISCOURSE 
As this Article has explicated above, redefining “protectionism” 
as “new protectionism” was framed as a necessary and logical step 
                                                                                                             
bedded Liberalism, 54 INT’L STUD. Q. 1013, 1014, 1026, 1029–30 (2010) (provid-
ing empirical evidence of genuine nature of concerns with environmental and la-
bor standards); Ronald B. Davies & Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati, A Race to 
the Bottom in Labor Standards? An Empirical Investigation, J. DEV. ECON., July 
2013, at 1, 11–12 (providing empirical evidence of the race to the bottom in labor 
standards). 
 115 See Howse, From Politics to Technocracy, supra note 38, at 100 (“Thus, 
the notion that a more effective policy instrument than trade protection is always 
available to achieve any legitimate public end vastly oversimplifies the problem 
of politics.”). Bhagwati argued that using trade distorting measures to tackle un-
employment is only a second-best measure, while purely domestic measures 
would be the first best solution. See Bhagwati, Threats to the World Trading Re-
gime, supra note 37, at 238. On the theory of second best, see Jagdish N. 
Bhagwati, The Generalized Theory of Distortions and Welfare, in TRADE, 
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND GROWTH 69 (Jagdish N. Bhagwati et al. eds., 1971). 
 116 See, e.g., BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM, supra note 36, at 126–27. 
 117 Id. at 126. 
 118 Id. at 127. 
 119 Id. 
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in response to new forms of trade barriers. John Ruggie convinc-
ingly argues instead that the emergence of the new protectionism 
was not the cause but rather the effect of the neoliberal discourse, 
which redefined social purposes of the international trading sys-
tem.120 It was, thus, a new vision of the international trading system 
dictated by the neoliberal discourse, and not objective circum-
stances, which effectuated the transformation of the notion of pro-
tectionism.121 
This evolution of the neoliberal discourse happened against the 
background of a shift in the economic theory of regulation.122 A ne-
oliberal view that any regulation may constitute a potential barrier 
to trade relies to a large extent on the theory of regulatory capture 
that became “common language” in the circles of trade economists 
and international lawyers associated with the GATT.123 These eco-
nomic theories were later embraced in two official GATT reports.124 
In contrast to public interest theory (which advanced analytical ar-
guments that regulation is adopted in the public interest, primarily 
to correct market failures and pursue non-economic and societal 
goals),125 the “regulatory capture” theory (based on the empirical 
foundations of the public choice theory) argued that regulation is 
                                                                                                             
 120 Ruggie, supra note 79, at 410–13. See also LANG, AFTER NEOLIBERALISM, 
supra note 39, at 169–70. 
 121 See Ruggie, supra note 79, at 410, 412–13. 
 122 See generally Zang, Divided by Common Language, supra note 23, at 432–
57. 
 123 Id. at 438 (“During the 1980s, Ordo-liberal and public-choice economics 
gained influence among trade economists and international lawyers associated 
with GATT, and ‘capture’ theory became the common language.”). 
 124 Id. 
 125 See ROBERT BALDWIN, MARTIN CAVE & MARTIN LODGE, 
UNDERSTANDING REGULATION 39–43 (2nd ed., 1999); ANTHONY OGUS, 
REGULATION, LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY 58–71(1994). The private 
interest theory questioned one of the core assumptions of the public interest the-
ory, the assumption of the “benevolent regulator,” in other words, that the political 
process creating regulation is efficient. See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Theory of 
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971) (“The second 
[alternative] view [of regulation] is essentially that the political process defies ra-
tional explanation: ‘politics’ is an imponderable, a constantly and unpredictably 
shifting mixture of forces of the most diverse nature, comprehending acts of great 
moral virtue (the emancipation of slaves) and of the most vulgar venality (the 
congressman feathering his own nest).”). 
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adopted and implemented primarily in the interest of organized in-
terest groups,126 and that regulatory capture is essentially unavoida-
ble.127 Captured regulation leads to a reduction of social welfare be-
cause it merely leads to the transfer of wealth from one industry to 
another and does not serve public interest any more.128 This explains 
why, from the perspective of this theory, regulation should be re-
duced to a minimum.129 This theory was also used as a justification 
of the aggressive pursuit of export interests on the international level 
to constrain domestic protectionist trade policy making.130 Binding 
reciprocal trade rules were thus seen as a tool to contain domestic 
protectionism through what Richard Baldwin from the Graduate In-
stitute of International Studies in Geneva calls a “juggernaut effect,” 
                                                                                                             
 126 OGUS, supra note 125, 57–58 (1994). For an overview of “regulatory cap-
ture” theory, see BALDWIN, ET AL., supra note 98, at 43–49; OGUS, supra note 
125, at 55–75; CASS SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 69–71 (1993) 
[hereinafter SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION]. 
 127 Political economists developed sophisticated models based on empirical 
data that strongly suggested that not only elected political actors but also non-
elected bureaucrats (especially in the case of the European Economic Commu-
nity) were more prone to adopt protectionist regulation than to adhere to free mar-
ket principles. See Patrick A. Messerlin, The Political Economy of Protectionism: 
The Bureaucratic Case, 117 WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHIV. 469, 469–71 
(1981). But see Robert E. Baldwin, The Political Economy of Trade Policy, 3 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 119, 131 (1989) (“[T]he individual’s various social concerns can 
play an important role in shaping his or her decisions. To expand their already 
substantial contributions toward understanding the policymaking process, econo-
mists should integrate such social motivations into their microeconomic optimiz-
ing framework.”). 
 128 See e.g., TUMLIR, PROTECTIONISM, supra note 57, at 4 (arguing that “[a]ll 
protection is a redistribution of income and wealth within the protecting coun-
try”); see also OVERBEEK, supra note 34, at 558 (discussing the policy of managed 
trade). 
 129 See e.g., SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 126, at 70 
(criticizing the capture theory). Sunstein states that, “[T]he notion of rent-seeking 
rejects, as unproductive, nearly all of the basic workings of politics. It treats citi-
zenship itself as an evil. Efforts to enact public aspirations, to counteract discrim-
ination, to protect the environment—all these are seen as the diversion of produc-
tive energies into a wasteful place.” Id. at 71. 
 130 LANG, AFTER NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 234 (“As regards the trade 
regime itself, public choice theory supported the view that aggressive champion-
ing of export interests through trade negotiations was generally beneficial, as it 
provided a counterweight to the inherent tendency of protectionist special inter-
ests to capture domestic trade policy-making processes.”). 
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which is using domestic export-oriented groups who profit from re-
duction of trade barriers to fight the domestic protectionist lobby.131 
The new approach to domestic regulation was reinforced by a 
somewhat simplified version of trade economics that “professors 
dole out to journalists”132 (a “market fundamentalist ideology” ra-
ther than the true economic science).133 Proponents of this ideology 
argued that trade leads to efficiency gains and enhances domestic 
welfare, while silencing the downsides, such as lack of considera-
tion of social or distributional effects of free trade policy.134 Relying 
on the assumption that any public policy objective can be more ef-
ficiently achieved by domestic regulation not interfering with inter-
national trade, this approach judged domestic trade restrictive 
                                                                                                             
 131 RICHARD BALDWIN, THE GREAT CONVERGENCE. INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE NEW GLOBALIZATION 70 (2016); see also Howse, From 
Politics to Technocracy, supra note 38, at 100–01. 
 132 See RODRIK, supra note 11, at 77 (“Free market economics was in the as-
cendancy, producing what has been variously called the Washington Consensus, 
market fundamentalism, or neoliberalism . . . . This new vision elevated the sim-
plistic case for trade—the one that economics professors dole out to journalists—
over the appropriately qualified version. It regarded any obstacle to free trade as 
an abomination to be removed; caveats to be damned.”); see also Robert Driskill, 
Deconstructing the Argument for Free Trade: A Case Study of the Role of Econ-
omists in Policy Debates, 28 ECON. & PHIL., 1, 2 (2012) (“[I]n light of the appar-
ent settled nature of economists’ judgement on the issue of trade liberalization, 
the profession has stopped thinking critically about the question and, as a conse-
quence, makes poor-quality arguments justifying their consensus.”). 
 133 JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS REVISITED xl 
(2018) [hereinafter STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION] (“Doubling down on the Wash-
ington Consensus was a policy inspired by the special interests that it served, but 
the belief in the efficacy of these policies was supported by ‘market fundamental-
ist’ ideologies—the notion that free, unregulated markets were the best way to 
organize a society.”) (emphasis added). 
 134 See Howse, From Politics to Technocracy, supra note 38, at 99 (“Put in 
this crude way, the case for trade liberalization appeared to be totally indifferent 
to any notion of a just distribution of benefits and burdens from the removal of 
trade restrictions.”). 
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measures against the benchmark of an imaginary “toolbox of effec-
tive nontrade policy instruments.”135 This perspective was also re-
inforced by the predisposition that protectionism explains domestic 
rules that deviate from this benchmark of efficient domestic rules.136 
Taking an opposite view, Joseph Stiglitz, the Nobel Prize win-
ning economist, argued, “[t]he globalization which emerged at the 
end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first 
was not based on ‘free trade,’ but managed trade—managed for spe-
cial corporate interests in the United States and other advanced 
countries . . . .”137 The “market fundamentalist” ideologies that cre-
ated a presumption that “free, unregulated markets were the best 
way to organize a society” reinforced the myopic focus of political 
economy theory on the failures of domestic regulation. 138 Paradox-
ically, a policy of deregulation (or not adopting regulation in the first 
place) and of complete free trade is a type of domestic policy, which 
itself is prone to “capture” by domestic interest groups that benefit 
from such policies.139 This led to questions about why international 
trade-law regulation would be immune to such capture.140 To illus-
trate this line of reasoning, an argument can be made that some 
countries, such as the United States, set their data protection stand-
ards strategically low in order to increase their competitiveness on 
a global digital market.141 
                                                                                                             
 135 Id. at 100 (“One simply assumed a certain toolbox of effective nontrade 
policy instruments, and the stability and viability of the social bargains within 
states as well, or at least the stability of institutions that construct and reconstruct 
such social bargains.”). 
 136 See id. (“In its confidence in the prescription of free trade as a timeless 
truth, the network identified special interest groups as the evil force that explained 
all, or almost all, deviations from the clearly rational policy prescription to use 
nontrade instruments for achieving public policy goals.”). 
 137 STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION, supra note 133, at 20. 
 138 See id. at xl. 
 139 See Howse, From Politics to Technocracy, supra note 38, at 100–01. 
 140 See id. 
 141 See, e.g., Graham Greenleaf, The Influence of European Data Privacy 
Standards Outside Europe: Implications for Globalization of Convention 108, 2 
INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 68, 72 (2012) (characterising the U.S. privacy standards 
as inherently or deliberately weak). “[A]ttempts by US companies and the US 
government to use their combined economic and political influence to limit the 
development of data privacy laws in other countries will continue to be important, 
but may now be on the wrong side of history.” Id.; see also Shamel Azmeh & 
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4. THE IMPACT OF NEOLIBERAL DISCOURSE ON FORMATION AND 
FUNCTIONING OF INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM 
The neoliberal discourse had a profound impact on the further 
rounds of negotiations of the GATT, in particular, the Uruguay 
Round (1986-1994) that led to the creation, design and functioning 
of the WTO and the Execution of the WTO Agreement,142 and 
caused a considerable expansion of the scope of the multilateral 
trade system.143 The WTO Agreement not only incorporated the 
GATT 1947,144 but also introduced new international trade law dis-
ciplines on the international trade in services (General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (“GATS”)),145 technical standards,146 sanitary 
                                                                                                             
Christopher Foster, The TPP and the Digital Trade Agenda: Digital Industrial 
Policy and Silicon Valley’s Influence on New Trade Agreements, 12 (London Sch. 
of Econ. and Pol. Sci., Working Paper No. 16-175, 2016) (“Over the last few 
years, the political role of ICT companies has increased substantially with some 
of these firms becoming key political lobbying forces.”). 
 142 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. 
 143 Howse, The World Trade Organization 20 Years On, supra note 45, at 17, 
53–54 (showing that the U.S. fair trade agenda became the core of the Uruguay 
Round, which lead to the adoption of trade disciplines implementing the rules 
dictated by “the predominant ideology represented by the Washington consen-
sus”: extension of disciplines on domestic regulation beyond GATT non-discrim-
ination obligations, greater market access, expansive intellectual property protec-
tion, de-monopolization and deregulation of telecommunications and finance, and 
“scaling down” governmental health, safety and environmental protection). 
 144 General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT 1994] (incorporating almost all of the provisions 
of GATT 1947). 
 145 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 
[hereinafter GATS]. 
 146 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 
U.N.T.S. 120. 
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and phytosanitary measures,147 and intellectual property.148 Another 
important outcome of the Uruguay Round was the creation of a bind-
ing dispute settlement mechanism.149 
During the Uruguay Round, “a specialized policy elite”—em-
ployees of GATT/WTO secretariat and a broad range of “experts”—
took over the gradual development and administration of the multi-
lateral trading system.150 These elites were “insulated from, and not 
particularly interested in, the larger political and social conflicts of 
the age”151 and shared a common set of neoliberal normative values 
(ethos or ideology) on the nature and goals of international trade, the 
                                                                                                             
 147 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493. 
 148 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, An-
nex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]; see also DANIEL J. 
GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 3 (4th ed. 2010). 
 149 Although there was a dispute settlement mechanism under the GATT 1947, 
the decision of the dispute settlement body (“Panel”) had to be adopted by a con-
sensus, which, in practice, meant that a losing party could block the adoption of 
the decision against it. See JACKSON, supra note 69, at 68. Establishment of the 
Dispute Settlement System solved this problem. The Dispute Settlement System 
is embodied in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settle-
ment of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S.; see JACKSON, supra note 69, at 72–73; see also 
Edwin Vermulst & Bart Driessen, An Overview of the WTO Dispute Settlement 
System and its Relationship with the Uruguay Round Agreements, 29 J. WORLD 
TRADE 131, 131 (1995) (providing an overview of the WTO dispute settlement 
system). 
 150 Howse, From Politics to Technocracy, supra note 38, at 98 (“This group 
included some officials employed in the GATT/ WTO Secretariat . . . the larger 
group of ‘experts’: former or current governmental trade officials; GATT-friendly 
academics who often sat on GATT/WTO dispute settlement panels and were in-
vited to various conferences and meetings of the GATT/WTO; international civil 
servants in other organizations (particularly the World Bank, the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, and the International Monetary Fund) 
preoccupied with trade matters; and a few private attorneys, consultants, and for-
mer politicians.”). 
 151 Id. (“A sense of pride developed that an international regime was being 
evolved that stood above the ‘madhouse’ of politics (if one can borrow Pascal’s 
image), a regime grounded in the insights of economic ‘science,’ and not vulner-
able to the open-ended normative controversies and conflicts that plagued most 
international institutions and regimes, most notably, for instance, the United Na-
tions.”). 
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relationship between trade law, and politics and the boundaries of 
domestic regulatory autonomy.152 The main goal of the international 
trading system, as advanced by these policy elites, was no longer 
“embedded liberalism,” but the continued, gradual liberalization of 
trade.153 International trade and globalization became an imperative 
for any trade policy measure, subordinated to the domestic eco-
nomic, social, and political priorities, and an “end in itself.”154 Un-
der the influence of these policy elites, the WTO dispute settlement 
                                                                                                             
 152 See LANG, AFTER NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 181 (“[T]rade re-
gime’s neoliberal turn was in significant part . . . a transformation of collective 
ideas about the nature and purpose of the trade regime, collective ideas about the 
function of law in trade politics, and collective principles and techniques for eval-
uating the legitimacy of governmental action . . . [and] this transformation of the 
GATT/WTO’s ‘legal imagination’ radically reshaped the form, structure, content, 
and interpretation of international trade law.”); see also Joseph H. H. Weiler, The 
Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats Reflections on the Internal and Ex-
ternal Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 191, 193 
(2001) (“The diplomatic ethos which developed in the context of the old GATT 
dispute settlement tenaciously persists despite the much transformed juridified 
WTO.”). 
 153 See RODRIK, supra note 11, at 76 (citing THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE 
LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE: UNDERSTANDING GLOBALIZATION 61–65 (1999)) 
(“[T]he WTO marks the pursuit of a new kind of globalization . . . . Domestic 
economic management was to become subservient to international trade and fi-
nance rather than the other way around. Economic globalization, the international 
integration of the markets for goods and capital (but not labor), became an end in 
itself, overshadowing domestic agendas. . . . Globalization became an imperative, 
apparently requiring all nations to pursue a common strategy of low corporate 
taxation, tight fiscal policy, deregulation, and reduction of the power of unions.”); 
see also Howse, From Politics to Technocracy, supra note 38, at 104 (“[Some 
insiders] moved from free trade as an economic ideology to free trade as embed-
ded in a broader liberal economic ideology. Trade liberalization became part of a 
general set of prescriptions for growth and prosperity, at odds to a large extent 
with the progressive welfare state vision of the embedded liberalism bargain.”); 
Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Customs Classification of Fro-
zen Boneless Chicken Cuts, ¶ 243, WTO Docs. WT/DS269/AB/R; 
WT/DS286/AB/R (adopted Sept. 12, 2005) (stating that security and predictabil-
ity of “the reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the 
substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade is an object and purpose 
of the WTO Agreement, generally, as well as of the GATT 1994”). 
 154 See RODRIK, supra note 11, at 76. 
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system, which had exclusive competence to enforce WTO rules, be-
came largely “self-referential” and gave little weight to other inter-
national rules, such as those governing human rights.155 
This shift in the dominant discourse affected the behavior of 
WTO members.156 Compared to the previous system under GATT 
1947, the WTO dispute settlement system challenged a broader 
range of domestic policy issues.157 As a result, in addition to tradi-
tional trade-related questions such as tariffs and quotas, WTO dis-
pute settlement bodies increasingly had to evaluate compliance with 
the new trade rules of domestic health and environment standards, 
cultural policies, and regulation protecting public morals.158 In ad-
dition to domestic regulation discriminating based on origin (“de 
jure discrimination”),159 which was a primary matter of concern in 
                                                                                                             
 155 Weiler, supra note 152, at 194 (“A very dominant feature of the GATT was 
its self-referential and even communitarian ethos explicable in constructivist 
terms.”). 
 156 See LANG, AFTER NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 223. 
 157 See id. at 223–24 (“By the end of the 1990s, however, as informal norms 
limiting the scope of application of the GATT regulatory disciplines were gradu-
ally reconstituted, the range of measures subject to challenge under Articles I and 
III of the GATT had broadened considerably . . . . It was in part the result of a 
twofold imaginative change consisting of, first, a redefinition of the commonsense 
concept of ‘trade barrier,” and second, a rethinking of the nature and purpose of 
the trade regime itself.”). 
 158 See e.g. Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the 
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 1, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS285/AB/R (adopted Apr. 20, 2005) [hereinafter United States—Measures 
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services]; Appellate 
Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Prohibition of As-
bestos and Asbestos Products, ¶ 1, WTO Doc. NWI/DS135/AB/R (adopted Mar. 
12, 2001); Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 1, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 
1998); Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Concerning 
Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), ¶ 2, WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R (adopted 
Jan. 16, 1998); Appellate Body Report, Canada—Certain Measures Concerning 
Periodicals, 1–2, WTO Doc. WT/DS31/AB/R (adopted June 30, 1997). 
 159 Robert E. Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Req-
uiem for an Aim and Effects Test, 32 INT’L L. 619, 620 (1998) [hereinafter Hudec, 
GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation] (defining “de jure discrimina-
tion” as “regulatory measures that discriminate explicitly by providing different 
standards for domestic and foreign goods or services”); see also NICOLAS F. 
DIEBOLD, NON-DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES: 
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the GATT 1947, starting from late 1980s an increasing number of 
disputes focused on de facto discrimination, or domestic measures 
that did not specifically aim to discriminate foreign goods in favor 
of domestic ones based on their origin, but rather, on a domestic 
regulatory purpose (e.g. health or environmental protection).160 
The WTO caselaw that emerged from these disputes demon-
strates a neoliberal shift in the trade adjudicators’ interpretative 
techniques.161 The WTO adjudicating bodies increasingly refrained 
from considering the regulatory intent when assessing whether a 
particular domestic measure resulting in discrimination between do-
mestic and foreign goods or services violates the relevant trade 
agreement and is, therefore, protectionist.162 Instead, the focus 
shifted towards the economic impact on the competitive opportuni-
                                                                                                             
‘LIKENESS’ IN WTO/GATS 35–37 (2010) [hereinafter DIEBOLD, NON-
DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES]. 
 160 See Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation, supra note 
159, at 620 (defining “de facto discrimination” as “regulatory measures that make 
no explicit distinction between foreign and domestic goods (called ‘origin-neu-
tral’), but which have a disproportionate impact on foreign goods or services that 
is for some reason viewed as wrong or illegitimate”). “Historically, GATT has 
been principally occupied with border measures and explicitly discriminatory 
measures, with de facto discrimination only becoming a major concern relatively 
recently.” Id. at 622. Hudec clarifies that “[o]f the first 207 legal complaints filed 
in GATT between 1948 and 1990, only a small handful involved claims of de 
facto discrimination by internal regulatory measures.” Id. 622 n.8; see also 
DIEBOLD, NON-DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES, supra 
note 159, at 37–45. 
 161 See LANG, AFTER NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 255. 
 162 See id. at 255, 257–65 (“Over the course of the 1990s, the clear trend was 
incrementally but decisively to eliminate virtually any explicit consideration of 
intent in the interpretation of GATT non-discrimination norms.”); see also 
DIEBOLD, NON-DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES, supra 
note 159, at 75–80; MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, ROBERT HOWSE & ANTONIA 
ELIASON, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 138–45 (2013) (examin-
ing the Appellate Body’s interpretation of the National Obligation in the GATT 
and “rejection of an ‘aims and effects’ test to determine the validity of an internal 
tax measure.”); Lothar Ehring, De Facto Discrimination in WTO Law: National 
and Most-Favored-Nation Treatment—or Equal Treatment? 36 J. WORLD TRADE 
921, 931–46 (2002); Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation, su-
pra note 159, at 629–33. 
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ties of foreign goods and the effects on competition between prod-
ucts or services.163 These developments led to an equivalence be-
tween trade-distorting measures, discrimination, and protection-
ism.164 
At bottom, this equivalence between discrimination and protec-
tionism had two practical implications. First, it altered the baseline 
between legitimate regulation and protectionism, thus making the 
term protectionism much more capacious. This, in turn, left a much 
narrower domestic regulatory space to protect non-economic values, 
such as the environment, labor rights, animal welfare, and human 
rights. Second, by refraining from any consideration of regulatory 
intent in the assessment of violations of international trade commit-
ments, the WTO adjudicating bodies transferred the center of grav-
ity in consideration of regulatory purposes towards the all-important 
general exceptions contained in GATT 1994 Article XX and GATS 
Article XIV.165 This shift had an important consequence for the do-
                                                                                                             
 163 See, e.g., Panel Report, Argentina—Measures Affecting the Export of Bo-
vine Hides and the Import of Finished Leather, ¶ 11.182, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS155/R (adopted Feb. 16, 2001) (clarifying that “Article III:2, first sen-
tence, is not concerned with taxes or changes as such or the policy purposes Mem-
bers pursue with them, but with their economic impact on the competitive oppor-
tunities of imported and like domestic products”) (emphasis added); LANG, AFTER 
NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 262; Howse, The World Trade Organization 
20 Years On, supra note 45, at 46 (“Consideration of regulatory intent or of evi-
dence of purposeful discrimination plays no role in this analysis. The adjudicator 
makes a determination of whether the products are ‘like’ based upon objective 
criteria, such as physical characteristics and end uses, while consumer preferences 
can also be dispositive, and then undertakes a formalistic (not empirical) analysis 
of whether the regulatory intervention in question has detrimental impact on com-
petitive opportunities for imported like products. In this disparate impact or de 
facto discrimination analysis, there is no apparent room for consideration of out-
side values or legitimate regulatory purposes.”). 
 164 See LANG, AFTER NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 255 (“[A]n implicit 
association . . . began to be made between the notion of discrimination under Ar-
ticles I and III and the notion of a ‘market distortion’ from economic analysis.”). 
“[T]he non-discrimination norm became a much more powerful tool to wield 
against domestic regulation, even that which was apparently ‘non-discriminatory’ 
in the sense that that term had been traditionally understood. ‘Discrimination’ be-
gan to look very much like ‘trade-distorting market intervention’.” Id. at 264. 
 165 See Appellate Body Report, Argentina—Measures Relating to Trade in 
Goods and Services, ¶ 6.114, WTO Doc. WT/DS453/AB/R (adopted May 9, 
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mestic regulatory space: while the burden of proof of an alleged vi-
olation of a trade obligation is normally on the complaining party, 
the burden of proof that all the conditions of a “necessity” test have 
been met are on the party whose regulatory measure is contested.166 
This way, regulations in the public interest that interfered with in-
ternational trade commitments were effectively put in a defensive 
position, facing the requirement of the necessity test and the require-
ments of the chapeau of the general exceptions.167 
Although the interpretation of the general exceptions has been, 
out of necessity, uneven throughout the years,168 one thing has re-
mained stable: it is a particularly difficult test to meet.169 The inter-
pretation of the general exceptions, which have become the core 
mechanism to distinguish between domestic measures that are legit-
imate and those that are protectionist,170 has created a “protectionist 
                                                                                                             
2016) (“[A] Member’s commitments under the GATS could in some cases serve 
to further its national policy objectives. Where measures are found to be incon-
sistent with a Member’s obligations or commitments under the GATS, the GATS 
provides for various mechanisms, such as Article XIV, which take account of pol-
icy objectives underlying such measures.”). 
 166 See Donald H. Regan, The Meaning of ‘Necessary’ in GATT Article XX 
and GATS Article XIV: The Myth of Cost-Benefit Balancing 6 WORLD TRADE 
REV., 347, 364 (2007). 
 167 See LANG, AFTER NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 265 (arguing that 
“[p]art of the purpose and the effect of the reinterpretation of Article III, in other 
words, was to shift the centre of gravity of the legal discipline of domestic regu-
lation under the GATT from the non-discrimination test in Article III to the ne-
cessity test in Article XX”). 
 168 For a comprehensive overview, see Gabrielle Marceau & Joel P. Tracht-
man, A Map of the World Trade Organization Law of Domestic Regulation of 
Goods: The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosani-
tary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 48 
J. WORLD TRADE 351, 368–77 (2014); Regan, supra note 166, at 347–66 (2007); 
Ingo Venzke, Making General Exceptions: The Spell of Precedents in Developing 
Article XX GATT into Standards for Domestic Regulatory Policy, 12 GERMAN 
L.J. 1111, 1116–35 (2011) (detailing how various GATT panels and Appellate 
Bodies have analyzed Article XX arguments). 
 169 Panagiotis Delimatsis, Protecting Public Morals in a Digital Age: Revisit-
ing the WTO Rulings on US – Gambling and China – Publications and Audiovis-
ual Products, 14 J. INT’L ECON. L. 257, 266 (2011); Venzke, supra note 168, at 
1118–19. 
 170 See Panagiotis Delimatsis, Who’s Afraid of Necessity? And Why it Mat-
ters?, in WTO DOMESTIC REGULATION AND SERVICES TRADE 95 (Aik Hoe Lim 
& Bart De Meester eds., 2014) (“Since the inception of GATT, necessity tests 
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bias”; that is, an inclination to protect the interests of trade-oriented 
stakeholders that “may be inconsistent with the human rights inter-
ests of consumers in maximum equal liberty and open markets.”171 
For example, in the interpretation of the “reasonably available” 
test—the benchmark for the assessment of whether a particular 
trade-inconsistent domestic measure meets the “necessity” require-
ment of the general exception172—WTO adjudicating bodies assess 
whether an alternative measure that provides the same level of pro-
tection of the public interest or objective pursued by a trade-incon-
sistent measure without prohibitive cost or substantial technical dif-
ficulties is available.173 Inconsistency in the interpretation of what 
“the same level of protection” and “prohibitive” costs entail, which 
in some cases amounted to the consideration of an actual level of 
protection achieved by a contested measure (rather than a desired 
level of protection subjectively determined by the state and not (yet) 
necessarily achieved), and disregard of high administrative and en-
forcement costs, has left WTO members a much narrower regulatory 
space than the wording of the test might otherwise suggest.174 The 
                                                                                                             
have formed part of the contract, providing flexibility and “breathing space” to 
regulators. Necessity has been traditionally considered as the prevailing proxy for 
the identification and the discipline of protectionist or unduly burdensome regu-
latory behaviour.”). 
 171 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights and International Economic Law 
in the 21st Century, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 3, 27 (2001). 
 172 See, e.g. Appellate Body Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of 
Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶ 164, WTO Docs. WT/DS161/AB/R, 
WT/DS169/AB/R (adopted Jan. 10, 2001) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, 
Korea—Various Measures on Beef]; Panel Report, Argentina—Measures Relat-
ing to Trade in Goods and Services, ¶ 7.729, WTO Doc. WT/DS453/R (adopted 
May 9, 2016); United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services note 158, ¶¶ 304–307; Appellate Body Reports, 
European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing 
of Seal Products, ¶¶ 5.169, 5.214, WTO Docs. WT/DS400/AB/R / 
WT/DS401/AB/R (adopted June 18, 2014). 
 173 United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling 
and Betting Services, supra note 158, ¶ 308. 
 174 See Appellate Body Report, Korea—Various Measures on Beef, supra note 
141, ¶ 178. Based on the actual application of the contested measure, the Appel-
late Body held the following: 
We think it unlikely that Korea intended to establish a level of 
protection that totally eliminates fraud with respect to the origin 
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reality is that a less trade-restrictive measure is, in theory, almost 
always reasonably available in the imaginary “toolbox of effective 
nontrade policy instruments” mentioned above.175 
Recently, under sharp waves of critique and public discontent 
with the WTO’s practice of reframing regulatory approaches pro-
tecting non-economic values as barriers to trade, the WTO at-
tempted to restore its legitimacy by trying to give more deference to 
the levels of protection of domestic societal interests.176 It does not 
seem to be working. As Andrew Lang neatly put it,  
In the lingua franca of trade professionals, ‘the tooth-
paste was out of the tube,’ and it was simply not pos-
sible to return to a trade regime which was narrowly 
focused on (say) border barriers, and only a small 
subset of domestic regulations which had direct and 
immediate impacts on trade flows.177 
After the Uruguay Round, WTO multilateral negotiations have 
not made any significant progress in further liberalization of inter-
national trade beyond what could be achieved through a neoliberal 
                                                                                                             
of beef (domestic or foreign) sold by retailers. The total elimi-
nation of fraud would probably require a total ban of imports. 
Consequently, we assume that in effect Korea intended to re-
duce considerably the number of cases of fraud occurring with 
respect to the origin of beef sold by retailers. The Panel did find 
that the dual retail system ‘does appear to reduce the opportu-
nities and thus the temptations for butchers to misrepresent for-
eign beef for domestic beef.  
Id. (emphasis added). The alternative measure, which the Appellate Body said 
was reasonably available to Korea, involved higher administrative and enforce-
ment costs. Korea argued that it lacked the resources necessary for this alternative, 
but the Appellate Body still concluded that the contested measure did not pass the 
“necessity” assessment. Id., ¶¶ 175, 180. But see United States—Measures Affect-
ing the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 158, 
¶¶ 308, 317 (The Appellate Body dismissed the alternative measure proposed by 
a claiming party as ‘not an appropriate alternative’, and stated, “[A] ‘reasonably 
available’ alternative measure must be a measure that would preserve for the re-
sponding Member its right to achieve its desired level of protection with respect 
to the objective pursued under paragraph (a) of Article XIV.”) (emphasis added). 
 175 Howse, From Politics to Technocracy, supra note 38, at 100. 
 176 For a detailed account see Howse, The World Trade Organization 20 Years 
On, supra note 45, at 13, 45–75. 
 177 LANG, AFTER NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 315. 
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interpretation of existing rules.178 Instead, international trade law-
making moved to bilateral and regional fora where multiple bilateral 
and plurilateral preferential trade and investment agreements have 
been concluded around the world (some 2300 bilateral investment 
treaties and 291 regional trade agreements are in force).179 These 
agreements have structured and furthered the integration of national 
economies into a single world economic order.180 As opposed to 
WTO negotiations, where consensus of all parties is required, bilat-
eral and regional negotiations make it easier for certain states to ad-
vance a new form of the neoliberal discourse—that of global digital 
trade—to achieve an ever-deeper trade liberalization.181 Drawing a 
parallel with redefinition of protectionism as “new protectionism” 
in 1970s, the next Part discusses how the redefinition of protection-
ism as “digital protectionism” may have contributed to such transi-
tion. 
II. DIGITAL PROTECTIONISM: THE LATEST WAVE OF TRADE 
CONSTRAINTS ON REGULATORY AUTONOMY 
As noted at the end of the previous Part, the last decade has wit-
nessed a trend to regulate electronic commerce and digital trade in 
                                                                                                             
 178 MIRA BURRI, SHOULD THERE BE NEW MULTILATERAL RULES FOR DIGITAL 
TRADE? 3 (2013) (“As the Doha negotiations continue to make little progress, the 
multilateral venue of rule-making is being seriously undermined, and this triggers 
forum-shopping—bilaterally, regionally, and through new plurilateral initiatives 
within clubs of countries, unaffiliated to any international organization, such as 
the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA).”). 
 179 See Regional Trade Agreements, WTO, https://www.wto.org/eng-
lish/tratope/regione/regione.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2019); U.N. Conference on 
Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2016: Investor, Nationality, 
Policy Challenges, 101, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2016 (June 22, 2016). Ac-
cording to Wolfe, of the 275 regional/bilateral trade agreements (“RTAs”) that 
had been notified to the WTO by May 2017, seventy-give have e-commerce pro-
visions, and such provisions are included in more than 60% of the RTAs that en-
tered into force between 2014 and 2016. Robert Wolfe, Learning About Digital 
Trade: Privacy and E-commerce in CETA and TPP, 18 WORLD TRADE REV. s63 
(2019). 
 180 See Howse, The World Trade Organization 20 Years On, supra note 45, at 
48. 
 181 See Joost Pauwelyn, The WTO in Crisis: Five Fundamentals Reconsidered, 
WTO https://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/public_forum12_e/art_pf12_e/art 
9.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2019). 
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bilateral and regional trade agreements.182 These changes have oc-
curred against a background composed of the idea of globalization 
as a net positive, on the one hand, and the development of new in-
formation technologies that allowed for almost instant exchange of 
information, services, and capital, on the other hand. As (personal) 
data became an essential component of cross-border trade, ensuring 
its unrestricted cross-border flow became an important yet conten-
tious point in the negotiations of “new generation” international 
trade agreements.183 These negotiations coincided with the dis-
course of digital trade advanced by the United States, stressing the 
economic benefits of digital trade and exposing the downsides of 
restrictions on cross-border flows of personal data—which are also 
sometimes referred to as data localization requirements184—label-
ling them as “digital protectionism.” This label, as the Article ex-
plains below, is in particular often attached to the E.U. restrictions 
on cross-border transfers of personal data by those criticizing the 
E.U. approach.185 In spite, or perhaps because, of this, E.U. politi-
cians also regularly express their disapproval of digital protection-
ism.186 Although the E.U. and U.S. discourses on digital trade are 
ostensibly woven with similar terminological threads of digital pro-
tectionism, such discourses are inchoate and fundamentally diverge 
                                                                                                             
 182 See Wolfe, supra note 179, at s63. 
 183 See infra Section II.B. 
 184 It could be argued that “restrictions on cross-border data flows” and “data 
localization” mean different things, as data localization laws do not always restrict 
cross-border flows of data. See, e.g., Francesca Casalini & Javier López González, 
Trade and Cross-Border Data Flows 5 (OECD Trade Policy Papers, No. 220), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/b2023a47-en. Some authors view data localization as a 
form of restrictions on cross-border data flows. See, e.g., Susannah Hodson, Ap-
plying WTO and FTA Disciplines to Data Localization Measures, 18 WORLD 
TRADE REV. 2 (2019). Given that there is no consensus on the meaning of these 
terms, and drawing a clear line between them is not the purpose of this Article, I 
will use them interchangeably. 
 185 MATTHIAS BAUER ET AL., EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICAL ECONOMY (ECIPE), U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE ECONOMIC 
IMPORTANCE OF GETTING DATA PROTECTION RIGHT: PROTECTING PRIVACY, 
TRANSMITTING DATA, MOVING COMMERCE 11 (2013), https://Www.Uscham-
ber.Com/Sites/Default/Files/Documents/Files/020508_Economicimportance_Fi-
nal_Revised_Lr.Pdf. 
 186 Catherine Stupp, Lawmakers Rebuke US ‘Digital Protectionism’ Charges, 
EURACTIV (Sep. 25, 2015), https://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/news/law-
makers-rebuke-us-digital-protectionism-charges/. 
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on the views on the underlying values and policy objectives of dig-
ital trade.187 Although in both cases powerful economic interests 
may have played a role in constructing the discourse, when it comes 
to the interplay between digital trade and the protection of personal 
data, unlike the United States, the European Union is bound by in-
ternal constitutional constraints.188 The rights to privacy and the 
protection of personal data are fundamental rights in the E.U. Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights (“E.U. Charter”), which took effect in 
2009 and has the highest legal force in the E.U. legal system.189 This 
Charter has been called the E.U. “Bill of Rights,” thus comparing it 
to the first ten Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.190 It is this 
divergence that could explain why the attempt to redefine protec-
tionism—and narrow domestic regulatory space to protect personal 
data—has ultimately been reflected in the U.S.-led, and not the 
E.U.-led, trade agreements.191 Before turning to the digital trade dis-
course and digital protectionism, let us first see what the E.U. re-
strictions on cross-border transfers of personal data, which are often 
the source of controversy between the European Union and its trad-
ing partners, entail. 
A. The Source of Controversy: E.U. Restrictions on Cross-Border 
Transfers of Personal Data 
This Section provides a high-level overview of the restrictions 
on cross-border transfers of personal data under E.U. law. Readers 
who are already familiar with this topic may skip to the following 
Section. 
                                                                                                             
 187 Greenberg Ctr. for Geoeconomic Studies, The Rise of Digital Protection-
ism, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.cfr.org/report/rise-
digital-protectionism. 
 188 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 18, 2000, 
2000 O.J. (C 364) 1 [hereinafter Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU]. 
 189 Id. arts. 7, 8. 
 190 Charteropedia, EUR. UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RTS., 
https://fra.europa.eu/en/charterpedia (last visited Nov. 9, 2019) (“The Charter is 
the European Union’s ‘bill of rights’.”). 
 191 See RACHEL F. FEFER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44565, DIGITAL 
TRADE AND U.S. TRADE POLICY 21–23 (2019), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44565.pdf. 
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The E.U. legal framework for personal data protection includes 
two sets of rules: substantive rules regulating access to and pro-
cessing of any personal data in the European Union, on the one hand, 
and the rules governing transfers of personal data outside the Euro-
pean Economic Area (“EEA”).192 Restrictions on transfers of per-
sonal data also apply to providing remote access to personal data 
from outside the EEA.193 Unlike the E.U. “border control approach” 
to transfers of personal data, the United States maintains an “open 
skies” policy on this issue.194 Regulation of cross-border data flows 
gives domestic privacy rules an international dimension.195 It is that 
set of rules that is more often showcased as detrimental to interna-
tional trade and described as protectionist.196 
                                                                                                             
 192 Martina F. Ferracane & Erik van der Marel, The Cost of Data Protection-
ism, ECIPE (Oct. 2018), http://ecipe.org/blog/the-cost-of-data-protection-
ism/#_ftn5, [hereinafter Ferracane & van der Marel, The Cost of Data Protection-
ism] (“We identify two main categories of data policies. The first category covers 
those policies that impact the cross-border transfer of data whilst the second cat-
egory covers policies that apply to the use of data domestically.”). 
 193 EUR. DATA PROT. BD., GUIDELINES 2/2018 ON DEROGATIONS OF ARTICLE 
49 UNDER REGULATION 2016/619, at 4 (2018), https://edpb.eu-
ropa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file1/edpb_guidelines_2_2018_derogations_en.pdf. 
[hereinafter EUR. DATA PROT. BD.] (noting that “a transfer will for example gen-
erally be considered to be non-occasional or repetitive when the data importer is 
granted direct access to a database (e.g. via an interface to an IT-application) on 
a general basis.”). The European Data Protection Board is a consultative body 
comprising all E.U. data protection authorities. See About EDPB, EUR. DATA 
PROTECTION BOARD, https://edpb.europa.eu/about-edpb/about-edpb_en (last vis-
ited Nov. 9, 2019).  
 194 Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, The Regulation of Cross-Border Data Flows, 1 
INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 180, 184 (2011), (“The relatively strict border control 
scheme introduced through this has had a significant impact in other countries 
striving towards meeting the privacy standard set by the EU”); see also François 
LeSieur, Regulating Cross-Border Data Flows and Privacy in the Networked Dig-
ital Environment and Global Knowledge Economy, 2 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 93, 
101, 103–04 (2012). 
 195 See LeSieur, supra note 194, at 93. 
 196 See Avi Goldfarb & Daniel Trefler, Artificial Intelligence and Interna-
tional Trade, in THE ECONOMICS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 463, 479–80 
(Ajay Agrawal et al. eds., 2019) (viewing restrictions on personal data transfers 
as a form of data localization that could favor domestic firms and have negative 
effects on trade); see also Ferracane & van der Marel, The Cost of Data Protec-
tionism, supra note 192 (“We find that restrictions on the cross-border movement 
of data, as opposed to restrictions on the domestic use of data, significantly reduce 
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The E.U. framework governing transfers of personal data out-
side the EEA is based on a “prohibition with derogations” princi-
ple.197 Under the General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”),198 
which entered into force in May 2018, transfers of personal data to 
a country or territory outside the EEA or to an international organi-
zation (referred to jointly as “cross-border transfers of personal 
data”) may only occur if the conditions of Chapter V of the GDPR 
are met.199 Let us see what this entails. 
The European Data Protection Board (“EDPB”)200 advocates a 
layered approach to cross-border transfers of personal data outside 
the EEA.201 Transfers of personal data can occur without restrictions 
only if the destination country, territory, or international organiza-
tion ensures an “adequate” level of personal data protection.202 “Ad-
equate,” as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(“CJEU”), means “essentially equivalent” to the level of protection 
of fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the E.U. Charter 
of Fundamental Rights.203 The European Commission (“Commis-
sion”) unilaterally evaluates adequacy of the data protection regime 
of a country, territory, or international organization on a case-by-
case basis, taking into account its legal and administrative mecha-
nisms of personal data protection.204 If the Commission’s assess-
                                                                                                             
imports of services.”); Avi Goldfarb & Catherine E. Tucker, Privacy Regulation 
and Online Advertising, 57 MGMT. SCI. 57, 69–70 (2011) (demonstrating that Eu-
ropean strict e-privacy rules lead to an average reduction in effectiveness of 65% 
of banner ads, thus proving to be damaging for the European advertising industry). 
 197 Svetlana Yakovleva, Should Fundamental Rights to Privacy and Data Pro-
tection be a Part of the EU’s International Trade ‘Deals’?, 17 WORLD TRADE 
REV. 477, 486 (2018). 
 198 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Pro-
cessing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 
[hereinafter GDPR]. 
 199 Id. art. 44. 
 200 See EUR. DATA PROT. BD., supra note 193, at 3. 
 201 Id. 
 202 GDPR, supra note 198, art. 45. 
 203 Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 EUR-Lex 
62014CJ0362 (Oct. 6, 2015). 
 204 For a list of criteria for assessment, see GDPR art. 45(2). 
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ment results in a positive finding, it issues a legally binding “ade-
quacy decision.”205 Transfers of personal data to countries, territo-
ries, or international organizations that have not been granted an ad-
equacy decision can lawfully occur only subject to “appropriate 
safeguards” put in place by the data controller or possessor (such as 
standard contractual clauses, binding corporate rules, certification, 
or codes of conduct).206 In exceptional circumstances, exporters of 
personal data may rely on limited derogations (such as unambiguous 
consent of the data subject or the performance or conclusion of a 
contract with or in the interest of the data subject).207 The deroga-
tions may only be used for non-repetitive and occasional transfers, 
however.208 The layered approach requires that before using these 
derogations, data exporters should first “endeavour possibilities to 
frame the transfer” with one of the adequate safeguards.209 
The European Union’s restrictions on cross-border transfers of 
personal data undoubtedly impose limitations on international trade. 
The key question is whether such restrictions can appropriately be 
labelled as “protectionist,” and if so, what the consequences of using 
this label might be in future policy decisions. The Article addresses 
this question later in Part III. 
B. The Digital Trade Discourse(s) 
As shown above, showcasing the economic benefits of free 
cross-border data flows, the narrative of digital trade often presents 
domestic privacy and data protection regimes (as well as their inter-
                                                                                                             
 205 “Adequacy decisions” are adopted as Commission implementing acts 
based on Article 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 
288, October 26, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47–390. As of July 2019, the Commission has 
issued adequacy decisions for Andorra, Argentina, Canada, the Faroe Islands, 
Guernsey, the Isle of Man, Israel, Japan, Jersey, New Zealand, Switzerland, and 
Uruguay, and a special sectoral regime—the E.U.-U.S. “Privacy Shield”. See Ad-
equacy Decisions, EUR. COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-
topic/data-protection/international-dimension-data-protection/adequacy-deci-
sions_en (last visited Nov. 4, 2019). 
 206 GDPR, supra note 198, arts. 46–47. 
 207 Id. art. 49. 
 208 EUR. DATA PROT. BD., supra note 193, at 4, 8. 
 209 Id. at 4. 
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national divergence) as (digital) trade barriers. A number of eco-
nomic arguments, advanced primarily by the U.S. government, Eu-
ropean and U.S. pro-trade think tanks (but also by several academ-
ics) are used to explain why restrictions on cross-border flows of 
personal data or data localization requirements hamper digital trade. 
For instance, an influential McKinsey & Company report argued 
that in 2014 alone, cross-border data flows generated $2.8 trillion in 
value.210 An earlier study conducted for the U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce by the pro-trade think tank European Center for International 
Political Economy (“ECIPE”) warned of the negative welfare ef-
fects on the E.U. economy if cross-border data flows would be dis-
rupted by the then-draft GDPR.211 A number of other ECIPE studies 
predict that removal of restrictions on cross-border flows of infor-
mation would increase imports of services, on average by five per-
cent.212 These studies feed into the lobbying activities of export-ori-
ented service industries around the world.213 In a similar vein, in a 
                                                                                                             
 210 JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., MCKINSEY & CO., DIGITAL GLOBALIZATION: 




also U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP, BUSINESS 
WITHOUT BORDERS: THE IMPORTANCE OF CROSS-BORDER DATA TRANSFERS TO 
GLOBAL PROSPERITY 1–2 (2014), 
https://www.huntonak.com/images/content/3/0/v3/3086/Business-without-
Borders.pdf [hereinafter BUSINESS WITHOUT BORDERS]. 
 211 MATTHIAS BAUER ET AL., EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICAL ECONOMY (ECIPE), U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE ECONOMIC 
IMPORTANCE OF GETTING DATA PROTECTION RIGHT: PROTECTING PRIVACY, 
TRANSMITTING DATA, MOVING COMMERCE 3 (2013) 
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/documents/files/020508_Econom
icImportance_Final_Revised_lr.pdf. 
 212 See Ferracane & van der Marel, The Cost of Data Protectionism, supra 
note 192 ( “Our analysis predicts that, if countries lifted their restrictions on the 
cross-border flow of data, the imports of services would rise on average by five 
percent across all countries, with obvious benefits for local companies and 
consumers who could access cheaper and better online services from abroad.”). 
 213 See, e.g., Press Release, Glob. Serv. Coal., Statement on Digital Trade 
(Oct. 16, 2017), http://www.esf.be/new/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Global-Ser-
vices-Coalition-Statement-on-Digital-Trade-Final-16-Oct-2017.pdf (quoting 
Manyika, supra note 210, and several ECIPE studies and “calling[ing] for nego-
tiators of ongoing or future negotiations related to data flow including FTAs/EPAs 
to make their utmost efforts to agree on strong and effective provisions which 
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taxonomy of trade restricting measures prepared by the United 
States International Trade Commission (“USITC”), the E.U. data 
protection framework, which unlike U.S. law requires a higher level 
of data protection complemented by restrictions on cross-border 
transfers of personal data, is mentioned as restricting international 
digital trade in several sectors.214 The USITC and ECIPE stress that, 
generally speaking, restrictions on cross-border transfers, in addi-
tion to substantive rules restricting the use of personal data and data 
localization measures, increase the costs of conducting business for 
multinational companies.215 More specifically, researchers associ-
ated with the ECIPE argue that restrictions on cross-border data 
flows reduce (or, in other words, restrict) imports of data-intensive 
services.216 
As any user of Facebook can attest, personal data, viewed as an 
economic asset, also constitutes an important ingredient of artificial 
intelligence-based systems and algorithms, an input in the produc-
tion of many digital services, production processes, and logistics.217 
                                                                                                             
guarantee free flow of data, and prohibit forced data localization and requirements 
for provision of software source code, while applying appropriate and effective 
protection and security for personal data.”). 
 214 DAVID COFFIN ET AL., U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, GLOBAL DIGITAL 
TRADE 1: MARKET OPPORTUNITIES AND KEY FOREIGN TRADE RESTRICTIONS  273 
(2017), https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4716.pdf (“According to 
input from industry representatives, regulatory and policy measures focused on 
data protection and privacy affect all kinds of industries. These measures can 
inhibit global digital trade by U.S. firms due to the increased administrative costs 
associated with complying with stricter privacy measures that differ from U.S. 
standards.”). 
 215 Id.; Ferracane & van der Marel, The Cost of Data Protectionism, supra 
note 192. 
 216 See Martina Francesca Ferracane & Erik van der Marel, Do Data Policy 
Restrictions Inhibit Trade in Services? 15 (Eur. Ctr. for Int’l Political Econ., Dig. 
Trade Estimates Working Paper No. 2, 2018), https://ecipe.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2018/10/Do-Data-Policy-Restrictions-Inhibit-Trade-in-Services-final.pdf 
(showing that “more restrictive data policies, in particular with respect to the 
cross-border movement of data, result in lower imports in data-intense services 
for countries imposing them.”). 
 217 See JACQUES CRÉMER, YVES-ALEXANDRE DE MONTIOYE, & HEIKE 
SCHWEITZER, COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE DIGITAL ERA, FINAL REPORT TO THE 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR COMPETITION 73 (2019), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/kd0419345enn.pdf (“Data is 
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In other words, it is a factor of production.218 Foreign providers of 
such services, including targeted marketing companies, are in a less 
favorable position then domestic providers that do not have to com-
ply with the cross-border transfer restrictions to provide the same 
services domestically.219 In addition, restrictions on flows of data 
are viewed not only as detrimental to ICT services, but also for trade 
in goods and services generally as they may result in companies 
choosing a less efficient mode of production (or supply) of ser-
vices.220 Global information flows allow multinational companies to 
                                                                                                             
a core input factor for production processes, logistics, targeted marketing, smart 
products and services, as well as Artificial Intelligence (AI).”). 
 218 See Milton Mueller & Karl Grindal, Data Flows and the Digital Economy: 
Information as a Mobile Factor of Production, 21 DIGITAL POL’Y, REG. & 
GOVERNANCE 71, 80 (2019) (concluding that “information in the form of digital 
data flows can be considered a mobile factor of production . . . .”); see also Fran-
cisco Costa-Cabral & Orla Lynskey, The Internal and External Constraints of 
Data Protection on Competition Law in the EU 11 (London Sch. of Econ. Law, 
Soc’y & Econ., Working Paper No. 25, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2703655 
(“Without personal data as an input some goods and services are now ostensibly 
impossible to produce, leading to the growth of commodity markets for personal 
data. Thus, personal data is a full-fledged factor of production in a modern econ-
omy.”); see also Seda Gürses & Joris van Hoboken, Privacy After the Agile Turn, 
in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSUMER PRIVACY 579, 595 (Evan Selinger 
et al. eds., 2018) (showing that users’ data has become an integral part of produc-
tion and testing of digital services and software). 
 219 Under the GDPR, in order to access EEA personal data from outside the 
EEA foreign companies not only have to comply with legal grounds for collecting 
personal data under Articles 5 and 6 of the GDPR (requirements that generally 
apply to European companies), but also with the limitations on cross-border trans-
fers of personal data (Chapter V GDPR). EUR. DATA PROT. BD., supra note 193, 
at 3.  
When applying Article 49 one must bear in mind that according 
to Article 44 the data exporter transferring personal data to third 
countries or international organizations must also meet the con-
ditions of the other provisions of the GDPR. Each processing 
activity must comply with the relevant data protection provi-
sions, in particular with Articles 5 and 6. Hence, a two-step test 
must be applied: first, a legal basis must apply to the data pro-
cessing as such together with all relevant provisions of the 
GDPR; and as a second step, the provisions of Chapter V must 
be complied with.  
Id.; see also Bergkamp, supra note 8, at 39. 
 220 See Ferracane & van der Marel, The Cost of Data Protectionism, supra 
note 192 (citing Andrea Andrenelli et. al., Multinational Production and Trade in 
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operate globally with less of a physical presence.221 Some academ-
ics also argue that restrictions on data flows may limit the possibili-
ties of world-wide aggregation of personal data and are thus threat-
ening technological advances in such areas as cloud computing and 
AI.222 In a similar vein, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and Hunton 
& Williams warned that such restrictions may turn the “Internet” 
into a “splinternet,” paving the way to economic stagnation.223 
C. Framing Data Protection as “Digital Protectionism” in the 
Digital Trade Discourse 
Discourse matters and the discourse is changing. Political, aca-
demic, and societal debates on cross-border data flows now revolve 
                                                                                                             
Services, (OECD, Trade Policy Paper No. 212, 2018), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/16ec6b55-en) [hereinafter Andrenelli, Multinational 
Production] (“[A] range of data-intense services from computer services to retail 
and information services are increasingly being traded over the internet rather than 
by other means such as foreign establishments. Restricting data would, therefore, 
also inhibit companies from choosing the most efficient channel of trading many 
services.”). 
 221 See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Re-
port: Investment and the Digital Economy, at 167, UN Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2017 
(June 7, 2017) [hereinafter World Investment Report 2017]. 
 222 See Anupam Chander & Uyen P. Lê, Data Nationalism, 64 EMORY L.J. 
677, 680 (2014) [hereinafter Chander & Lê, Data Nationalism] (Labelling E.U. 
restrictions on transfers of personal data as data localization measures and stating 
that “[b]y creating national barriers to data, data localization measures break up 
the World Wide Web, which was designed to share information across the 
globe . . . . Data localization would dramatically alter this fundamental architec-
ture of the Internet.”); id. at 681 (arguing that data localization measures promote 
“data nationalism,” which “poses a mortal threat to the new kind of international 
trade made possible by the Internet—information services such as those supplied 
by Bangalore or Silicon Valley.”); see also Goldfarb & Trefler, supra note 196, 
at 29 (“Data localization is an issue for AI because AI requires data . . . . In other 
words, localization is a way to restrict the possible scale of any country in AI, but 
at the cost of lower quality overall.”). But see Christopher Kuner, Data National-
ism and its Discontents, 64 EMORY L.J. 2089, 2090 (2015) [hereinafter Kuner, 
Data Nationalism] (offering a powerful critique of these arguments). 
 223 BUSINESS WITHOUT BORDERS, supra note 210, at 2–3 (“Technological ad-
vances and an increasingly globalized economy have brought us to a policy cross-
roads: one path leads to a ‘splinternet’ of economic isolation, characterized by 
misguided attempts to safeguard data by building protectionist walls . . . . [T]his 
isolationist approach has repeatedly caused economic stagnation.”). 
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around terms such as “digital protectionism,” “data protectionism,” 
“data nationalism,” and “innovation mercantilism.”224 
That said, the view that restrictions on cross-border flows of per-
sonal data could favor domestic industries is not new.225 As early as 
1978, John Eger raised a concern that restrictions on cross-border 
flows of personal data adopted by some E.U. countries and envis-
aged to be introduced on E.U. level might, in practice, not only be 
used to protect privacy and national sovereignty, but also “to protect 
domestic economic interests” as indirect barriers to trade.226 It is 
only recently, however, that the term “digital protectionism” was 
coined to refer to such restrictions.227 For example, in a recent non-
paper for the discussions on electronic commerce at the WTO, Japan 
stressed the necessity “to address emerging ‘digital protectionism’” 
as a pre-requisite for “open, secure, and reliable global e-commerce 
environment that will promote and facilitate cross-border digital 
trade.”228 Relying on the definition of barriers to digital trade by 
USITC, George Washington University Professor Susan Aaronson 
defined digital protectionism as “barriers or impediments to digital 
trade, including censorship, filtering, localization measures, and 
                                                                                                             
 224 See e.g. Chander & Lê, Data Nationalism, supra note 222, at 679, 739; 
Neha Mishra, Data Localization Laws in a Digital World: Data Protection or 
Data Protectionism? PUB. SPHERE, 206, at 137, 144 [hereinafter Mishra, Data Lo-
calization Laws] (“From a [international political economy] perspective, a domi-
nant view is the emergence of ‘innovation mercantilism’ in digital trade today.”); 
Aaronson, What We Are Talking About, supra note 35, at 3; Andrew D. Mitchell 
& Neha Mishra, Data at the Docks: Modernizing International Trade Law for the 
Digital Economy, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1073, 1111–12 (2018) [hereinafter 
Mitchell & Mishra, Data at the Docks]. 
 225 See John M. Eger, Emerging Restrictions on Transnational Data Flows: 
Privacy Protection or Non-Tariff Trade Barriers, 10 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1055, 
1066 (1978). 
 226 See id. at 1066 (“Many countries in Europe may have no concern other 
than protecting the privacy of personal data, a concern which neither the American 
public nor any member of a democratic society can fault. But there is the danger, 
of course, that these new laws will be used not only to protect just privacy but also 
to protect domestic economic interests.”). 
 227 See Aaronson, What Are We Talking About, supra note 35, at 2, 8. 
 228 Work Programme on Electronic Commerce, Non-Paper for the Discus-
sions on Electronic Commerce / Digital Trade from Japan, ¶ 2.2, WTO Doc. 
JOB/GC/100 (July 21, 2016). 
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regulations to protect privacy.”229 Other academics, most notably 
Anupam Chander and Uyen P. Lê, argued that “[w]e must insist on 
data protection without data protectionism. A better, safer Internet 
for everyone should not require breaking it apart.”230 Similarly, Mira 
Burri called upon international legal scholars to “stress the dangers 
of data protectionism, often under the disguise of legitimate objec-
tives, such as national security or privacy protection.”231 At the same 
time, Burri points out that not only divergent approaches to data pri-
vacy and protection (which is arguably the crux of the cross-border 
data flow problem), but also standards of data protection that are too 
low could be viewed as barriers or obstacles to trade.232 This is, in 
part, because consumer confidence and trust, she argues, are a pre-
condition for well-functioning digital trade.233 This leads to a search 
for an optimal level (from a trade perspective) of protection rather 
than a complete absence of protection.234 
The U.S. administration’s recent rhetoric centered on the notion 
of data protectionism seems to be based exactly on this logic. U.S. 
trade experts and the administration have used harsh language to 
characterize the European Union’s privacy and data protection 
                                                                                                             
 229 Susan Aaronson, Why Trade Agreements Are Not Setting Information 
Free: The Lost History and Reinvigorated Debate over Cross-Border Data Flows, 
Human Rights, and National Security, 14 WORLD TRADE REV. 671, 674 (2015) 
[hereinafter Aaronson, Why Trade Agreements Are Not Setting Information Free] 
(citing JAMES STAMPS ET AL., U.S. INT’ TRADE COMM’N,  DIGITAL TRADE IN THE 
U.S. AND GLOBAL ECONOMIES, PART 1, at 5–1 to 5–2 (2013), 
https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4415.pdf [hereinafter Digital Trade, 
Part 1]); see also Aaronson, What We Are Talking About, supra note 35, at 17–
22. 
 230 Chander & Lê, Data Nationalism, supra note 222, at 739 (emphasis added). 
 231 Burri, The Regulation of Data Flows, supra note 9, at 448 (emphasis 
added). 
 232 Mira Burri, Current and Emerging Trends in Disruptive Technologies: Im-
plications for the Present and Future of EU’s Trade Policy, PARL. EUR. DOC. 
(EP/EXPO/B/INTA/2017/6) 13–14 (2017). 
 233 Id.; see also Neha Mishra, Building Bridges: International Trade Law, In-
ternet Governance, and the Regulation of Data Flows, 52 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 463, 503 (2019) [hereinafter Mishra, Building Bridges] (“Implementing inter-
net privacy is increasingly recognised as one of the fundamental requirements for 
digital trade.”). 
 234 Id. 
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framework.235 Work by Professor Aaronson demonstrates how the 
U.S. administration routinely uses the terms “protectionism” or 
“digital protectionism” to refer to E.U.-style privacy and personal 
data protection regimes.236 Yet, in parallel to attaching the (nega-
tive) label “protectionism” to—what it sees as too much—privacy 
protection, the U.S. government has also at times criticized situa-
tions with too little privacy protection on instrumental grounds, ar-
guing that insufficient consumer privacy protection can stifle elec-
tronic commerce.237 It seems to agree that the protection of privacy 
and personal data are crucial to maintain consumer trust in digital 
technologies that in turn is indispensable for the strong and orderly 
development of electronic and digital commerce.238 As the Article 
argues in Part III, this is not a mere “inconsistency” of U.S. argu-
ments on this issue,239 but indeed a fundamental question of a base-
line—or optimal level of protection—that delineates “useful” (and 
possibly indispensable) protection from excessive protection (that 
one would then label “protectionist” to try to lower it). In Part III, 
the Article returns to the key role of discourse in drawing this base-
line. 
                                                                                                             
 235 See, e.g., Digital Trade in the U.S. and Global Economies, Part 2, Inv. No. 
332-540, USITC Pub. 4485, at 14 (Aug. 2014), http://www.usitc.gov/publica-
tions/332/pub4485.pdf [hereinafter Digital Trade, Part 2] (stating that E. U. data 
privacy and protection requirements are “obstacles to international digital trade,” 
among localization requirements, intellectual property rights infringement and 
customs measures.). 
 236 See, e.g., Aaronson, What Are We Talking About, supra note 35, at 8–10; 
see also Susan A. Aaronson, Digital Protectionism? Or Label the U.S. Govern-
ment Uses to Criticize Policy It Doesn’t Like? COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 
(Mar. 3, 2016) http://blogs.cfr.org/cyber/2016/03/03/digital-protectionism-or-la-
bel-the-u-s-government-uses-to-criticize-policy-it-doesnt-like/ [hereinafter 
Aaronson, Digital Protectionism?]. 
 237 See Susan Ariel Aaronson, Redefining Protectionism: The New Challenge 
in the Digital Age 87 (The George Washington University, Institute for Interna-
tional Economic Policy Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 30, 2016) 
[hereinafter Aaronson, Redefining Protectionism]; see also Aaronson, What We 
Are Talking About, supra note 35, at 21–22. 
 238 Id. at 19. 
 239 Aaronson, Redefining Protectionism, supra note 237, at 87 (“U.S. argu-
ments against digital protectionism are often inconsistent.”); see also Aaronson, 
What We Are Talking About, supra note 35, at 21 (“[T]he United States has 
adopted an inconsistent approach to privacy as a barrier to trade . . . .”). 
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Authors associated with ECIPE and Baker & McKenzie have 
characterized the E.U. data protection framework as “disproportion-
ate and potentially protectionist.”240 This resonates with Alan Beat-
tie’s article in Financial Times comparing the European Union’s ap-
proach to resistance to genetically modified organisms (“GMOs”) 
on public health grounds—a topic around which the battle between 
the European Union and United States lasted for at least two dec-
ades.241 Even former U.S. President Barack Obama, reacting to the 
antitrust and data protection enforcement actions against U.S. tech 
giants Google and Facebook in the European Union, publicly insin-
uated the European Union was merely pursuing its “commercial in-
terests.”242 
As alluded to above, despite being criticized for pursing poten-
tially protectionist restrictions on transfers of personal data, the Eu-
ropean Union itself is also actively seeking to remove measures it 
labels as digital protectionism.243 If one looks at the European Union 
                                                                                                             
 240 BAUER ET AL., supra note 185, at 4. (“The question of whether the Euro-
pean regulatory model on privacy is disproportionate and potentially protectionist 
has become one of the most controversial political debates within the EU at this 
time, and perhaps rightly so.”); see also Lothar Determann, Adequacy of Data 
Protection in the USA: Myths and Facts, 6 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L., 244, 247–48 
(2016) (“The USA support free global trade and have so far not retaliated against 
the protectionist data transfer restrictions in ‘Fortress Europe.’”). 
 241 Alan Beattie, EU Trade Data Flows Are Becoming the New GMOs, FIN. 
TIMES (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/9da22968-d8ee-11e7-a039-
c64b1c09b482 (arguing that the E.U. privacy and data protection framework is a 
localization requirement that acts as a form of protectionism in favour of (un-
named) interest groups, just as the E.U. prohibition on GMOs helped European 
farmers to protect themselves unfairly from U.S. competition.) Beattie contends 
that this regulatory framework will benefit European firms and, in the long term, 
the European Union’s “attitude to cross-border data flows . . . will retard Euro-
pean companies’ ability to maximise digital technology to full advantage.” Id. 
 242 Murad Ahmed et. al., Obama Attacks Europe Over Technology Protection-
ism, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/41d968d6-b5d2-
11e4-b58d-00144feab7de (“We have owned the internet. Our companies have 
created it, expanded it, perfected it in ways that they can’t compete. And often-
times what is portrayed as high-minded positions on issues sometimes is just de-
signed to carve out some of their commercial interests.”). 
 243 Julia Fioretti, EU Moves to Remove Barriers to Data Flows in Trade Deals, 
REUTERS (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-data-trade-
idUSKBN1FT2DC. 
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not as a homogenous institution but a composition of different sub-
systems (primarily at the E.U. and Member States levels) with dif-
ferent goals and decision-making processes that determine the Eu-
ropean Union’s external (trade) and internal policies, then the situa-
tion is less clear.244 The issue becomes even more complicated if 
one also takes into account that, in the E.U. Commission, different 
departments (directorates general) are responsible for international 
trade (DG Trade)245 and fundamental rights (DG Just).246 
After the 2008 worldwide financial crisis, the European Com-
mission changed its discourse; in its new discourse, trade liberaliza-
tion was “consistently presented . . . as a desirable and even neces-
sary solution to the crisis and protectionism as a mistake from the 
past that has to be avoided.”247 This rhetoric targeted not only the 
European Union’s trading partners, but also the traditionally more 
protectionist E.U. Member States that opposed to European Union’s 
bilateral concessions that could harm their domestic industries.248 
Faithful to its longstanding course towards further liberalization 
of trade and with an eye toward benefiting from globalization, in its 
                                                                                                             
 244 See ALASDAIR R. YOUNG & JOHN PETERSON, PAROCHIAL GLOBAL 
EUROPE: 21ST CENTURY TRADE POLITICS 23 (2014) (“Trade policy might be 
viewed as one of the most atomistic of all areas of public policy. Each policy 
decision—whether it is to negotiate a free trade agreement or impose anti-dump-
ing duties on an imported product—involves different calculations, interests, and 
timeframes.”). 
 245 Directorate-General: Trade, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/de-
partments/trade_en (last visited Jan. 10, 2020). 
 246 Directorate-General: Just, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/de-
partments/justice-and-consumers_en (last visited Jan. 10, 2020). 
 247 Yelter Bollen, Ferdi De Ville & Jan Orbie, EU Trade Policy: Persistent 
Liberalisation, Contentious Protectionism, 38 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 279, 288 
(2016) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Bollen et al., EU Trade Policy]. 
 248 Id. (“This liberalisation-as-recovery-instrument discourse has been very 
powerful and difficult to contest by traditionally more protectionist Member 
States, uncompetitive industries or trade unions.”); see also Gabriel Siles-Brügge, 
Resisting Protectionism After the Crisis: Strategic Economic Discourse and the 
EU–Korea Free Trade Agreement, 16 NEW POLIT. ECON. 627, 643 (2011) (“How 
did DG Trade manage to convince the Member States to agree to the provisions 
of the FTA when it was facing the opposition of the powerful car industry . . . ? 
The answer is that, in a sense, it had already won the battle, by recasting liberali-
sation as necessary process, both in terms of the external constraint posed by glob-
alisation but also, more specifically, the competitive pressure emanating from 
commercial rivals.”). 
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2015 Communication “Trade for All,” the European Commission 
contended that “the free flow of data across borders has become 
more important for European competitiveness in general.”249 In No-
vember 2016, the E.U. trade commissioner Cecilia Malström noted 
that “in the digital age, restrictions on cross-border data flows inhibit 
trade of all kinds, and may amount to ‘digital protectionism.’”250 
She committed to using international trade deals as a means for set-
ting the rules for digital trade. Where, then, one might ask, is the 
issue, if everyone agrees on the ills of digital protectionism? It fol-
lows from the fact that, when it comes to the rights to privacy and 
the protection of personal data, the European Union’s opposition to 
digital protectionism is now on a wholly different trajectory. The 
E.U. approach in this respect shifted in 2015 following push-back 
                                                                                                             
 249 EUR. COMM’N, TRADE FOR ALL: TOWARD A MORE RESPONSIBLE TRADE 
AND INVESTMENT POLICY 12 (2015), https://trade.ec.europa.eu/do-
clib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153846.pdf (emphasis added). 
 250 Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Commissioner Malmström on the Opportu-
nities of Digital Trade (Nov. 17, 2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/in-
dex.cfm?id=1580. 
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by the European Parliament,251 E.U.-Member States,252 academ-
ics,253 and civil society254 to the European Union’s digital “free 
trade” policy, which made it apparent that such a policy “should not 
undermine European levels of protection and democratic policy-
making.”255 This shift is apparent, for example, in the 2017 Com-
munication “Exchanging and Protecting Personal Data in a Global-
ised World,” where the European Commission carefully carved out 
privacy protection from “protectionism” by highlighting that “Euro-
pean companies operating in some third countries are increasingly 
                                                                                                             
 251 See Resolution of July 8, 2015 Containing the European Parliament’s Rec-
ommendations for the European Commission on the Negotiations for the Trans-
atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), EUR. PARL. DOC. 
P8_TA(2015)0252 9 (2015) (“[T]o ensure that the EU’s Acquis on data privacy 
is not compromised through the liberalisation of data flows . . . while recognizing 
the relevance of data flows as a backbone of transatlantic trade and the digital 
economy . . . .”); Resolution of Feb. 3, 2016 Containing the European Parlia-
ment’s Recommendations to the Commission on the Negotiations for the Trade 
in Services Agreement (TiSA), EUR. PARL. DOC. P8_TA(2016)0041 (2016) 
(“[T]o acknowledge that data protection and the right to privacy are not a trade 
barrier, but fundamental rights, which are enshrined in Article 39 TEU and 
Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Un-
ion . . . .”). 
 252 See Bollen et al., EU Trade Policy, supra note 247, at 284 (“In the states 
where TTIP has become most politicised, notably Germany, Austria and the 
United Kingdom, the openness-protectionism dichotomy is of minor importance. 
Instead, the debate is dominated by arguments about sovereignty, regulatory par-
adigms and food safety.”). 
 253 See, e.g., KRISTINA IRION, SVETLANA YAKOVLEVA, & MARIJA BARTL, 
TRADE AND PRIVACY: COMPLICATED BEDFELLOWS? HOW TO ACHIEVE DATA 
PROTECTION-PROOF FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 54 (2016) (“The risks for privacy 
and data protection stemming from the sphere of the EU are, broadly speaking, 
that EU international relations could place more emphasis on international trade 
in services relative to EU standards on privacy and data protection.”). 
 254 See, e.g., Heini Järvinen, BEUC and EDRi Urge the EU Commission Not 
to Undermine Citizens’ Privacy in Trade Agreements, EUR. DATA RTS. (June 13, 
2016), https://edri.org/beuc-edri-urge-eu-commission-not-undermine-citizens-
privacy-trade-agreements/ (“Discussions on forced data localisation should take 
place outside trade agreements. Otherwise, our fundamental rights to privacy and 
data protection can be undermined or challenged as trade barriers.”). 
 255 Bollen et al., EU Trade Policy, supra note 247, at 284. 
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faced with protectionist restrictions that cannot be justified with le-
gitimate privacy considerations.”256  
In sum, while the European Union and United States frame their 
digital trade discourses in similar terms, they clearly do not agree on 
the right balance to be struck between the economic benefits of dig-
ital trade, on the one hand, and societal values, such as the protection 
of the rights to privacy and personal data, on the other.257 Both trad-
ing partners, however, do seem to agree that the term “protection-
ism” has a negative valence,258 which reinforces the importance of 
using the term only with full knowledge of its power to frame the 
debate and shape policy decisions and the outcome of international 
trade negotiators. In practice, however, the European Union and 
United States apply their own standards and values to measure what 
digital protectionism is abroad as a result of regulatory divergence 
on a number of domestic policies that affect digital trade, including 
privacy and data protection.259 While both the European Union and 
United States recognize, in theory, that privacy and data protection 
are important values, they diverge quite jarringly on what the ‘cor-
rect’ level of such protections should be.260 In other words, there is 
a deep disagreement on where to draw the line where protection be-
comes protectionism. This is the issue to which this Article returns 
below. We must first, however, add one more layer of bricks to the 
analytical edifice and turn to the business interests that underpin the 
shifts in the discourse.  
                                                                                                             
 256 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council Exchanging and Protecting Personal Data in a Globalised World, COM 
(2017) 7 final, ¶ 3 (Jan. 10, 2017) (emphasis added).  
 257 Aaronson, Why Trade Agreements Are Not Setting Information Free, supra 
note 229, at 687 (“Unfortunately, despite their collaboration, the US and the EU 
do not completely agree on digital rights . . . . In addition, the US and the EU 
disagree on the role of the state and business in protecting privacy.”). 
 258 See supra Part I. 
 259 See Aaronson, Why Trade Agreements Are Not Setting Information Free, 
supra note 229, at 682 (“Under US law, online privacy is a consumer right, 
whereas in the EU (as well as in Australia and Canada), privacy is a human and 
consumer right that must be protected by governments.”). 
 260 See id. at 682–83 (“Under US law, online privacy is a consumer right, 
whereas in the EU . . . privacy is a human and consumer right that must be pro-
tected by governments . . . . The EU strategy seemed directly at odds with US 
voluntary, limited, and sectoral approach.”). 
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D. Business Interests Behind the “Digital Trade” Discourse 
In Section I.D.3, this Article explained how a policy favoring 
liberalization of trade, just as a policy favoring domestic regulation 
limiting free trade (which is often presented by those favoring free 
trade as protectionist), can be captured. In following pages, this Ar-
ticle will demonstrate that not only the economic benefits of cross-
border digital trade but also certain business interests profiting from 
the absence of restrictions on cross-border transfers are shaping the 
“digital trade” discourse. 
The United States was one of the first WTO member states to 
adopt a so-called “digital trade” agenda back in 2002.261 Histori-
cally, the United States has a “strong competitive advantage in the 
digital economy . . . .”262 As Professor Aaronson has argued, by 
making the campaign against digital protectionism an essential ele-
ment of its international trade policy as demanded by the global 
U.S.-based internet platforms, the United States is trying to promote 
a global internet, free of barriers to entry, while preserving its de-
clining internet dominance.263 Some observers suspect that the 
United States applies the “digital protectionism” label to any domes-
tic regulation that reduces its market share abroad in this space.264 
This echoes the “diminished giant syndrome,” a term coined by 
                                                                                                             
 261 See Mira Burri, The Governance of Data and Data Flows in Trade Agree-
ments: The Pitfalls of Legal Adaptation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV., 65, 99, 129 
(2017); Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, The Digital Trade Agenda of the U.S.: Parallel 
Tracks of Bilateral, Regional and Multilateral Liberalization, 58 
AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT 7, 7 (2003). 
 262 Azmeh & Foster, supra note 141, at 4–5 (“Such policies also represent a 
long term threat to the US economy which has a strong comparative advantage in 
the digital economy and related activities which gives it a strong advantage to lead 
the major technological shifts in the coming decades in different economic sec-
tors.”); see also Aaronson, What We Are Talking About, supra note 35, at 8 (not-
ing the particular importance of digital trade to the U.S. economy). 
 263 See Aaronson, Digital Protectionism?, supra note 236 (“The United States 
has conflicting objectives regarding the digital economy. On one hand, it wants 
to encourage a vibrant global Internet with few barriers to entry. On the other, the 
United States wants to preserve its Internet dominance, which is clearly declining 
as China, India, Indonesia and others develop their digital prowess and bring more 
people online.”). 
 264 Id. (“[T]o some observers, it seems like the United States defines [digital 
protectionism] as policies that with or without intent reduce U.S. market share in 
foreign markets.”). 
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Bhagwati to refer to the U.S. trade policy in the 1970s, which used 
new protectionism to reshape international trading order to its ad-
vantage.265 American tech companies view initiatives to control do-
mestic data space in several countries, including through restrictions 
on data flows (e.g. those adopted in China, Australia, India, Russia, 
Thailand, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates) as threats to their 
business model.266 As a result, executives of these companies, often 
relying on research of specialized think tanks, activated their lobby-
ing activities with trade policy officials to “do a better job of limiting 
digital protectionism.”267 
A 2016 study showed that tensions around cross-border data 
flows have intensified due to an increase in the use of the label “dig-
ital protectionism.”268 Based on the analysis of data on political 
spending (lobbying, campaign contributions, and other forms of po-
litical activism), the authors of the study were able to claim convinc-
ingly that powerful U.S. tech companies (including large corpora-
tions like Google, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft, and Apple, as well 
as smaller firms such as LinkedIn, Airbnb, and Expedia) and indus-
try associations (such as the Business Software Alliance (“BSA”), 
Information Technology Industry Council (“ITI”), and the Software 
& Information Industry Association (“SIIA”))269 played a crucial 
                                                                                                             
 265 See Bhagwati, The Diminished Giant Syndrome, supra note 97, at 22 (“The 
American mood parallels Great Britain’s at the end of the nineteenth century . . . . 
As was Great Britain at that time, America has been struck by a ‘diminished giant 
syndrome’—reinforced by the slippage in the growth of its living standards in the 
1980s.”). 
 266 See, e.g., Aaronson, Why Trade Agreements Are Not Setting Information 
Free, supra note 229, at 684 (“[P]olicymakers from [China, Australia, India, Rus-
sia, Thailand, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates] were increasingly deter-
mined to control the Internet within their borders and facilitate the rise of domestic 
Internet firms . . . . Many US based Internet companies saw in these actions a 
threat to their bottom lines.”). 
 267 Id. (“[E]xecutives demanded that officials do a better job of limiting digital 
protectionism . . . . For example, Google used the research of the Open Network 
Initiative (a Canadian think tank) to document how more than 40 governments 
instituted broad scale restrictions of information flows.”). 
 268 Azmeh & Foster, supra note 141, at 11 (“[T]ensions around cross-border 
data flows. Such tensions have been brought to the fore by the growing use of so-
called ‘digital protectionism’ in a number of countries.”). 
 269 Id. at 12–14 (“In the US, political spending by these firms . . . have in-
creased substantially over the last few years making internet and new ‘tech’ com-
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role in the formation of the U.S. “digital trade agenda,” prioritization 
of cross-border data flows in international trade policy, and increase 
in pressure on domestic regulations restricting such flows.270 These 
political efforts, as well as fears concerning a diminishing techno-
logical advantage of the United States in the global digital economy, 
made the “digital trade agenda” “a key part of the U.S. trade policy 
in future multilateral and bilateral agreements.”271 
As far as the Author knows, no published similar research exists 
on the lobbying activities on digital trade at the E.U. level. The E.U. 
Transparency Register, which discloses information on interest 
groups affecting decision-making in the European Union, does not 
contain statistics on interest group spending in each particular 
area.272 The available information, however, demonstrates that not 
only big U.S. tech companies, such as Google, Apple, Facebook, 
                                                                                                             
panies one of the strongest lobbying sectors in Washington (table 1). This in-
cluded major spending from large companies such as Google, Facebook, Amazon, 
Yahoo, Apple, EBay, Microsoft, and Apple, but also younger firms such as Snap-
chat, Rapidshare, Linkedin, Dropbox, Twitter, Airbnb, Expedia, in addition to in-
dustry associations . . . .”). See also U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., Digital 
Economy Report 2019: Value Creation and Capture: Implications for Developing 
Countries, UNCTAD/DER/2019, at 88–89, https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLi-
brary/der2019_en.pdf (“[Global digital platforms]” have an interest in lobbying 
for international rules and regulations that allow to enable them to leverage their 
business models. Indeed, in the past few years, technology companies have re-
placed the financial sector as the biggest lobbyists, and major platforms have spent 
considerable resources in key locations.”). 
 270 See Azmeh & Foster, supra note 141, at 19 (“Many of the policies de-
manded by the industry were reflected in the US trade policy and in the ‘digital 
dozen’ principles adopted by the USTR.[] Similarly, the trade promotion authority 
(TPA) . . . listed digital trade and cross-border data flows as principle negotiating 
objectives of the United States.”). 
 271 Id. at 30; see also John Selby, Data Localization Laws: Trade Barriers or 
Legitimate Responses to Cybersecurity Risks, or Both? 25 INT’L J.L. & INFO. 
TECH. 213, 217 (2017) (“It is not surprising to see the US government push 
strongly in the next generation of international trade agreements to restrict efforts 
to implement data localization in other countries.”). 
 272 See Homepage, EUROPA: TRANSPARENCY REGISTER, http://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/transparencyregister/public/homePage.do?redir=false&locale=en (last 
updated Nov. 11, 2019). 
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Amazon, and Microsoft,273 but also large European industry associ-
ations, such as Business Europe and Digital Europe, annually spend 
several million Euros on lobbying activities at E.U. institutions in-
volving digital trade, cross-border data flows, and personal data pro-
tection. 274 
                                                                                                             
 273 See Azmeh & Foster, supra note 141, at 12–13, 12 n.5; Registrant Profile: 
Google, EUROPA: TRANSPARENCY REGISTER, http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyre-
gister/public/consultation/displaylobbyist.do?id=03181945560-59 (last updated 
Oct. 22, 2019, 17:22:31) (showing that Google spent more than eight million Euro 
on lobbying activities in the European Union in 2018); Registrant Profile: Ama-
zon Europe Core SARL, EUROPA: TRANSPARENCY REGISTER, http://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/displaylobby-
ist.do?id=366117914426-10&isListLobbyistView=true (last updated Mar. 26, 
2019, 01:43:22) (showing that Amazon spent more than 1.75 million Euro on lob-
bying activities in the European Union in 2018); Registrant Profile: Microsoft 
Corporation, EUROPA: TRANSPARENCY REG., http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyre-
gister/public/consultation/displaylobbyist.do?id=0801162959-21&isListLobby-
istView=true (last updated Oct. 9, 2019, 14:58:21) (showing that Microsoft spent 
more than five million Euro on lobbying activities in the European Union from 
July 2018 through June 2019); Registrant Profile: Apple Inc., EUROPA: 
TRANSPARENCY REG., http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consulta-
tion/displaylobbyist.do?id=588327811384-96 (last updated Sept. 19, 2019, 
14:24:05) (showing that Apple spent more than two million Euro on lobbying 
activities in the European Union from October 2017 through September 2018); 
Registrant Profile: Facebook Ireland Limited, EUROPA: TRANSPARENCY REG., 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/displaylobby-
ist.do?id=28666427835-74&isListLobbyistView=true (last updated Mar. 25, 
2019, 15:19:33) (showing that Facebook spent more than 3.5 million Euro on lob-
bying activities in the European Union in 2018). Unfortunately, the E.U. Trans-
parency Register does not break down these costs by topic. 
 274 See Registrant Profile: BusinessEurope, EUROPA: TRANSPARENCY REG., 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/displaylobby-
ist.do?id=3978240953-79 (last updated Mar. 7, 2019, 14:50:46) (showing that 
Business Europe spent more than four million Euro on lobbying activities in the 
Euorpean Union in 2018); Registrant Profile: DigitalEurope, EUROPA: 
TRANSPARENCY REG., http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consulta-
tion/displaylobbyist.do?id=64270747023-20 (last updated Mar. 1, 2019, 9:15:48) 
(showing that Business Europe spent more than four million Euro on lobbying 
activities in the European Union in 2018); see also DIGITAL EUROPE, LIST OF 
DIGITALEUROPE MEETINGS HELD WITH COMMISSIONERS MEMBERS OF THE OR 
DIRECTOR-GENERALS SINCE JANUARY DECEMBER 1, 2014, EUROPA: 
TRANSPARENCY REG. 1–8, http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/con-
sultation/displaylobbyist.do?id=64270747023-20&pdf=true (last updated Nov. 
11, 2019) (showing that Digital Europe was active on the topics of trade, data 
flows, artificial intelligence, and GDPR). 
486 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:416 
 
E. Measures Banning “Digital Protectionism” in Recent Trade 
Agreements 
Just like the neoliberal discourse of 1970s and 1980s, the mod-
ern digital trade discourse(s) are reflected in recent international 
trade agreements, which increasingly include dedicated chapters on 
electronic commerce and digital trade (“digital trade chapters”).275 
Such chapters tackle a range of domestic policies affecting cross-
border digital commerce276 (“digital trade provisions”), but this Ar-
ticle only focuses on those concerning cross-border data flows. 
Countries have not yet achieved a multilateral consensus on the 
design and scope of digital trade provisions, which have thus far 
only appeared in bilateral and regional trade agreements, and have 
somewhat overshadowed the WTO’s multilateral efforts in this 
area.277 Although the proposals on electronic commerce in the WTO 
increasingly focus on barriers to digital trade and digital protection-
ism,278 the WTO has not yet made any progress on this issue. In early 
2019, seventy-six WTO member states, including Canada, China, 
the European Union, and the United States,279 started a new round 
of negotiations on electronic commerce at the WTO in order to cre-
ate rules governing e-commerce and cross-border data flows.280 It 
                                                                                                             
 275 See, e.g., Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific 
Partnership art. 14, Mar. 8, 2018, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Trans-Pacific-
Partnership/Text/14.-Electronic-Commerce-Chapter.pdf [hereinafter CPTPP] 
(governing electronic commerce in the Trans-Pacific Partnership). 
 276 See, e.g., id. art. 14.5 (outlining the endeavors each party to the agreement 
must make in maintaining a legal framework governing electronic transactions 
domestically). 
 277 See Burri, The Regulation of Data Flows Through Trade Agreements, su-
pra note 9, at 417 (“As the Doha negotiations continue to make little progress, the 
multilateral venue of rule-making has been seriously undermined and this has trig-
gered forum-shopping—bilaterally, regionally, or through plurilateral initia-
tives.”). 
 278 See Mitchell & Mishra, Data at the Docks, supra note 224, at 1111 (“The 
majority of the recent proposals on electronic commerce circulated by WTO 
Members in recent years tend to focus on regulatory barriers to digital trade. In 
particular, they emphasize digital protectionism.”). 
 279 Leika Kihara, China and U.S. Among 76 WTO Members Pushing for New 
E-Commerce Rules, REUTERS (Jan. 5, 2019, 8:58 PM), https://www.reu-
ters.com/article/us-davos-meeting-ecommerce/china-and-u-s-among-76-wto-
members-pushing-for-new-e-commerce-rules-idUSKCN1PJ0UK. 
 280 76 WTO Partners Launch Talks on E-Commerce, supra note 31. 
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remains to be seen how these negotiations will play out. Despite a 
seemingly firm consensus on the use of the terms “digital trade” and 
“digital protectionism”—the axes around which the discourses gov-
erning international negotiations revolve—the value structures un-
derlying these discourses diverge, as the U.S. and the E.U. example 
above illustrates. This Section explicates how international trade 
provisions on cross-border data flows advanced by the United States 
and the European Union mirror this divergence. 
In the spirit of its digital trade agenda, the United States has been 
a pioneer in including provisions on free cross-border data flows in 
international trade agreements.281 Although the United States has 
advocated regulating information flows via international trade rules 
roughly since the 1980s,282 the first time a non-actionable (or non-
binding), horizontal provision on free cross-border data flows ap-
peared in a trade agreement was in the electronic commerce chapter 
of the 2012 U.S.-Korea free trade agreement.283 The United States 
later proposed a binding horizontal provision—a demand of key 
                                                                                                             
 281 Aaronson, Redefining Protectionism, supra note 237, at 59 (“The United 
States is the Paul Revere of digital protectionism, using naming and shaming to 
condemn such policies.”); see also Susan Ariel Aaronson, Match Made in 
Heaven? The Wedding of Trade and Human Rights, in 26 THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 507 (Lisa L. 
Martin ed., 2015); Cross-Border Data Flows: Could Foreign Protectionism Hurt 
U.S. Jobs?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Commerce, Manufacturing, and 
Trade of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 113th Cong. 3 (2014) (statement 
of U.S. Chamber of Commerce); Michael Geist, Data Rules in Modern Trade 
Agreements: Toward Reconciling an Open Internet with Privacy and Security 
Safeguards, CTR. FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION (April 4, 2018), 
https://www.cigionline.org/articles/data-rules-modern-trade-agreements-toward-
reconciling-open-internet-privacy-and-security (“The CPTPP also includes a spe-
cific exception for financial services, ironically at the insistence of the US Treas-
ury, which wanted to retain the right to establish restrictions on financial data 
flows.”). 
 282 See Aaronson, Why Trade Agreements Are Not Setting Information Free, 
supra note 229, at 672 (noting that the issue of free flow of information in trade 
agreements “is not new; in the 1980s, with the advent of faster computers, soft-
ware, and satellites, officials from some states, including the US and Japan, 
wanted to include language governing the free flow of information in trade agree-
ments.”). For a concise overview of earlier initiatives, see id. at 679–85. 
 283 Id. at 687 (“[T]his provision does not forbid the use of such barriers, nor 
does it define necessary or unnecessary barriers. In short, the language is not ac-
tionable.”). 
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U.S. lobbies as explained above—in the drafts of the currently 
stalled Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (“TTIP”) 
and Trade in Services Agreement (“TiSA”).284 The e-commerce 
chapter of Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship (“CPTPP”) similarly includes a legally binding horizontal ob-
ligation on the free cross-border data flow of information, including 
personal data, which states that “[e]ach Party shall allow the cross-
border transfer of information by electronic means, including per-
sonal information, when this activity is for the conduct of the busi-
ness of a covered person.”285 
This provision was included in CPTPP before the U.S. with-
drawal from the agreement286 and remained unchanged in the final 
                                                                                                             
 284 See Gaël Le Roux, TTIP Negotiations, Policy Convergence, and the Trans-
atlantic Digital Economy, 19 BUS. & POL. 709, 731 (2017) (“The USTR includes 
an essential element that is still not addressed by the European Commission in its 
initial proposal, which is cross-border data flows. The United States thus remains 
very offensive on the matter and reproduced what they have already pushed 
through in the KORUS and the TPP texts.”). A bracketed draft for Article 2 of the 
Annex on Electronic Commerce to TiSA included a prohibition to “prevent a ser-
vice supplier of another Party from transferring, accessing processing or storing 
information, including personal information, within or outside the Party’s terri-
tory, where such activity is carried out in connection with the conduct of the ser-
vice supplier’s business.” Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) Annex on Elec-
tronic Commerce, WIKILEAKS, (2016), https://wikileaks.org/tisa/docu-
ment/20151001_Annex-on-Electronic-Commerce/; COALITION FOR PRIVACY & 
FREE TRADE, COMMENTS OF THE COALITION FOR PRIVACY AND FREE TRADE TO 
THE TRADE POLICY STAFF COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE 2–3 (2013), http://www.centerfordigitaldemoc-
racy.org/sites/default/files/Coalition-for-Privacy-and-Free-Trade-Comments-to-
USTR-May-9-2013_0.pdf (“The Obama Administration already has recognized 
the importance of interoperable privacy frameworks to global economic progress 
and prosperity: . . . The United States is committed to engaging with its interna-
tional partners to increase interoperability in privacy laws by pursuing mutual 
recognition, the development of codes of conduct through multistakeholder pro-
cesses, and enforcement cooperation.”) (emphasis added). But see James Fonta-
nella-Khan, Data Protection Ruled out of EU-US Trade Talks, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 
4, 2013), https://www.ft.com/content/92a14dd2-44b9-11e3-a751-00144feabdc0 
(noting E.U. officials’ fear that “finding a middle ground with the U.S. would only 
lower overall E.U. privacy standards.”). 
 285 CPTPP, supra note 275, art 14.11(2). 
 286 The version of the agreement with the United States as a party was known 
simply as the Transpacific Partnership (“TPP”). Removing the United States from 
this agreement was one of President Trump’s first decisions. See Letter from the 
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version of the agreement concluded without the United States.287 
The United States Mexico Canada Agreement (“USMCA”)—a re-
vision of the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”)— 
includes a similar provision.288 Including such provisions in recent 
trade agreements is a U.S. priority.289  The U.S. proposal for the on-
going e-commerce talks at the WTO and the recent U.S.-Japan trade 
agreement replicate the “golden standard” provisions on digital 
trade.290 This move, against the background of trade restricting 
                                                                                                             
Exec. Office of the President, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, to TPP 
Depositary (Jan. 30, 2017), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Re-
leases/1-30-17%20USTR%20Letter%20to%20TPP%20Depositary.pdf. 
 287 See generally CPTPP, supra note 275. 
 288 Agreement Between the United States of America, the United Mexican 
States, and Canada, Can.-Mex.-U.S. art. 19.11(1), Nov. 30, 2018, 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/FTA/USMCA/Text/19-
Digital-Trade.pdf [hereinafter USMCA] (“No Party shall prohibit or restrict the 
cross-border transfer of information, including personal information, by elec-
tronic means if this activity is for the conduct of the business of a covered per-
son.”); see also Aaronson & Leblond, supra note 3, at 257 (noting that despite the 
fact that Trump withdrew from the TPP right after becoming President, “the 
Trump administration has built its proposals on those of the Obama administration 
(namely, the TPP).”). 
 289 See, e.g., RACHEL F. FEFER ET AL, supra note 191, at 1 (“To enable inter-
national data flows and trade, the United States has aimed to eliminate trade bar-
riers and establish enforceable international rules and best practices that allow 
policymakers to achieve public policy objectives, including promoting online se-
curity and privacy.”); see also Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representa-
tive, Summary of Objectives for the NAFTA Renegotiation, 8 (Nov. 17, 2017), 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Releases/Nov%20Objec-
tives%20Update.pdf (outlining specific negotiation objectives for the initiation of 
NAFTA negotiations as it related to digital trade in goods and services and cross-
border data flows). 
 290 Inu Manak, U.S. WTO E-Commerce Proposal Reads Like USMCA, INT’L 
ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG (May 8, 2019, 02:43 PM), https://world-
tradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2019/05/us-wto-e-commerce-proposal-reads-
like-usmca.html; President Donald J. Trump Has Secured a Tremendous Victory 
for American Farmers and Businesses with New Japan Trade Agreements, WHITE 
HOUSE: BRIEFINGS & STATEMENTS (Oct. 7, 2019), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-se-
cured-tremendous-victory-american-farmers-businesses-new-japan-trade-agree-
ments/; Agreement Between the United States of America and Japan Concerning 
Digital Trade art.11(1), Oct. 7, 2019, https://ustr.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/files/agreements/japan/Agreement_be-
tween_the_United_States_and_Japan_concerning_Digital_Trade.pdf (“Neither 
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measures in traditional trade sectors,291 illustrates the strategic im-
portance of digital trade for the U.S. economy. 
As compared to prior U.S.-led free trade agreements, both the 
CPTPP and USMCA not only contain an exception from a free data 
flow provision for regulation pursuing important domestic public 
policy objectives, but also a dedicated article on the protection of 
personal information.292 In both cases, the structure and text of the 
exception strongly resemble those of Article XIV(c)(ii) of GATS. 
For example, Article 19.11(2) of the USMCA, states the following: 
This Article does not prevent a Party from adopting 
or maintaining a measure inconsistent with para-
graph 1 that is necessary to achieve a legitimate pub-
lic policy objective, provided that the measure: 
(a) is not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifia-
ble discrimination or a disguised restriction 
on trade; and 
(b) does not impose restrictions on transfers 
of information greater than are necessary to 
achieve the objective.293 
                                                                                                             
Party shall prohibit or restrict the cross-border transfer of information, including 
personal information, by electronic means, if this activity is for the conduct of the 
business of a covered person.”). 
 291 See Daniel C.K. Chow, Ian M. Sheldon, & William McGuire, The Revival 
of Economic Nationalism and the Global Trading System, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2133, 2151 (2019) (“[T]he Trump Administration is following a path of economic 
nationalism and pushing back with threats of not playing by the accepted rules of 
international governance.”); see also Kyle Handley & Nuno Limão, Trade Under 
T.R.U.M.P. Policies, in ECONOMICS AND POLICY IN THE AGE OF TRUMP, 141, 
141–43 (Chad P. Bown ed., 2017). 
 292 Article 14.11(2) of the CPTPP and article 19.11(2) USMCA contain an 
exception for the free cross-border data flow provision; Article 14.8 of the CPTPP 
and Article 19.8 of the USMCA contain a provision on the protection of personal 
information. CPTPP, supra note 275, arts. 14.11(2), 14.8; USMCA, supra note 
288, arts. 19.11(2), 19.8. 
 293 USMCA, supra note 288, art. 19.11(2) (emphasis added). 
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In both the USMCA and CPTPP, the exceptions do not specifi-
cally identify privacy and data protection by name, or any other par-
ticular policy objective.294 It can be reasonably argued that privacy 
and data protection would fall under such exceptions, as these policy 
interests are among the public policy goals that are most likely to be 
affected by the free cross-border data flow provision. The above-
mentioned necessity test—the benchmark to evaluate the con-
sistency of domestic regulation with the conditions of the excep-
tion—requires an objective assessment.295 The USMCA also clari-
fies that “[a] measure does not meet the conditions of this paragraph 
if it accords different treatment to data transfers solely on the basis 
that they are cross-border in a manner that modifies the conditions 
of competition to the detriment of service suppliers of another 
Party.”296 This ties in with the interpretation of the necessity test in 
the WTO general exceptions discussed supra in Section II.D.4 and 
does not recognize regulatory intent as a factor in the necessity test 
assessment.297 
The provision on the protection of personal information in the 
USMCA includes not only aspirational provisions on the protection 
of personal information but also a number of binding obligations: 
(1) “[To] adopt or maintain a legal framework that 
provides for protection of personal data of users 
of digital trade,” featuring the [Asia-Pacific Eco-
nomic Cooperation (“APEC”)] . . . Privacy 
Framework and the 2013 OECD Guidelines gov-
erning the Protection of Privacy and Transborder 
Flows of Personal data as examples of such 
frameworks; 
                                                                                                             
 294 See id.; CPTPP, supra note 275, art. 14.11. 
 295 Instead of the “necessity” requirement, the exception in Article 14.11(2) of 
the CPTPP provides that restrictions should not be “greater than are required to 
achieve the objective.” CPTPP, supra note 275, art. 14.11(3)(b) (emphasis added). 
This difference seems, however, purely semantic, and according to the WTO Sec-
retariat, is yet another way to convey the concept of “necessity.” See WTO Sec-
retariat, “Necessity Tests” in the WTO, ¶ I.A.5, WTO Doc. 2/WPDR/W/27 (Dec. 
2, 2003); CPTPP, supra note 275, at 6.  
 296 USMCA, supra note 288, art. 19.11(2)(b) n.5 (emphasis added). 
 297 Id. at 6. 
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(2) To implement key data protection principles such 
as a limitation on the collection of data, data qual-
ity, purpose specification and a requirement that 
“any restrictions on cross-border flows of per-
sonal information are necessary and proportion-
ate to the risks presented”; 
(3) A transparency requirement that parties publish 
information on how individuals can pursue a 
remedy in case of violation of personal infor-
mation protections and on how companies can 
comply with the local personal information pro-
tection requirements; and 
(4) To cooperate with regulations towards develop-
ing mechanisms of compatibility between the 
parties’ data protection regimes and an endorse-
ment of APEC Cross-Border Privacy Rules 
(“CBPR”) system as a “valid mechanism” to fa-
cilitate cross-border information flows while pro-
tecting personal data.298 
At bottom, this provision transplants the U.S. approach to the 
protection of personal data as a consumer right. Explicit mention of 
the 2013 OECD Guidelines and the APEC CBPR reflects the eco-
nomic approach to the protection of personal data as a precondition 
for digital trade.299 This way, privacy and personal data protection 
become normalized—or redefined—as tools of international trade 
and are viewed as trade values.300 
The European Union’s digital trade discourse has also produced 
several “new generation” international trade agreements that con-
tain, in addition to the usual chapters on trade liberalization, specific 
chapters on electronic commerce that included predominantly aspi-
rational provisions.301 However, so far, unlike the United States, the 
                                                                                                             
 298 Id. at 4–5. 
 299 Id.; see Yakovleva, supra note 197, at 484–85. 
 300 USMCA, supra note 288, art. 19.8; see Yakovleva, supra note 197, at 484–
85. 
 301 See Bollen et al., EU Trade Policy, supra note 247, at 282 (“[S]ince the 
2006 Global Europe communication the EU has put bilateral trade deals explicitly 
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European Union has taken a more cautious approach to cross-border 
data flows in trying to defend its regulatory autonomy to protect the 
fundamental rights to privacy and personal data.302 So far, none of 
the E.U. completed trade agreements include binding provisions on 
cross-border data flows.303 In the course of the TTIP and TiSA ne-
gotiations, such provisions, especially the exceptions from them for 
privacy and data protection, became a contentious (and a turning) 
point in the European Union’s approach to regulating cross-border 
data flows in trade agreements, which has affected its trade negoti-
ations with other trading partners.304 In the digital trade chapters of 
the E.U.-Japan Free Trade Agreement (“JEFTA”) and (the revision 
of) the E.U.-Mexico Free Trade Agreements, the European Union 
explicitly refrained from including a free cross-border data flow pro-
vision; these agreements only contain a three-year review clause, 
which allows parties to reconsider this issue.305 Cross-border flows 
of personal data between the European Union and Japan were even-
tually routed through a mutual adequacy decision granted by both 
                                                                                                             
at the service of its commercial and wider economic interests.”); id. at 287 (stating 
that after the 2008 crisis the European Union significantly intensified “the 
(neo)liberal pattern in the bilateral dimension” by opening trade negotiations with 
the US, Canada, and Japan); see also Siles-Brügge, Resisting Protection-
ism, supra note 248, at 629; Jane Orbie & Ferdi De Ville, ‘A Boost to Our Econ-
omies That Doesn’t Cost a Cent’: EU Trade Policy Discourse Since the Crisis, in 
EU FOREIGN POLICY THROUGH THE LENS OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: MAKING 
SENSE OF DIVERSITY 95, 95–110 (Caterina Carta & Jean- Frédéric Morin eds., 
2014). 
 302 See Aaronson, Why Trade Agreements Are Not Setting Information Free, 
supra note 229, at 685 (“The EU, in contrast, embraced a less combative and more 
internationalist strategy. The EU pushed for WTO wide data flow principles but 
did not name and shame other countries for digital protectionism (although it does 
list some countries’ policies as barriers to trade).”). 
 303 See id. at 685, 689–90. 
 304 See IRION ET AL., supra note 253, at 41; see also Fontanella-Khan, supra 
note 284. 
 305 European Union—Japan Economic Partnership Agreement, E.U.-Japan art 
8.81, Feb. 1, 2019 [hereinafter JEFTA]; EUROPEAN COMM’N, MODERNISATION 
OF THE TRADE PART OF THE EU-MEXICO GLOBAL AGREEMENT WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE 5–6 (2018), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/april/tra-
doc_156811.pdf; see also Brett Fortnam, EU Punts on Data Flow Language in 
Japan Deal, Leaving Position Unresolved, INSIDE US TRADE (July 6, 2017, 4:03 
PM), https://daytona.law.miami.edu:2742/inside-us-trade/eu-punts-data-flow-
language-japan-deal-leaving-position-unresolved. 
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parties to each other (the European Union—in accordance with the 
GDPR) a week before JEFTA took effect.306 
In 2018, the European Union agreed on model provisions on free 
cross-border data flows and respective exceptions for privacy and 
data protection.307 The European Union has already included these 
clauses in its proposals for currently negotiated trade agreements 
with New Zealand, Australia, Chile, Indonesia, and Tunisia, and in 
its proposal for the recent WTO negotiations on electronic com-
merce.308 Unlike an open provision on cross-border data flows in 
Articles 14.11(2) of the CPTPP and 19.11(1) of the USMCA,309 Ar-
                                                                                                             
 306 European Commission Press Release IP/19/421, European Commission 
Adopts Adequacy Decision on Japan, Creating the World’s Largest Area of Safe 
Data Flows (Jan. 23, 2019). 
 307 EUROPEAN COMM’N, HORIZONTAL PROVISIONS FOR CROSS-BORDER DATA 
FLOWS AND FOR PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION, in EU TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
AGREEMENTS 1–2 (2018), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/may/tra-
doc_156884.pdf [hereinafter HORIZONTAL PROVISIONS FOR CROSS-BORDER 
DATA FLOWS AND FOR PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION]. 
 308 See European Union, Joint Statement on Election Commerce: EU Proposal 
for WTO Disciplines and Commitments Relating to Electronic Commerce, at 4, 
WTO Doc. INF/ECOM/22 (Apr. 26, 2019); European Union, EU-New Zealand 
Free Trade Agreement Proposal on Digital Trade, at 4–5 (Sept. 25, 2018), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/december/tradoc_157581.pdf; Euro-
pean Union, EU-Australia Free Trade Agreement Proposal on Digital Trade, at 
4–5 (Oct. 10, 2018), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/december/tra-
doc_157581.pdf.; European Union, EU-Tunisia Free Trade Agreement Proposal 
on Digital Trade, at 4–5 (Nov. 9. 2018), https://trade.ec.europa.eu/do-
clib/docs/2019/january/tradoc_157660.%20ALECA%202019%20-
%20texte%20commerce%20numerique.pdf. Digital Trade Proposals for E.U.-
Chile and E.U.-Indonesia were drafted before the European Union agreed on the 
model provisions. Therefore, these proposals only contain a placeholder for a pro-
vision on cross-border data flows. European Union, EU-Chile Modernised Asso-
ciation Agreement Proposal for Digital Trade, at 7 (Feb. 5, 2018), 
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/february/tradoc_156582.pdf (con-
taining a placeholder for provisions on data flows); European Union, EU-
Indonesia Free Trade Agreement Proposal for Digital Trade, at 7 (Jul 27, 2017), 
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/september/tradoc_156106.pdf. The 
European Union tabled its model clauses at a later stage in negotiations with these 
two countries. See, e.g., European Union, Report of the 5th Round of Negotiations 
for a Free Trade Agreement Between the European Union and Indonesia, at 1, 3 
(July 2018), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/july/tradoc_157137.pdf. 
 309 CPTPP, supra note 275, art. 14.11(2); USMCA, supra note 288, art. 
19.11(1). 
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ticle A of the European Union’s proposal only outlaws an enumer-
ated list of restrictions on cross-border data flows: the requirement 
to use local computing facilities or network elements (both as such 
and as a precondition for data transfers), the requirements for data 
localization, and the requirement on storing or processing infor-
mation abroad.310 This article is formulated in a way that makes the 
European Union’s own restrictions on cross-border transfers of per-
sonal data a priori not subject to the prohibition to restrict cross-
border data flows. Furthermore, Article B of the European Union’s 
proposal embodies the recognition that “the protection of personal 
data and privacy is a fundamental right and that high standards in 
this regard contribute to trust in the digital economy and to the de-
velopment of trade.”311 In addition, it provides for a broad national-
security-type exception for domestic privacy and data protection 
rules: 
Each Party may adopt and maintain the safeguards it 
deems appropriate to ensure the protection of per-
sonal data and privacy, including through the adop-
tion and application of rules for the cross-border 
transfer of personal data. Nothing in this agreement 
shall affect the protection of personal data and pri-
vacy afforded by the Parties’ respective safe-
guards.312 
This exception is fundamentally different from those included in 
the CPTPP and the USMCA in at least three ways. First, it integrates 
into a trade agreement a different normative approach to protecting 
the rights to privacy and data protection—that of fundamental rights 
protection as compared to the instrumental approach embedded in 
the CPTPP and the USMCA.313 Second, it recognizes rules on cross-
                                                                                                             
 310 HORIZONTAL PROVISIONS FOR CROSS-BORDER DATA FLOWS AND FOR 
PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION, supra note 307, at 1. 
 311 Id. at 2. 
 312 Id. (emphasis added). 
 313 Compare CPTPP, supra note 275, art. 14.11(3) in conjunction with art. 
14.8(1), and USMCA, supra note 288, art. 19.8(1), with European Union, Joint 
Statement on Election Commerce: EU Proposal for WTO Disciplines and Com-
mitments Relating to Electronic Commerce, at 4, WTO Doc. INF/ECOM/22 (Apr. 
26, 2019). 
496 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:416 
 
border data flows as a valid regulatory tool to protect the rights to 
privacy and personal data.314 Third, it incorporates a subjective ne-
cessity test—as opposed to the objective necessity test in the CPTPP 
and the USMCA—similar to that employed in national security ex-
ceptions in WTO agreements.315 
To sum up, in the light of different digital trade discourses ad-
vanced by the United States and the European Union, the contrast in 
the design of cross-border data flow provisions and exceptions from 
such provisions for domestic regulation that protects privacy and 
personal data illustrates the practical implications of a different 
baseline between protection and protectionism within a particular 
discourse. 
F. The “Digital Protectionism” Label as a Trigger to Redefine 
“Barriers to Trade” 
This Article argues that against the backdrop of the expansion of 
“protectionism” into “new protectionism” in the 1970s and 1980s 
that led to a fundamental redefinition of “barriers to trade” and re-
negotiation of international trade rules, the coining of the term “dig-
ital protectionism” is a new trigger for another fundamental redefini-
tion of what constitutes a barrier to trade and, thus, deeper trade lib-
eralization. Simply put, by labelling certain domestic policies such 
as restrictions on cross-border data flows and data localization 
measures as digital protectionism, it is much easier to critique them, 
reject them, and put competing policy interests such as privacy, data 
protection, or industrial policy in a subordinate position. Moreover, 
in trade terms, affixing the digital protectionism label to another 
country’s policy decision and insisting on the efficiency gains of 
free trade automatically puts that measure on the defensive. 
                                                                                                             
 314 Compare CPTPP, supra note 275, art. 14.11(3), in conjunction with art. 
14.8(1), and USMCA, supra note 288, art. 19.11(3), in conjunction with art. 
19.8(1), with European Union, Joint Statement on Election Commerce: EU Pro-
posal for WTO Disciplines and Commitments Relating to Electronic Commerce, 
at 4, WTO Doc. INF/ECOM/22 (Apr. 26, 2019). 
 315 Compare CPTPP, supra note 275, art. 14.11(3), and USMCA, supra note 
288, art. 19.11(2), with European Union, Joint Statement on Election Commerce: 
EU Proposal for WTO Disciplines and Commitments Relating to Electronic Com-
merce, at 4, WTO Doc. INF/ECOM/22 (Apr. 26, 2019); see, e.g., GATS, supra 
note 145, pt. II, art. XIV.bis. 
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At the dawn of the multilateral trading system governed by the 
discourse of embedded liberalism, the term protectionism was 
meant to target measures intended to protect domestic industry (as 
applied by the GATT for two decades or more).316 Within the dis-
course of neoliberalism, the term “new protectionism” led to a re-
moval of the intent component of the test as a relevant factor in de-
fining a protectionism measure.317 The increasingly frequent use of 
the term “digital protectionism” seems to be heading in the direction 
of questioning any form of regulation altogether.318 Despite the no-
table differences in the scope and types of domestic policies out-
lawed by digital trade provisions in the E.U.- and U.S.-led trade 
agreements discussed in the previous Section, they have one trait in 
common: they are not formulated as non-discrimination provi-
sions.319 While a challenge of restrictions on cross-border data flows 
or data localization measures would require the contesting party to 
prove discrimination if such measures were challenged under most-
favored-nation (“MFN”) treatment obligations under the GATS, or 
services chapters of post-GATS Free Trade Agreements 
(“FTAs”),320 this Article argues that such a challenge under the dig-
ital trade provisions would not impose such a requirement because 
the measures prohibit restrictions on cross-border data flows or data 
localization measures irrespective of their discriminatory charac-
ter.321 This means that a complainant need not establish discrimina-
tion. Put simply, new digital trade provisions make it easier to chal-
lenge domestic regulation that interferes with digital trade, and make 
the rate of successful challenges much more probable compared to 
challenges under non-discrimination provisions. 
Professor Aaronson puts forward several theoretical arguments 
about why digital protectionism is unlike other form of protection-
                                                                                                             
 316 See supra notes 87 & 88 and accompanying text. 
 317 Aaronson, What We Are Talking About, supra note 35, at 6–7. 
 318 Id. at 6, 8, 17. 
 319 CPTPP, supra note 275, art. 14.11; USMCA, supra note 288, art. 19.11. 
 320 See Marceau & Trachtman, supra note 168, at 358–60. 
 321 See CPTPP, supra note 275, art. 14.11; see also USMCA, supra note 288, 
art. 19.11. 
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ism and calls on the United States to lead in (re)defining “protec-
tionism” for the digital age.322 Her arguments are based on the prem-
ise that information is different from the objects of trade that the 
“old protectionism” is concerned with.323 The discussion above, 
however, shows that this redefinition has already taken place. While 
it seems hard to disagree with the proposition that information is 
different in nature from goods and services, does that difference im-
ply ipso facto that there is a sufficient reason to redefine protection-
ism? This implication is not obvious, as the characteristics that de-
lineate protectionism from protection—the discriminatory intent or 
effect of domestic regulation—are not related to the objects of reg-
ulation. Therefore, the rhetoric presenting the redefinition of “pro-
tectionism” as “digital protectionism” as a logical, necessary step to 
respond to changing circumstances could be self-serving. Put differ-
ently, it could be, just as in the case of “new protectionism,” that the 
emergence of “digital protectionism” is a product of a new digital 
trade discourse—and not the consequence of digital transformation 
of trade—that serves particular business interests and not the 
broader public interest. 
All that said, digital protectionism has already been incorporated 
in several trade agreements—it is here to stay.324 Given that a dif-
ferent conceptualization of digital protectionism has already led to 
diverging and potentially mutually inconsistent digital trade provi-
sions, a consensus on what digital protectionism means is necessary. 
“Digital protectionism” is defined and interpreted within a par-
ticular discourse. It follows that, to be able to reach a consensus on 
the meaning of “digital protectionism,” countries must agree on the 
discourse in the first place. As things stand now, though there is an 
agreement on the use of the terms “digital trade” and “digital pro-
tectionism,” the value structures underlying the discourse are vastly 
different. Using the example of privacy and data protection, Part III 
                                                                                                             
 322 Aaronson, Redefining Protectionism, supra note 237, at 58, 87 (“Scholars 
and policymakers alike need to rethink how we define and measure [digital pro-
tectionism] as well as reconsider the appropriate strategies to address it . . . . 
Given the stakes, the United States should take a leading role in defining protec-
tionism at the World Trade Organization.”). 
 323 Aaronson, What We Are Talking About, supra note 35, at 6–8. 
 324 See, e.g., CPTPP, supra note 275, art. 14.11; USMCA, supra note 288, art. 
19.11; see also HORIZONTAL PROVISIONS FOR CROSS-BORDER DATA FLOWS AND 
FOR PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION, supra note 307, at 1–2. 
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will illustrate how fundamental values on which a discourse is based 
affect the baseline between protection and protectionism. 
III. THE BASELINE BETWEEN PRIVACY PROTECTION AND 
PROTECTIONISM: THE ROLE OF DISCOURSE 
One variant of the digital trade discourse, advanced in particular 
by the United States and demonstrated in Parts II.B and C above, 
tends to equate strict privacy and data protection measures such as 
restrictions on cross-border data flows with a non-tariff trade barrier 
and, potentially, digital protectionism.325 However, even when some 
degree of privacy and data protection are factored into this discourse 
of digital trade, the protection of these interests is often presented as 
an economic necessity, a precondition for free trade rather than a 
fundamental right and societal value beyond its economic utility.326 
It is likely presented as such because the use of the digital protec-
tionism label features trade values as natural and obvious and forces 
policy makers to defend the measure against a baseline of free trade 
as non-protectionist. Regulatory conversations on privacy and data 
protection within the economic digital trade discourse about the 
term “digital protectionism” thus implicitly bring in the normative 
goal of maximization of wealth rather than a set of goals interacting 
with and counterbalancing each other.327 
                                                                                                             
 325 It is, however, often recognized that other legitimate concerns could also 
play a role. See, e.g., Mishra, Data Localization Laws, supra note 224, at 150–52 
(“The contentious issues with respect to data localization extend well beyond free 
trade versus protectionism into some delicate, complex and legitimate political 
concerns, such as technology transfer and IP rights, privacy, human rights, and 
national security, which is currently missing (and expectedly so) on most trade 
agendas.”). Mitchell and Hepburn similarly concede that there might be privacy 
and security concerns behind restrictions on cross-border data flows, but add that 
“digital protectionism may also be at play . . . .” Andrew D. Mitchell & Jarrod 
Hepburn, Don’t Fence Me In: Reforming Trade and Investment Law to Better 
Facilitate Cross-Border Data Transfer, 19 YALE J.L. & TECH. 182, 186 (2017). 
 326 USMCA, supra note 288, art. 19.8; Yakovleva, supra note 197, at 484–85. 
 327 See Driskill, supra note 132, at 2–3 (“[T]he standard argument made by 
economists in favour of free trade . . . implicitly imposes philosophical value 
judgements about what is good for a nation or society, or it makes leaps of empir-
ical faith about how the world works.”). 
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This Part unpacks the differences between economic and legal 
(fundamental rights) approaches to data protection, exposes the lim-
its of the economic discourse on privacy and data protection, and 
calls for a broader multidisciplinary discourse. It argues that, in 
shaping policy about the protection of privacy and personal data be-
yond what is economically justified, it is more likely to be labelled 
as protectionism in an economic discourse than in a multidiscipli-
nary discourse in which the protectionism label loses some of its 
discursive power. 
A. Normative Approaches to Privacy and Data Protection 
There are at least two policy approaches to the protection of pri-
vacy and personal data: (1) an economic approach in which personal 
data is viewed as an economic asset and its protection is a precondi-
tion of data-intensive trade; and (2) a moral value approach in which 
personal data is a materialized form of human behavior and its pro-
tection is directed not to data, but to an individual’s constitutional 
rights.328 While in the first case the normative goal of protection is 
to generate more trade in data, as individuals tend to share more data 
when they believe it is protected,329 in the second case the aim is the 
protection of human dignity, autonomy, and privacy as valuable 
themselves.330 
From an economic perspective, protection of privacy and per-
sonal data has several justifications, of which the creation and 
maintenance of consumers’ trust is most prominently featured in the 
                                                                                                             
 328 See Sarah Spiekermann et al., The Challenges of Personal Data Markets 
and Privacy, 25 ELECTRONIC MKTS. 161, 164 (2015) (“Interpreting personal data 
as a tradable good raises ethical concerns about whether people’s lives, material-
ized in their data traces, should be property at all, or whether in fact personal data 
should be considered inalienable from data subjects.”). 
 329 See, e.g., Alessandro Acquisti et al., Privacy and Human Behavior in the 
Age of Information, 374 SCI. 509, 512–13 (2015) [hereinafter Acquisti et al., Pri-
vacy and Human Behavior] (showing that providing users with explicit control 
mechanisms over their personal data may lead to sharing more sensitive data by 
users). 
 330 See infra note 334 (collecting sources on the goals of the moral approach 
from a broad societal perspective). 
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economic discourse on digital trade.331 This justification is explic-
itly included in the text of several E.U.- and U.S.-led FTAs.332 This 
economic approach serves as a normative rationale for the protec-
tion of personal data as a commercial consumer right in the United 
States.333 
                                                                                                             
 331 See supra Section II.C. Looking at the digital economy as a whole, trust 
meets all the criteria of a public good: it is neither rivalrous nor excludable. With-
out regulation, the market will not produce an optimal amount of trust necessary 
for the digital economy to flourish. On trust as a public good, see generally HANS-
BERND SCHÄFER & CLAUS OTT, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CIVIL LAW 359–60 
(2004); George M. Cohen, The Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract 
Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 941, 976 (1992) (“Economists too have recognized that 
trust is an extremely valuable and vulnerable resource, which the market alone 
cannot be counted on to supply.”). For a discussion on the how privacy protection 
contributes to building trust, see Neil M. Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking 
Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431, 435 (2016); Neil 
Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy’s Trust Gap: A Review, 126 YALE L. J. 
1180, 1185–86 (2017) (reviewing FINN BRUNTON & HELEN NISSENBAUM, 
OBFUSCATION: A USER’S GUIDE FOR PRIVACY AND PROTEST (2015)); Adam N. 
Joinson et al., Privacy, Trust, and Self-Disclosure Online, 25 HUM.–COMPUTER 
INTERACTION 1, 4 (2010). For an overview of other economic justifications of 
privacy protection, see, e.g., Ian Brown, The Economics of Privacy, Data Protec-
tion and Surveillance, in 12 HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNET 
247, 248–56 (Michael Latzer & Johannes M. Bauer, eds., 2016). 
 332 See, e.g., USMCA, supra note 288, art. 19.8(1) (“Personal Information 
Protection— The Parties recognize the economic and social benefits of protecting 
the personal information of users of digital trade and the contribution that this 
makes to enhancing consumer confidence in digital trade.”); see also CPTPP, su-
pra note 275, art. 14.8(1) (a similar provision stating “The Parties recognise the 
economic and social benefits of protecting the personal information of users of 
electronic commerce and the contribution that this makes to enhancing consumer 
confidence in electronic commerce.”); Free Trade Agreement Between the Euro-
pean Union and the Republic of Singapore, E.U.-Sing. art. 8.57(4), Oct. 19, 2018, 
7972/1/18 REV 1; Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-E.U., 
art. 16.4, Oct. 30, 2016, 2017 O.J. (L 11) 23 (entitled “Trust and confidence in 
electronic commerce,” which requires that parties “should adopt or maintain laws, 
regulations or administrative measures for the protection of personal information 
of users engaged in electronic commerce . . . .”). 
 333 See WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: 
FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE 
GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY 6 (2012), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=700959 
(“Preserving trust in the Internet economy protects and enhances substantial eco-
nomic activity. Online retail sales in the United States total $145 billion annu-
ally . . . . To preserve these economic benefits, consumers must continue to trust 
networked technologies. Strengthening consumer data privacy protections will 
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By contrast, the moral value approach views the protection of 
personal data rights from a broad societal perspective as contrib-
uting to the preservation of a free and democratic society, social 
equality, individual autonomy, integrity, and self-determination.334 
In addition, preventing and correcting discriminatory harms caused 
by inappropriate use of personal data can (and should) be seen as a 
matter of social justice.335 
Importantly, these two approaches are not mutually exclusive, 
as economically motivated protection contributes to the protection 
of a fundamental right, and fundamental right protection may have 
positive effects on digital commerce. The European Union is a good 
illustration of how these two approaches can coexist, as it simulta-
neously advances both models in the domestic and international are-
nas.336 In the European Union, a strong economic discourse—in 
which personal data and its protection are presented as enablers of 
the digital single market—is counterbalanced by a fundamental 
                                                                                                             
help to achieve this goal.”). For a comparison of E.U. and U.S. data protection 
regimes, see Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Insti-
tutions and Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966, 1966–67 (2013) [hereinafter 
Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision]; Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, 
Reconciling Personal Information in the United States and European Union, 102 
CALIF. L. REV. 877, 877 (2014) [hereinafter Schwartz, Reconciling Personal In-
formation]. 
 334 See Cécile de Terwangne, Is a Global Data Protection Regulatory Model 
Possible?, in 10 REINVENTING DATA PROTECTION? 175, 180, 185–88 (Serge Gut-
wirth et al. eds., 2009); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy 
and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1423–28 (2000); Paul M. 
Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1658–
66 (1999); Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. 
L. REV. 2056, 2087 (2004); Shoshana Zuboff, Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism 
and the Prospects of an Information Civilization, 30 J. INFO. TECH. 75, 85–86 
(2015); LeSieur, supra note 194, at 94–95, 98. 
 335 See KHIARA M. BRIDGES, THE POVERTY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS 153 (2017) 
(arguing that “denying privacy is a mechanism for social control.”); Linnet Tay-
lor, What Is Data Justice: The Case for Connecting Digital Rights and Freedoms 
Globally, 4 BIG DATA & SOC. 1, 4–8 (2017) (Showing, based on examples of big 
data-driven discrimination, that “a specific articulation of social justice is now 
required with regard to contemporary data technologies.”). 
 336 HORIZONTAL PROVISIONS FOR CROSS-BORDER DATA FLOWS AND FOR 
PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION, supra note 307, art. B(1). 
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rights discourse.337 It is for that reason Professors Radim Polčák and 
Dan Jerker B. Svantesson label the intertwined nature of economic 
and fundamental rights considerations in data privacy a “Gordian 
knot.”338 
In the European Union, privacy and data protection are protected 
as binding fundamental rights.339 The E.U. privacy and data protec-
tion framework, arguably one of the strictest in the world,340 is 
deeply rooted in a European cultural preference for strong privacy 
protection and is viewed as an integral part and key instance of the 
protection of human dignity.341 However, the history of the E.U. 
data protection regime shows that the first E.U. legislative instru-
ment on data protection—the 1995 Data Protection Directive—was 
also undergirded by the goal of establishing a functioning internal 
market, of which the protection of the fundamental rights of individ-
uals to privacy and data protection was a necessary ingredient.342 
Similarly, Article 1 of the GDPR proclaims the protection of per-
sonal data is a fundamental right but also prohibits restrictions on 
                                                                                                             
 337 EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR, OPINION 4/2015, TOWARDS A 
NEW DIGITAL ETHICS DATA, DIGNITY AND TECHNOLOGY 4, 9–10 (Sept. 2015), 
https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/15-09-11_data_ethics_en.pdf. 
 338 RADIM POLČÁK & DAN JERKER B. SVANTESSON, INFORMATION 
SOVEREIGNTY: DATA PRIVACY, SOVEREIGN POWERS AND THE RULE OF LAW 208 
(2017) (“[D]ata privacy involves multiple fundamental human rights – the right 
of privacy and the freedom of expression at a minimum – and significant com-
mercial values. Indeed, maybe we are here dealing with a Gordian knot.”). 
 339 See supra Part II. 
 340 See Mishra, Data Localization Laws, supra note 224, at 140 (“The EU is 
considered to be one of the strictest regimes in the world for data privacy.”). 
 341 See Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 2007 O.J. 
(C 303) 17, 17; EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR, supra note 337, at 
12; Stefano Rodotà, Data Protection as a Fundamental Right, in 3 REINVENTING 
DATA PROTECTION? 77, 80 (Serge Gutwirth et al. eds., 2009); Chris Jay Hoof-
nagle et al., The European Union General Data Protection Regulation: What It Is 
and What It Means, 28 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 65, 69–72 (2019). 
 342 Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 OJ (L 281) 31, 31–
32, 38 [hereinafter Data Protection Directive]. For a discussion, see GLORIA 
GONZÁLEZ FUSTER, THE EMERGENCE OF PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION AS A 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF THE EU 198 (2014); Joris van Hoboken, The European 
Approach to Privacy 5 (Aug. 28, 2014) (unpublished 2014 TPRC Conference Pa-
per), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2418636. 
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the free movement of data within the European Union.343 Recital 4 
of the GDPR reconciles the economic and fundamental rights objec-
tives of data protection, stating that, “[t]he processing of personal 
data should be designed to serve mankind.”344 That is, the funda-
mental right to data protection should be balanced with other funda-
mental rights, including the right to conduct a business enshrined in 
Article 16 of the E.U. Charter.345 
E.U. data protection reforms that led to the adoption of the 
GDPR were one of the pillars of the Digital Single Market project, 
presented by the European Commission as the key for making the 
European Union thrive in the emerging global data economy.346 It 
is crucial, the Commission noted, to “enable the free flow of per-
sonal data within the Union, from which the critical mass of data 
essential for a strong data economy can be generated.”347 This rhet-
oric is clearly linked to the neoliberal internal and external policy 
discourse of the European Commission discussed above.348 At the 
same time, the Commission acknowledged the following: 
[r]espect for private life and the protection of 
personal data are fundamental rights in the EU . . . . 
Strong data protection, confidentiality of 
communications and data security are crucial to 
dispel individuals’ doubts about misuse of their data 
and to create trust. Without this trust, the potential of 
a thriving data economy will not be met.349 
                                                                                                             
 343 GDPR, supra note 198, art. 1. 
 344 Id. recital 4. 
 345 Id.; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, supra note 188, art. 16. 
 346 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Eu-
ropean Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and 
the Committee of the Regions, Completing a Trusted Digital Single Market for 
All, at 2–3, COM (2018) 320 final (May 15, 2018) [hereinafter Communication 
on Completing a Trusted Digital Single Market]. 
 347 Id. at 4. 
 348 See supra Section II.B. 
 349 Communication on Completing a Trusted Digital Single Market, supra 
note 346, at 2–3 (emphasis added). Similarly, in the explanatory memorandum to 
the proposal for the GDPR, the European Commission notes, on the one hand, 
that building a stronger and more coherent data protection framework in the Eu-
ropean Union is essential for building the pan-European digital economy, and, on 
the other hand, emphasizes the protection of the right to protection of personal 
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In a similar vein, the European Union’s most recent standard 
clause on cross-border data flows discussed above provides that “the 
protection of personal data and privacy is a fundamental right and 
that high standards in this regard contribute to trust in the digital 
economy and to the development of trade.”350 This illustrates that 
the Commission does not separate the economic and moral ap-
proaches to privacy and data protection and seems to assign equal 
importance to each. 
In contrast to the European Commission, the CJEU has 
grounded the E.U. restrictions on cross-border transfers of personal 
data in the international context solely on a fundamental rights ba-
sis.351 This notwithstanding the fact that Chapter V of the GDPR, 
which regulates such transfers—as well as previously the same rules 
in the Data Protection Directive—are, in theory, guided by the exact 
same economic and non-economic rationales envisaged in Article 1 
of the GDPR.352 As the CJEU explained in the 2015 Schrems ruling, 
which invalidated the E.U.-U.S. Safe Harbor framework for com-
mercial personal data transfers,353 limitations on transfers of per-
sonal data outside the EEA constitute a part of the European Union’s 
“constitutional” data protection framework and are necessary to 
                                                                                                             
data as a fundamental right. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Pro-
cessing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data 
Protection Regulation), at 2, COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012). 
 350 See HORIZONTAL PROVISIONS FOR CROSS-BORDER DATA FLOWS AND FOR 
PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION, supra note 307, art. B (emphasis added). 
 351 Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 EUR-Lex 
62014CJ0362, ¶ 38–39, 42 (Oct. 6, 2015). 
 352 See GDPR, supra note 198, art. 1 & ch. V; Data Protection Directive, supra 
note 342, at 33–34, 36–37. 
 353 The EU-U.S. Safe Harbor was the European Commission’s decision rec-
ognizing the “adequacy” of the U.S. data protection in the meaning of the EU 
Data Protection Directive. See Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 Pursuant to 
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Ade-
quacy of the Protection Provided by the Safe Harbour Privacy Principles and Re-
lated Frequently Asked Questions Issued by the US Department of Commerce art. 
2, 2000 O.J. (L 215), 7, 9. After its invalidation, the framework was replaced by 
the “EU-U.S. Privacy Shield.” See Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 
2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 Pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Par-
liament and of the Council on the Adequacy of the Protection Provided by the 
EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, 2016 O.J. (L 207) 1, 3. 
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avoid circumvention of the E.U. data protection framework. 354 This 
ruling, adopted in the aftermath of the famous Snowden revelations, 
embodied the European discontent with U.S. foreign surveillance 
practices.355 
Although the European Union embraces both economic and 
moral value approaches to the protection of privacy and personal 
data, the latter will always prevail because the European Union may 
neither conclude nor implement through an E.U. legislative act an 
international agreement or decision of an international adjudicating 
body if it does not comply with the E.U. Charter.356 This matters 
because, although the economic and moral value rationales are com-
plementary, the crucial difference between them is, as the next Sec-
tion elaborates, that economic justification warrants a lower level of 
protection than the moral value one. 
                                                                                                             
 354 In the Schrems ruling, the CJEU stated that “[the adequacy requirement] 
implements the express obligation laid down in Article 8(1) of the Charter to pro-
tect personal data and . . . is intended to ensure that the high level of that protec-
tion continues where personal data is transferred to a third country.” Schrems, 
2015 EUR-Lex 62014CJ0362, at ¶ 72 (referring to Article 25(6) of the Data Pro-
tection Directive). However, this does not affect the analysis because Article 45 
of the GDPR preserved the essential features of the adequacy approach. See 
GDPR, supra note 198, art. 45; see also LEE A. BYGRAVE, DATA PROTECTION 
LAW: APPROACHING ITS RATIONALE, LOGIC AND LIMITS 79–80 (2002) (“The 
chief aim of these rules is to hinder data controllers from avoiding the require-
ments of data protection laws by shifting their data-processing operations to coun-
tries with more lenient requirements (so-called ‘data havens’).”). This approach 
is now explicitly incorporated in Article 44 of the GDPR, which requires that the 
limitations on transfers of personal data outside the EEA “shall be applied in order 
to ensure that the level of protection of natural persons guaranteed by [the GDPR] 
is not undermined.” GDPR, supra note 198, art. 44. 
 355 See Kuner, Data Nationalism, supra note 222, at 2092 (“The transfer of 
national borders to the online space reflects society’s ambivalence about the ben-
efits and drawbacks of globalization: on the one hand we have grown accustomed 
to the global availability of goods and services, but on the other hand we are un-
settled by the breakdown of barriers that seems to threaten our national and re-
gional identities. The Snowden revelations and other recent developments have 
increased the pace and intensity of these anxieties, but the deep-seated nature of 
these concerns shows the importance of developing an underlying normative 
framework to address them.”). 
 356 Arianna Vedaschi, Privacy and Data Protection Versus National Security 
in Transnational Flights: The EU-Canada PNR Agreement, 8 INT’L DATA 
PRIVACY L. 124, 138–39 (2018). 
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B. Limitations of the Economic Approach to Privacy and Data 
Protection 
There are at least two problems with fitting privacy and data pro-
tection’s non-economic value (as opposed to the economic value of 
ensuring consumers’ trust in digital trade) into the economic digital 
trade discourse. 
First, non-economic interests in general are difficult to quantify 
for use in the wealth maximization calculus; it is not always possible 
to find convincing proof justifying the economic necessity of ensur-
ing a certain level of privacy and data protection.357 Although some 
empirical research exists examining the costs of insufficient privacy 
protection,358 the aspects of privacy protection contributing to con-
sumers’ trust in digital ecosystems,359 and the value (or price) of 
privacy,360 such research has an inherent limitation: privacy and per-
                                                                                                             
 357 See IRWIN, supra note 50, at 221 (showing that empirical evidence “either 
played virtually no role” or “played a small and unproductive role . . . in evaluat-
ing the substance of an economic argument for protection” and that, rather, the 
debate about these issues was a “conceptual debate over economic logic . . . .”). 
 358 For empirical research attempting to quantify the chilling effects of gov-
ernmental surveillance see, e.g., PEN AM. CTR., CHILLING EFFECTS: NSA 
SURVEILLANCE DRIVES U.S. WRITERS TO SELF-CENSOR 3 (2013); Jonathon W. 
Penney, Chilling Effects: Online Surveillance and Wikipedia Use, 31 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 117, 145–61 (2016); Alex Marthews & Catherine Tucker, Government 
Surveillance and Internet Search Behavior 2–3 (Mar. 15, 2017) (unpublished pa-
per) (https://ssrn.com/abstract=2412564). 
 359 See, e.g., WORLD ECON. FORUM, RETHINKING PERSONAL DATA: A NEW 
LENS FOR STRENGTHENING TRUST 21 (2014), http://www3.wefo-
rum.org/docs/WEF_RethinkingPersonalData_ANewLens_Report_2014.pdf. 
 360 See, e.g., NICOLA JENTZSCH ET AL., EUROPEAN NETWORK & INFO. SEC. 
AGENCY, STUDY ON MONETISING PRIVACY: AN ECONOMIC MODEL FOR PRICING 
PERSONAL INFORMATION 1 (2012); Alessandro Acquisti et al., What Is Privacy 
Worth? 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 250 (2013); Dan Cvrcek et al., A Study on the 
Value of Location Privacy, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH ACM WORKSHOP ON 
PRIVACY IN ELECTRONIC SOCIETY 109, 110 (2006), https://dl.acm.org/cita-
tion.cfm?id=1179621; Bernardo A. Huberman et al., Valuating Privacy: The 
Value of Privacy, IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, Sept.–Oct. 2005, at 22, 22; Tamara 
Dinev & Paul Hart, An Extended Privacy Calculus Model for E-Commerce Trans-
actions, 17 INFO. SYS. RES. 61, 61 (2006); Luc Wathieu & Allan Friedman, An 
Empirical Approach to Understanding Privacy Valuation 1–2 (Harvard Bus. Sch., 
Working Paper No. 07-075, 2007). 
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sonal data protection cannot be precisely estimated because consum-
ers’ valuation of privacy is highly context-dependent and prone to 
behavioral biases.361 
The second problem is that even if privacy and personal data 
protection can be priced, an “optimal” level of protection from an 
economic perspective, as the Article argues below, will be lower 
than the optimal level of such protection determined from the legal 
(fundamental right) approach to privacy and data protection, be-
cause the economic calculus does not factor in the intrinsic value of 
privacy and data protection as a fundamental right. 
From an economic perspective, the line between data protection 
as a precondition of trade and as a trade barrier should be drawn 
based on the considerations of efficiency—arguably the key bench-
mark for evaluating any policy measure.362 Efficiency is defined as 
the maximization of social welfare,363 where social welfare is the 
aggregated welfare of individual members of society.364 There is no 
consensus on how to define welfare; money or utility are the most 
                                                                                                             
 361 See Acquisti et al., What Is Privacy Worth?, supra note 360, at 252 (chal-
lenging the premise that privacy valuations can be precisely estimated based on 
theories from behavioural economics and decision research); id. at 257 (“The di-
chotomy between [willingness to pay] and [willingness to accept payment] . . . 
suggests that ordinary studies investigating privacy valuations may not tell us 
much about whether, or how much, consumers will actually pay to protect their 
data.”); see also Acquisti et al., Privacy and Human Behavior, supra note 329, at 
505–10; Maria C. Wasastjerna, The Role of Big Data and Digital Privacy in Mer-
ger Review, 14 EUR. COMPETITION J. 417, 436 (2018) (stating that privacy lacks 
quantifiable metrics due to the subjectivity of consumer preferences about pri-
vacy). 
 362 See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 2 
(2004) [hereinafter SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS]; SCHÄFER & OTT, supra note 331, 
at 46–47; Francesco Parisi, Positive, Normative and Functional Schools in Law 
and Economics, 18 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 259, 262 (2004). Empirical research shows 
that people are more willing to share their information and participate in digital 
transactions if they trust the provider. See, e.g., Janice Y. Tsai et al., The Effect of 
Online Privacy Information on Purchasing Behavior: An Experimental Study, 22 
INFO. SYS. RES. 254, 266 (2011); see also Joinson et al., supra note 331, at 4–5, 
17 (2010). 
 363 See SCHÄFER & OTT, supra note 331, at 8; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 14–15 (9th ed. 2014). 
 364 See SCHÄFER & OTT, supra note 331, at 8. 
2020] PRIVACY PROTECTION(ISM) 509 
 
widely-used proxies to evaluate welfare and suggest the most opti-
mal regulatory option.365 In their well-known Harvard Law Review 
article Fairness Versus Welfare, Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell 
introduce one of the most comprehensive definitions of “welfare” 
that incorporates “in a positive way everything that an individual 
might value,” including a taste for fairness, and in a negative way 
anything that the “individual might find distasteful.”366 However, 
even this inclusive understanding of welfare does not (and should 
not, according to Kaplow and Shavell) include the notion of fairness 
as a value in itself.367 Kaplow and Shavell emphasize that welfare, 
defined in this way, should be the sole concern of legal policy mak-
ers; they criticize the legal method, which views fairness as an inde-
pendent evaluative principle that should be upheld even at the ex-
pense of individuals’ well-being, because it can sometimes lead to a 
decrease of social welfare and make society worse-off. 368 Similarly, 
                                                                                                             
 365 See Marco Fabbri & Diogo G.C. Britto, Distributive Justice, Public Poli-
cies and the Comparison of Legal Rules: Quantify the “Price of Equity”, 14 REV. 
L. & ECON. 1, 8 (2018) (noting that welfare economics theory traditionally max-
imizes utility, while law and economics tends to prefer using wealth as the object 
of maximization.”); Heico Kerkmeester, Methodology: General, in 0400 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS VOLUME I: THE HISTORY AND 
METHODOLOGY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 386–87 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Ger-
rit De Geest eds., 2000); Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization Revisited, 2 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 85, 86–87 (1985). 
 366 Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 961, 980–82 (2001) (“The notion of well-being . . . incorporates in a positive 
way everything that an individual might value—goods and services that the indi-
vidual can consume, social and environmental amenities, personally held notions 
of fulfillment, sympathetic feelings for others, and so forth. Similarly, an individ-
ual’s well-being reflects in a negative way harms to his or her person and property, 
costs and inconveniences, and anything else that the individual might find dis-
tasteful. Well-being is not restricted to hedonistic and materialistic enjoyment or 
to any other named class of pleasures and pains. The only limit on what is included 
in well-being is to be found in the minds of individuals themselves, not in the 
minds of analysts . . . .We further note a particular source of well-being . . . , 
namely, the possibility that individuals have a taste for a notion of fairness, just 
as they may have a taste for art, nature, or fine wine.”). 
 367 Id. at 1011–17. Kaplow and Shavell succinctly summarize the argument: 
“whenever a notion of fairness leads one to choose a different rule from that fa-
vored under welfare economics, everyone is necessarily worse off as a result.” Id. 
at 1012. 
 368 Id. at 967 (stating, as their central claim, that “the welfare-based normative 
approach should be exclusively employed in the evaluating legal rules. That is, 
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the economic approach is unable to fully capture the moral value of 
personal data protection as a fundamental right.369 
A data protection policy designed with both economic and non-
economic considerations in mind arguably should ensure a higher 
level of personal data protection than one designed with only eco-
nomic efficiency considerations in mind.370 Put differently, the goal 
of privacy and personal data protection predetermines, in part, both 
the desired optimal level of protection and the design of the regula-
tory framework.371 If the goal is economic and instrumental, then it 
is justified only to the extent necessary to generate and preserve con-
sumers’ trust (“bottom-up regulation design”).372 Driven by their 
bottom lines, companies will only invest in privacy and data protec-
tion up to the point where marginal costs of generating more trust 
will equal marginal benefits.373 The problem is that trust is a subjec-
tive notion: the subjective level of consumer trust that is sufficient 
for consumers to enter into digital transactions does not always ac-
curately reflect the actual trustworthiness of digital businesses, as 
consumers may not have full information or understanding on how 
well their personal data is actually protected by the company.374 This 
                                                                                                             
legal rules should be selected entirely with respect to their effects on the well-
being of individuals in society.”). 
 369 See Wolfgang Kerber, Digital Markets, Data, and Privacy: Competition 
Law, Consumer Law and Data Protection, 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 856, 
857 (2016) (“[E]conomic analysis usually focusses on welfare effects alone, 
which might not always grasp sufficiently the normative dimension of privacy as 
a fundamental right.”); see also Alessandro Acquisti, The Economics of Personal 
Data and the Economics of Privacy, Background Paper #3, at 4, in JOINT WPISP-
WPIE ROUNDTABLE, THE ECONOMICS OF PERSONAL DATA AND PRIVACY: 30 
YEARS AFTER THE OECD PRIVACY GUIDELINES (2010), 
https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/46968784.pdf (arguing that not all externali-
ties caused by the use of personal data can be captured in economic terms); Ac-
quisti et al., Privacy and Human Behavior, supra note 329, at 509. 
 370 See Acquisti et al., Privacy and Human Behavior, supra note 329, at 509. 
 371 See Kerber, supra note 369, at 863–64. 
 372 Sandra J. Milberg et al., Information Privacy: Corporate Management and 
National Regulation, 11 ORG. SCI., 35, 49 (2000); Yakovleva, supra note 197, at 
483. 
 373 See Kerber, supra note 369, at 865. 
 374 See Acquisti et al., Privacy and Human Behavior, supra note 329, at 512–
13 (showing that the perceived and the actual levels of privacy may not coincide, 
and that providing users with explicit control mechanisms over their personal data 
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means that by pursuing their strategic self-interest, companies may 
not necessarily improve the actual trustworthiness of their digital 
goods or services.375 In contrast, if the protection is granted for its 
own sake as independent normative significance (“top-down regu-
latory design”), the level of protection will tend to be higher than the 
level that is necessary to advance social welfare from the welfare 
economics perspective.376 
In sum, the protection of personal data as a fundamental right is 
a type of protection that is not necessarily efficiency-enhancing in 
an economic sense, but it can create both economic and non-eco-
nomic effects beneficial for society at large. Setting economic the-
ory and models as the proper realm of the discourse (and thus eco-
nomic efficiency as the proper benchmark) skews the outcome.377 
An emphasis on efficiency brands a broader range of domestic pol-
icies as protectionist. 
When it comes to cross-border transfers of personal data, eco-
nomic efficiency (or maximization gains from international digital 
trade) is not the only goal of protection or restrictions.378 Even if 
limitations on personal data transfers, such as those imposed by the 
European Union, do factually restrict trade, a country may well be 
willing to sacrifice some of the gains to protect its constitutional, 
cultural, or societal values.379 As Bhagwati rightly acknowledged, 
                                                                                                             
may lead to sharing more sensitive data by users); see also Joinson et al., supra 
note 331, at 16–17. 
 375 See RODRIK, supra note 11, at 227 (“Corporations, after all, are motivated 
by the bottom line. They may be willing to invest in social and environmental 
projects if doing so buys them customers’ goodwill. Yet we shouldn’t assume 
their motives align closely with those of society at large, nor exaggerate their will-
ingness to advance societal agendas. The most fundamental objection to labelling 
and other market-based approaches is that they overlook the social dimension of 
standard-setting.”). 
 376 SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 362, at 610. Shavell illustrates the 
point by the following example: “[I]f promise-keeping is granted independent sig-
nificance, more promises will be kept than would be best if the goal were to keep 
promises only to advance individuals’ utilities, and whatever utility-based meas-
ure of social welfare one endorses will likely be lower than it could be.” Id.; Ya-
kovleva, supra note 197, at 483. 
 377 See Acquisti et al., Privacy and Human Behavior, supra note 329, at 509. 
 378 See Kuner, Data Nationalism, supra note 222, at 2097. 
 379 Kuner makes a similar point. See id. at 2096 (arguing that the central ques-
tion that the criticism of the economic effects of data nationalism asks is: “[W]hat 
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when non-economic objectives, such as valuation in themselves of 
specific policy objectives, enter the scene, “free trade will generally 
cease to be the optimal solution.”380 Moreover, a country’s interna-
tional trade policy cannot be viewed in clinical isolation from other 
domestic policies and objectives. Just like all other policies, it is (or 
at least should be) guided by a common set of normative values of 
governmental policy in general, normative goals that are typically 
safeguarded by domestic constitutions.381 For the European Union, 
these principles are those contained in Article 3(5) and Article 21 of 
the Treaty on European Union and include the universality and in-
divisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the con-
tribution to their protection, as well as respect for human dignity and 
for principles of the United Nations and international law.382 It is 
beyond cavil that societies and governments have goals other than 
welfare.383 Susan Strange argued that efficiency is only one of the 
four basic values pursued by a politically organized society—
wealth, order, justice and freedom—and in all politically organized 
societies these values will be combined differently and lead to dif-
ferent outcomes.384 
                                                                                                             
if a country has decided that it wants to sacrifice a certain amount of economic 
efficiency in exchange for promoting other legitimate values that it believes are 
furthered by data nationalism?”). 
 380 Bhagwati, Fair Trade, supra note 97, at 19 (arguing that “[w]hen ‘non-
economic’ objectives (such as the valuation in themselves of specific outputs such 
as manufactures or high-tech industry so that a dollar worth of output is valued at 
four, for instance) are admitted into the analysis, free trade will generally cease to 
be the optimal solution.”) (emphasis added). 
 381 See Kuner, Data Nationalism, supra note 222, at 2097. 
 382 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union arts. 3.5, 21, Oct. 
26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) [hereinafter TEU]. 
 383 Strange, supra note 28, at 236 (“The basic premise that state policy should, 
or even can, be based on the single criterion of maximizing efficiency in the pro-
duction of goods and services for the market is demonstrably false.”). 
 384 Id. at 237 (“Efficiency, in short, is only one of four basic values that any 
politically organized society seeks to achieve for its members. Wealth, order, jus-
tice, and freedom; these are the basic elements of political compounds just as hy-
drogen, oxygen, and carbon are the essential elements of some chemical com-
pounds. And just as chemical elements can be combined differently to produce 
oil, wood, or potatoes, so basic values will be combined differently in all politi-
cally organized societies to produce, for example, fast-growing authoritarian 
states or slow-growing democracies, or conversely, fast-growing democracies or 
slow-growing police states.”); see also POLČÁK & SVANTESSON, supra note 338, 
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The E.U. data protection framework—a result of a difficult po-
litical compromise of, at that time, twenty eight-member states with 
distinct cultures and values—may not be the best regulation, but reg-
ulation can never be perfect.385 In a narrow effects-based definition 
of “protectionism” generated by neoliberal discourse, the E.U. 
framework indeed may be viewed as protectionist due to its restric-
tive effects on international trade.386 However, because of the limi-
tations of the economic discourse, this framework is not appropriate 
when fundamental rights are at stake.387 A neoliberal conception of 
protectionism that once drove the world trading system towards 
globalization has reached a turning point where it has become a vic-
tim of its own success.388 A new multidisciplinary discourse is nec-
essary in order to allow each trading party to strike the right balance 
between globalization (economic gains from digital trade and the 
right to conduct business), democratic politics, and domestic auton-
omy to pursue domestic values such as fundamental rights to privacy 
and data protection.389 
Yet, European integration and the resulting economic power of 
the European Union is not only an inward-looking effort, but to a 
large extent also an outward-looking strategy: while it improves in-
ternal trade within the European Union, it also improves European 
Union’s negotiating positions in external economic relations and ne-
gotiations of international treaties.390 It also contributes to the ex-
pansion of European standards and values around the world, a phe-
nomenon labelled by Anu Bradford as the “Brussels Effect.”391 The 
                                                                                                             
at 209 (“While the Internet is often seen as borderless in nature and global in 
scope, the physical work and the people that inhabit that world are still divided by 
fundamentally different cultures and values; and even where common values are 
found, those values are weighted in different ways.”). 
 385 See Mira Burri & Rachel Schär, The Reform of the EU Data Protection 
Framework: Outlining Key Changes and Assessing Their Fitness for a Data-
Driven Economy, 6 J. INFO. POL’Y 479, 488–89 (2016). 
 386 GLOBAL DIGITAL TRADE 1, supra note 214, at 276. 
 387 Burri & Schär, supra note 385, at 500. 
 388 RODRIK, supra note 11, at xvii–xviii. 
 389 Id. at 200 (pointing at a “fundamental political trilemma of the world econ-
omy,” meaning that it is impossible to simultaneously pursue democracy, national 
self-determination, and hyper-globalization). 
 390 See Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 47–48 
(2012). 
 391 See id. 
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European privacy and data protection framework was not only 
driven by the constitutional concerns of ensuring a high degree of 
protection of personal data, but also by a desire to strengthen the 
European single market.392 The presence of an economic rationale 
for unification of data protection rules in the European Union, how-
ever, does not diminish the fact that the level of data protection guar-
anteed by the unified rules is a projection of Europeans’ vision of 
governance and cultural values.393 
Although U.S. law does recognize, to some extent, the value of 
protecting privacy, such protection tends to be anchored in the com-
mercial sphere (aimed at protecting consumer welfare) rather than 
constitutional rights;394 the legal weight of such protection is thus 
lower than, say, that of the constitutional right to freedom of expres-
sion.395 Recall, in addition, that a more liberal approach to data pro-
tection in the United States not only echoes U.S. cultural values, but 
                                                                                                             
 392 See id. at 44–46. 
 393 See Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy 
Rules in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1319–20 (2000) [hereinafter 
Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in 
Cyberspace] (“[S]pecific privacy rules in any particular country have a govern-
ance function reflecting the country’s choices regarding the roles of the state, mar-
ket, and individual in the country’s democratic structure. Under this governance 
theory of privacy, national differences derive from distinct visions of governance, 
and privacy rules strive to protect a state’s norm of governance, whether it be a 
liberal market norm or a socially-protective, citizen’s rights norm.”); see also 
Milberg et al., supra note 372, at 47 (based on the empirical study of samples from 
nineteen different countries, the authors concluded that “[a] country’s cultural 
values are associated strongly with the privacy concerns that are exhibited by its 
populace (Hypothesis 1) and are associated marginally with its regulatory 
approach (Hypothesis 2).”). 
 394 See Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules 
in Cyberspace, supra note 393, at 1318. 
 395 Schwartz & Solove, supra note 333, at 880–81 (stating that the right to 
privacy in the United States “may even be secondary to other concerns, such as 
freedom of speech.”); see also Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision, supra 
note 333, at 1976–77 (“The First Amendment’s protections for freedom of ex-
pression . . . help define the U.S. orientation to privacy regulation.”). Although in 
some cases the First Amendment can “bolster privacy,” most of the time it is used 
to limit privacy: “statutes that limit information sharing on privacy grounds are 
subject to constitutional scrutiny of their impact on the speech of the data proces-
sor.” Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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also factors in the U.S. strategy of preserving global dominance in 
the information technology industry.396 
To sum up, the core of the debate between the European Union 
and its trading partners is not about whether the protection of pri-
vacy and personal data is legitimate as such, but rather about what 
level of protection is legitimate. As differences in data protection 
approaches, including to the issue of cross-border transfers of per-
sonal data, are fundamentally rooted in a delicate balance between 
different values pursued by a politically organized society, a related 
question is whether international trade should be tasked with the 
mission to reduce or remove this diversity, and if so, how to deter-
mine the “right” level of protection and of deference to domestic 
interests and values. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS: TOWARDS A NEW DIGITAL TRADE REGIME 
This Article has argued that the choice of the right discourse for 
policy conversations on domestic privacy and the protection of per-
sonal data in the context of international trade negotiations is cru-
cial. The discourse and value structures coming with it will ulti-
mately predetermine where the line will be drawn between legiti-
mate privacy and personal data protection and illegitimate protec-
tionism, both in the relevant provisions of international trade agree-
ments and in the interpretation of such provisions by trade adjudi-
cating bodies. 
Deliberations on the distinction between protection and protec-
tionism show that it is not clear-cut: drawing a line beyond which 
protection should be viewed as protectionism is ultimately a judge-
ment call.397 On a spectrum between the two extremes, there is a 
                                                                                                             
 396 See supra Section II.D. 
 397 Cf. Marceau & Trachtman, supra note 168, at 352 (“The distinction be-
tween a protectionist measure—condemned for imposing discriminatory or un-
justifiable costs—and a non-protectionist measure restricting trade incidentally 
(and thus imposing some costs) is sometimes difficult to make.”); see Sykes, su-
pra note 50, at 33 (“[I]t is exceedingly difficult to devise a workable and palatable 
legal rule to condemn regulatory measures that are necessary to nonprotectionist 
regulatory goals but that are nevertheless undesirable because of their trade im-
pact. As a result, this task is left to case-by-case bargaining.”); see also Robert 
Howse, Regulatory Measures, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION 441–43 (Martin Daunton et al., eds., 2012) (“Regulations 
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gray area that includes domestic measures with an element of uncer-
tainty as to what type of regulatory goal is at stake: protectionism in 
disguise or genuine protection, which only incidentally benefits do-
mestic industries.398 Whether measures in this gray area should fall 
under the label of “protection” or “protectionism”—in other words, 
whether trade adjudicating bodies should err on the side of protec-
tion or protectionism—essentially depends on the discourse. Within 
an economic discourse, where free trade alone is high on the values 
scale, such regulation should be excluded as protectionist. In con-
trast, in a multidisciplinary discourse where equal values are as-
signed to free trade and protection of fundamental rights, letting 
some disguised protectionist measures sift through in order to safe-
guard domestic autonomy to adopt socially beneficial regulation 
may be a preferred approach. 
This Article contends that the distinction between privacy and 
personal data protection and protectionism is in part a moral ques-
tion, that is, not just a question of economic efficiency. Therefore, 
when a policy conversation, such as the one on cross-border flows 
of personal data, involves non-economic spill-over effects to indi-
vidual rights, such conversation should not be confined within the 
straightjacket of trade economics, but rather placed in a broader nor-
mative perspective. The economic digital trade discourse, advanced 
by some states, most notably the United States, and reflected in the 
recently concluded CPTPP and USMCA, as this Article claims, sub-
ordinates non-economic values, such as the protection of privacy 
and personal data as moral values, to efficiency and sometimes to 
fuzzy welfare enhancement goals.399 As a result, only an economi-
cally justified—and lower—level of privacy and data protection, as 
                                                                                                             
serve diverse objectives and reflect compromises between different groups. In 
such circumstances, it is not simple to draw a line between internal policies that 
are legitimate exercises of domestic regulatory autonomy (even if they have some 
trade-restrictive effects) and those that can be considered a form of protectionism 
or ‘cheating’ on the WTO bargain, in that they undermine the market access rea-
sonably expected from commitments on liberalization of border measures in the 
multilateral trading system.”); Howse, From Politics to Technocracy, supra note 
38, at 96. 
 398 Marceau & Trachtman, supra note 168, at 352. 
 399 Additionally, these goals often do not reflect negative externalities of eco-
nomic growth (e.g., environmental degradation) and thus take a narrow view of 
“welfare.” 
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compared to that warranted by a multidisciplinary discourse, is able 
to qualify as not protectionist.400 In the Author’s opinion, the polit-
ical economy arguments against privacy and data protection beyond 
economic necessity should be taken with a grain of salt, precisely 
because those who are putting them forward may themselves be suf-
fering from capture by those profiting from unrestricted cross-bor-
der data flows. 
In a global perspective, the inchoate use of the terms “protec-
tionism” and “digital protectionism” in different discourses by the 
European Union and the United States exposes a deeper challenge 
of the present day multilateral trade negotiations.401 Having chosen 
digital protectionism as the main stumbling stone on the path of dig-
ital trade, trading partners focus more on the labels and their defini-
tion, while shying away from more fundamental questions about the 
goals and values of future (digital) trade.402 The Author believes that 
this path is misguided: there exist as many definitions of (digital) 
protectionism as there are discourses, which the E.U. and U.S. ex-
amples clearly demonstrate. Using the same terminology, these trad-
ing partners advance utterly different discourses built upon different 
views on where the balance between trade and privacy should be 
struck. Against this backdrop, the Article contends that countries 
should rethink the goals of international trade for the twenty-first 
century.403 Such goals should determine and define the discourse, 
not the other way around. A consensus on the discourse and under-
lying values is essential for the ongoing multilateral negotiations on 
digital trade to succeed. The discussion should be not about what 
protectionism means but rather about how far domestic regimes are 
willing to let trade rules interfere in their autonomy to protect their 
societal, cultural, and political values. Protectionism should be de-
fined based on the outcome of this discussion. 
On the subject of restrictions on cross-border flows of personal 
data, the Author is of the opinion that such restrictions are, and will 
remain, necessary. Unless approaches to data protection and privacy 
are harmonized, which is not the road to take because of differences 
and lack of (political) basis for such harmonization (plus risks of 
                                                                                                             
 400 See supra Section II.E. 
 401 See supra Part II. 
 402 See supra Part II. 
 403 See LANG, AFTER NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 353. 
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becoming the lowest common denominator), countries need more 
regulatory space to determine the design of domestic data protection 
regimes. It is precisely because data protection standards in other 
countries are low (perhaps, strategically low) that countries with 
higher standards need to impose restrictions on data transfers.404 
When it comes to the consequences of removing restrictions on 
cross-border flows of personal data on domestic privacy and data 
protection regimes and the ways to avert them, one could draw a 
parallel with restrictions on financial data flows, which are essential 
to ensure financial stability in a country. Harvard’s Dani Rodrik has 
eloquently argued the following: 
Financial globalization in effect neutralizes differ-
ences in national regulations. This is what is known 
in the trade as “regulatory arbitrage,” a race to the 
bottom in finance. For this reason, a commitment to 
regulatory diversity has a very important corollary: 
the need for restrictions on global finance . . . Gov-
ernments should be able to keep banks and financial 
flows out—not for financial protectionism but to pre-
vent the erosion of national regulations . . . .Hence a 
new global financial order must be constructed on the 
back of a minimal set of international guidelines and 
with limited international coordination . . . .Most im-
portant, the rules would explicitly recognize govern-
ments’ right to limit cross-border financial transac-
tions, insofar as the intent and effect are to prevent 
                                                                                                             
 404 On the prospects of harmonizing data protection regimes, see, e.g., Milberg 
et al., supra note 372, at 53 (“What will or will not meet ‘societal expectations’ is 
highly contingent on a society itself . . . . Thus, a universal regulatory approach to 
information privacy seems unlikely and would ignore cultural and societal differ-
ences.”); see also Christopher Kuner, Regulation of Transborder Data Flows Un-
der Data Protection and Privacy Law: Past, Present, and Future, in OECD 
DIGITAL ECONOMY PAPERS NO. 187, at 8 (2011); PERRY KELLER, EUROPEAN AND 
INTERNATIONAL MEDIA LAW: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY, TRADE, AND THE NEW 
MEDIA 348–51 (2011). But see Aaditya Mattoo & Joshua P. Meltzer, Interna-
tional Data Flows and Privacy: The Conflict and Its Resolution, 21 J. INT’L ECON. 
L. 769, 769 (2018) (arguing that a common privacy framework could be based on 
the OECD and APEC data protection frameworks). 
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foreign competition from less strict jurisdictions 
from undermining domestic regulatory standards.405 
This line of reasoning, in the Author’s view, applies equally to 
restrictions on cross-border transfers of personal data. Deep harmo-
nization of domestic privacy and data protection standards would 
also require a more extensive form of global governance. Whether 
this is the path to take is a separate question, far beyond the issue of 
cross-border data flows and beyond the scope of this Article. 
                                                                                                             
 405 See RODRIK, supra note 11, at 263–65. 
